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Abstract 
 
Is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), defined as the commitment of business to 
contribute to sustainable development and take responsibility for their impacts on society, 
coherent with Private Equity? To answer this question, the Chapter 1 of this Ph.D. dissertation 
surveys the literature on the economic determinants of CSR behaviors and its impacts on 
market structure, economic performance and society. Chapter 2 then tackles how firms can 
both succeed on profitability and sustainability levels and shows that the diverse policies 
encompassed in CSR do not equally matter to do well and do good. Chapter 3 empirically 
assesses where the French Private Equity industry stands in terms of CSR integration, and 
why. Responsible investment practices spread among mainstream Private Equity investors, 
characterized by a specific investor engagement and strategically driven by a need for new 
value creation sources, increased risk management and differentiation. Chapter 4 uses 
signaling theory to ask whether CSR could be used by Private Equity investors to better select 
their investments. It presents a money-burning investment game and experimentally tests it 
comparing a public good signal to a standard advertising signal. Results indicate that CSR 
does not improve firm selection, but it does not perfectly substitute to standard money-
burning signals and impacts equilibrium selection. Finally, Chapter 5 turns to professional 
Private Equity investors to quantify the impact sustainable and unsustainable corporate 
practices have on equity financing in a unique field experiment. An asymmetric effect is 
observed, entrepreneurs having more to loose from unsustainable practices than to gain from 
sustainable ones. The dissertation concludes by discussing main results, implications for the 
Private Equity industry and public policies, and the limits and possible extensions of this 
research. 
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Résumé 
 
La Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE), définie comme l’engagement des entreprises 
à contribuer au développement durable et à assumer la responsabilité de leurs impacts sur la 
société, est-elle compatible avec le Capital Investissement ? Pour répondre à cette question, le 
Chapitre 1 de la thèse analyse la littérature sur les déterminants économiques de la RSE et ses 
impacts sur la structure des marchés, la performance économique et la société. Le Chapitre 2 
explore comment les entreprises peuvent réussir à être simultanément rentables et durables et 
montre que toutes les politiques de RSE n’équivalent pas pour y parvenir. Le Chapitre 3 
évalue et explique empiriquement l’état de l’industrie française du Capital Investissement en 
matière d’intégration des enjeux de RSE. Il montre une rapide diffusion chez les acteurs 
conventionnels de pratiques d’investissement socialement responsable, qui se caractérisent 
par un engagement actionnarial particulier et sont stratégiquement déterminées par un besoin 
de nouvelles sources de création de valeur, d’amélioration de la gestion des risques et de 
différentiation. Le Chapitre 4 teste le potentiel de la RSE comme critère de sélection des 
investissements à partir de la théorie des jeux de signaux. Le modèle proposé est 
expérimentalement testé en laboratoire. Les résultats indiquent que la RSE n’améliore pas la 
sélection des entreprises mais ne se substitue pas parfaitement aux signaux standards et 
modifie la sélection des équilibres. Enfin, le Chapitre 5 présente une expérience avec des 
investisseurs professionnels qui permet de quantifier l’impact de la performance extra-
financière sur l’accès aux capitaux propres. Un effet asymétrique est observé, les 
entrepreneurs ayant plus à perdre des pratiques irresponsables qu’à gagner des responsables. 
La thèse se conclut en discutant les principaux résultats, leurs implications pour les 
investisseurs en capital et les politiques publiques, leurs limites et leurs possibles extensions. 
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NOTE DE PRESENTATION SYNTHETIQUE EN FRANÇAIS 
 
Dans Our Common Future, aussi connu sous le nom de rapport Brundtland, la 
Commission Mondiale sur l’Environnement et le Développement a défini le développement 
durable comme “un développement qui répond aux besoins du présent sans compromettre la 
capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs” (1987). En une génération, ce vaste 
concept s’est largement disséminé dans notre société et dans les politiques publiques. La 
stratégie de croissance européenne pour la décade en cours (Europe 2020) consiste ainsi à 
devenir “une économie intelligente, durable et inclusive” et fonde ses objectifs de durabilité 
sur la compétitivité, la protection environnementale et l’inclusion sociale. En tant qu’acteurs 
économiques majeurs pour la croissance et l’emploi, les entreprises jouent un rôle crucial 
pour que notre société parvienne à ces objectifs. La Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises 
(RSE) est définie comme leur engagement à contribuer à un développement économique 
durable (World Bank, 2003)
 1 
et à assumer la responsabilité de leurs impacts sur la société 
(Commission Européenne, 2011a). 
La crise financière et économique que le monde traverse depuis 2008 resserre les marges de 
manœuvre pour parvenir aux objectifs de durabilité, tout en augmentant l’urgence d’y réussir. 
Les Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (PME), qui constituent la majorité de notre tissu 
économique, industriel et social, sont confrontées à des difficultés significatives pour obtenir 
le financement dont elles ont besoin pour assurer leur croissance, menaçant leur capacité 
d’innovation et de création d’emplois (Commission Européenne, 2011b). Les fonds de Capital 
Investissement sont des véhicules d’investissements spécialisés dans les entreprises non 
cotées et dont l’efficacité, déjà soulignée par les académiques, a été mise en avant dans un 
rapport du Conseil d’Analyse Economique (CAE, 2008) comme suit : “la crise des marchés 
financiers va entraîner globalement un renforcement très significatif de ce type de 
financement de l’économie, jusqu’à lui donner un rôle majeur dans la restructuration du tissu 
productif des grandes économies développées. (…) Tout simplement parce que des milliers 
d’entreprises, de taille moyenne qui composent une large partie de la structure productive de 
notre pays, n’ont pas aujourd’hui et auront encore moins demain, d’autres sources de 
                                                             
1
 La Banque Mondiale (2003) définit précisément la RSE comme “l’engagement du monde des affaires à 
contribuer au développement économique durable, en travaillant avec les employés, leurs familles, la 
communicate locale et la société au sens large pour améliorer la qualité de vie, de façon positive tant pour les 
affaires que pour le développement”.  
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financement que celles du Capital Investissement.” Le rapport prend ainsi clairement position 
en faveur du rôle positif que l’industrie du Capital Investissement peut jouer pour l’économie 
et fait des propositions pour augmenter de façon accélérée cette classe d’actifs. 
En 2011, les fonds de Capital Investissement ont investi environ 45.5 milliards d’euros dans 
un peu plus de 5 000 entreprises en Europe (dont 9.7 milliards d’euros dans 1 700 entreprises 
françaises), dont environ 85% de PME (EVCA, 2012). La Commission Européenne (2011b) 
estime que plus de 10 000 entreprises européennes étaient détenues en 2009 dans les 
portefeuilles des fonds de Capital Investissement. Toutefois, le Capital Investissement suscite 
depuis 2007 une forte contestation sociale, tant aux Etats Unis qu’en Europe, suite à des cas 
très médiatisés de pillages d’entreprises. Les critiques ciblent le court-termisme des fonds, 
l’assèchement des capacités d’investissement, les impacts négatifs sur la croissance à long 
terme, la répartition inégale des produits de sessions des firmes, et l’expropriation des 
fondateurs d’entreprises. Un important corpus de travaux académiques a donc entrepris 
d’évaluer l’impact de l’industrie du Capital Investissement sur l’emploi et les salaires. De part 
et d’autre de l’Atlantique, ces recherches concordent et contredisent les critiques, trouvant en 
effet un impact global positif à long terme (Boucly et al., 2008, 2009; Amess and Wright, 
2007; Davis et al., 2011).  
Toutefois, les inquiétudes formulées se justifient dans les effets individuels à court-terme des 
investisseurs en capital, qui tendent à accélérer les processus de restructuration et de 
réallocation des emplois entre les sites des entreprises. Les changements structuraux peuvent 
générer de fortes tensions sociales, que les fonds ne prennent pas nécessairement en compte 
ou ne gèrent pas toujours de façon appropriée. Pour citer le Conseil d’Analyse Economique 
(CAE, 2008), il y a un réel besoin “de favoriser le Capital Investissement tout en le rendant 
plus acceptable socialement”. 2 
Cette thèse de doctorat explore la compatibilité du concept de RSE avec l’industrie du Capital 
Investissement et le potentiel de cette classe d’investisseurs pour promouvoir les 
comportements socialement responsables dans les entreprises qu’ils financent. Les 
investisseurs en capital peuvent-ils contribuer au développement durable à travers la RSE ? 
Ces questions de recherche sont issues du terrain, la RSE et les investissements socialement 
responsables étant des sujets encore émergents dans l’industrie du Capital Investissement 
                                                             
2
 Ce paragraphe et le précédent s’appuient sur le chapitre “Capital Investissement et Emploi”, Forget V.D. et 
Massut F.,à paraître dans l’ouvrage collectif Tout Savoir sur le Capital Investissement, G. Mougenot (Ed.), City 
& Work, Paris, 2013. 
Introduction 
xvii 
 
pendant la construction du projet doctoral (en 2008-2009). Peu de recherche académique avait 
alors été conduite (ce qui est encore le cas actuellement) sur le potentiel de l’investissement 
responsable dans cette classe d’actifs, quelque peu contestée, peu transparente, et néanmoins 
d’une importance stratégique pour les PME. C’est donc un travail exploratoire sur le champ 
nouveau de la RSE en Capital Investissement qui est ici présenté.  
L’Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR) a été défini par Renneboog et al. (2008) 
comme un processus d’intégration des considérations sociales, environnementales et éthiques 
dans les décisions d’investissement. L’ISR est un marché de niche qui a généré un intérêt 
considérable au sein des académiques et des médias cette dernière décennie, intérêt 
essentiellement centré sur la question de sa performance financière boursière (Capelle-
Blancard et Monjon, 2010). Le canal du Capital Investissement a entièrement été écarté de la 
thématique (Scholtens, 2008), à l’exception notable du travail pionnier de Cumming et Johan 
(2007). 
Pourtant, le Capital Investissement est une classe d’actifs qui semble structurellement plus 
adaptée à la promotion de la RSE dans les entreprises - si ce n’est plus adaptée que l’ISR sur 
les marchés cotés. En effet, les investisseurs en capital sont des actionnaires significatifs 
(voire majoritaires) des entreprises de leurs portefeuilles pour un horizon de moyen à long 
terme, puisqu’ils les détiennent habituellement entre 5 et 7 ans. Ils peuvent donc activement 
promouvoir la RSE dans les comités de direction des entreprises s’ils le décident, tandis que 
les investisseurs ISR n’ont souvent d’autres options sur les marchés cotés que de voter avec 
leurs pieds s’ils ne sont pas d’accord avec les pratiques des firmes. L’ISR sur les marchés 
cotés s’oppose également au principe de diversification qui fonde la théorie moderne du 
portefeuille de Markowitz (1952) (Capelle-Blancard et Giamporcaro-Saunière, 2006). A 
l’inverse, le Capital Investissement se base structurellement sur la sélection améliorée de 
quelques entreprises qu’ils suivent. L’investissement responsable en Capital Investissement 
apparait ainsi comme un concept qui mérite d’être exploré.  
Toutefois, ce n’est pas un hasard si la question de l’investissement responsable en Capital 
Investissement a si peu été traitée par les académiques jusqu’ici. C’est plutôt la conséquence 
d’une complète absence de données sur le sujet. Mesurer la RSE est déjà une tâche délicate 
sur les entreprises cotées, qui doivent répondre à des exigences réglementaires de 
transparence et de reporting, et font souvent l’objet d’évaluations par des agences 
spécialisées. Cela se complexifie encore plus lorsque l’on s’attaque aux firmes non cotées, et 
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particulièrement aux PME, qui n’ont pas ces obligations. De surcroît, les valeurs des deals et 
la performance financière des fonds de Capital Investissement (« Private Equity » en anglais) 
sont par essence des données privées. Cette thèse recourt donc à des sources de données 
innovantes et à des méthodologies variées pour contourner ces difficultés. Chaque chapitre 
traite un aspect différent du sujet de recherche et utilise pour ce faire les données et 
méthodologies les plus adéquates compte tenu des contraintes précédemment exprimées. La 
boite à outils qui en résulte associe économétrie, théorie des jeux et économie expérimentale.  
Le premier chapitre propose une revue de la littérature de la RSE afin d’identifier quels en 
sont les déterminants économiques. Une analyse empirique est ensuite effectuée dans le 
second chapitre pour comprendre comment les entreprises peuvent réussir à la fois sur les 
plans de la rentabilité et de la durabilité en se concentrant sur la nature multidimensionnelle 
de la RSE. Le Chapitre 3 évalue alors empiriquement où en est l’industrie française du Capital 
Investissement en termes d’intégration des enjeux de RSE (autrement dit, d’investissements 
socialement responsables), et pourquoi. Le Chapitre 4 prend un point de vue un peu différent 
et teste en laboratoire si la RSE peut être utilisée par les investisseurs en capital pour mieux 
sélectionner leurs investissements. Le Chapitre 5 se tourne vers les investisseurs 
professionnels pour évaluer expérimentalement si les pratiques responsables et irresponsables 
des entreprises impactent leur accès aux capitaux propres, et quantifie dans quelle mesure. 
Enfin, la conclusion de cette thèse met en perspective les résultats des différents chapitres 
pour répondre à la question centrale et discute de leurs implications pour l’industrie du 
Capital Investissement et les pouvoirs publics, avant de présenter ses limites et les futures 
pistes de recherche qu’elle ouvre. 
Les sections suivantes détaillent chaque chapitre et sa méthodologie et fournissent quelques 
éléments pour contextualiser les contributions qui sont apportées à la littérature de la RSE, de 
l’investissement socialement responsable, de la théorie des jeux et de la finance d’entreprise.  
 
QUELS SONT LES DETERMINANTS ECONOMIQUES DE LA RSE? 
 
Comme point de départ, le Chapitre 1 fait la revue de la littérature théorique et empirique sur 
la RSE et utilise une perspective économique pour proposer un cadre unifié des forces qui la 
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déterminent. Il est basé sur un article en cours co-écrit avec Patricia Crifo : “The Economics 
of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Survey” (soumis à une revue à comité de lecture).3  
Cette revue de littérature est une première pierre fondamentale dans la compréhension de 
l’intégration des enjeux de RSE en Capital Investissement, car une connaissance 
considérable sur la RSE a déjà été assemblée dans d’autres champs de recherche. Plus 
qu’un simple catalogue de la recherche existante, le Chapitre 1 a pour objectif de 
proposer une synthèse créative de la littérature pour mettre en lumière à la fois sa 
cohérence et ses manques. 
Une définition pragmatique de la RSE est tout d’abord proposée  à partir du cadre donné 
par la Commission Européenne (2011a). Alors que le concept de RSE est en phase avec 
les aspirations du développement durable, les questions de pourquoi les entreprises s’y 
engagent et de son impact effectif sont loin d’être triviales. Comprendre les déterminants 
de la RSE est central pour pouvoir analyser pourquoi et comment les firmes  
entreprennent des démarches socialement responsables et comment ces pratiques peuvent 
impacter leurs activités et la société dans son ensemble.  
La littérature économique sur les comportements de RSE peut être analysée à travers le 
prisme de trois classes d’imperfections de marché, qui structurent la revue de littérature. 
La première source de défaillance de marché déterminant la RSE est l’existence 
d’externalités et de bien public, dont la provision peut être motivée par l’évitement de 
régulations publiques, la réponse à une pression sociale, ou la volonté d’exercer son 
devoir moral pour que les activités de l’entreprise soient en phase avec ses valeurs. La 
seconde catégorie de déterminants de comportements de RSE vient de la compétition 
imparfaite, qui génère une différenciation des produits, des structures de marché 
particulières et l’exploitation d’asymétrie informationnelle sous la forme du 
« greenwashing ». La troisième catégorie d’imperfections de marché derrière les 
stratégies de RSE est ancrée dans les contrats imparfaits, la RSE pouvant alors être 
appréhendée comme la responsabilité déléguée des actionnaires de l’entreprise, de ses 
dirigeants et de ses employés. Pour chaque déterminant, les arguments théoriques et leurs 
tests empiriques sont présentés. 
                                                             
3 
Le Chapitre 1 met à jour et enrichit le chapitre “A Survey of the Literature on Corporate Social Responsability 
& Financial Performance” (Forget V.D, dans CSR: From Compliance to Opportunity?, P. Crifo et J. P. Ponssard 
(Eds), Editions de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 2010), publié pendant la première année du doctorat. 
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Enfin, les impacts de la RSE sur la performance des entreprises et sur la société sont 
passés en revue. Un double fossé est ainsi mis en lumière dans la littérature. Tout 
d’abord, il y a une déconnection importante entre notre connaissance des déterminants de 
la RSE et de ses impacts. Ensuite, il y a un grand écart entre ce que nous savons des 
conséquences financières et sociales de la RSE, ces dernières demeurant très peu 
étudiées. 
Parmi les pistes de recherche suggérées, la nature multidimensionnelle de la RSE et ce 
qu’elle implique pour la performance des firmes apparait prometteuse. Cette recherche 
fait l’objet du Chapitre 2. 
 
COMMENT LES ENTREPRISES PEUVENT-ELLES SIMULTANEMENT REUSSIR SUR LES PLANS 
FINANCIER ET EXTRA-FINANCIER? 
 
La revue de littérature révèle que le lien entre la performance financière et extra-
financière a suscité ces trente dernières années un grand nombre de recherches. Au-delà 
de la question de l’existence de ce lien, laquelle fait maintenant l’objet d’un consensus 
(Margolis et al., 2009), le mécanisme liant la rentabilité à la RSE est complexe et 
toujours académiquement débattu. Ce mécanisme est également central pour les 
investisseurs qui souhaitent s’en servir pour promouvoir la durabilité. Le Chapitre 2 est 
construit sur l’idée (développée dans le Chapitre 1) que la RSE comprend des politiques 
diversifiées, avec des effets variables sur la rentabilité qu’il est nécessaire de clarifier. Ce 
chapitre vise ainsi à comprendre l’importance relative des différentes politiques extra-
financières pour la rentabilité. Il est basé sur l’article en cours “Doing Well and Doing 
Good: A Multidimensional Puzzle” (HAL-00672037; soumis à une revue à comité de lecture). 
Contrairement aux autres chapitres de cette thèse, des données étaient disponibles pour traiter 
la question posée par le Chapitre 2. L’agence de notation extra-financière Vigéo nous a en 
effet donné accès à sa base de données, qui a été appariée avec la base de données financières 
Orbis (Bureau Von Dijk). La base de données résultante couvre 461 grandes et moyennes 
capitalisations européennes entre 1998 et 2007. Les données de RSE couvrent une certaine 
gamme de pratiques : la performance environnementale, les bonnes pratiques avec les clients 
Introduction 
xxi 
 
et les fournisseurs, l’implication dans les communautés locales, la gestion des ressources 
humaines et la gouvernance de l’entreprise.  
Une fois la base de données prête, la résolution d’un tel puzzle multidimensionnel 
demeure néanmoins délicate. En effet, le lien entre performance financière et les 
multiples dimensions de la RSE se heurte au problème dit d’« incertitude de modèle ». 
Cette incertitude vient de ce que les théories existantes ne sont pas suffisamment 
explicites pour indiquer quelles dimensions de RSE appartiennent (ou non) à la « vraie » 
régression (et auquel cas, avec quelle spécification). Dans un article très influent , Sala-i-
Martin et al. (2004) discutent d’un problème similaire sur l’économie de la croissance, un 
champ de recherche où les chercheurs sont également confrontés à une multitude de 
régresseurs potentiels. Ignorer l’incertitude de modèles résulte généralement dans des 
estimations de paramètres biaisées, des écarts types trop confiants et des inférences 
trompeuses.  
Pour s’attaquer à la nature multidimensionnelle de la RSE, le chapitre introduit dans la 
littérature le « model averaging », un cadre statistique formel qui prend explicitement en 
compte l’incertitude de modèle. Le model averaging affecte des poids aux différents 
modèles alternatifs en fonction de leur qualité et fournit ainsi une distribution de 
probabilité pour chaque estimation de coefficient. Il s’est déjà révélé pertinent dans de 
nombreux champs de recherche. Au-delà de son application originale à la RSE, la 
méthodologie ici présentée est une variante qui a le potentiel d’être aisément transférée à 
d’autres questions économiques par la simplicité de sa mise en œuvre. Toutefois, la 
méthodologie étant très consommatrice de données, le Chapitre 2 se limite à l’étude de la 
relation entre RSE et performance financière et ne peut adresser la question de la 
causalité entre ces deux groupes de variables.  
Le Chapitre 2 dévoile quelles dimensions de la RSE sont significativement liées à la 
performance financière, et lesquelles ne le sont pas. Il démontre ainsi que toutes les 
politiques de RSE n’ont pas la même importance pour réussir financièrement et extra -
financièrement, les bons comportements avec ses clients et fournisseurs apparaissant 
comme essentiels. La performance environnementale et la gestion des ressources 
humaines sont également faiblement liées à la rentabilité, ce qui n’est dans les données ni 
le cas de la gouvernance ni celui de l’implication dans les communautés locales. Un fort 
soutien est également apporté à la coexistence de politiques présentant un niveau optimal 
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pour la rentabilité (bonnes relations avec les clients et les fournisseurs, performance 
environnementale) et de politiques qui lui liées de façon monotone (gestion des 
ressources humaines).  
Les résultats suggèrent que les différentes dimensions de la RSE ont des niveaux 
optimums différents à atteindre pour que les entreprises réussissent socialement et 
financièrement. Ainsi, la RSE ne vient pas comme un lot de mesures à promouvoir 
aveuglément, mais appelle plutôt une analyse stratégique du modèle de gestion de 
l’entreprise considérée afin de sélectionner avec précaution le mélange approprié de 
politiques lui permettant à la fois d’être rentable et durable. Pour les investisseurs en 
capital, ces résultats impliquent un besoin d’expertise sur la RSE afin d’appréhender avec 
pertinence les occasions où elle peut générer du profit.  
 
OU EN EST L’INDUSTRIE DU CAPITAL INVESTISSEMENT EN TERMES DE RSE, ET 
POURQUOI? 
 
Le Chapitre 3 présente la littérature sur les investissements socialement responsables et met 
en exergue sa concentration sur le canal des marchés financiers publics, écartant celui du 
Capital Investissement. Il s’attaque donc à caractériser le mouvement d’investissement 
responsable en Capital Investissement et à analyser ses déterminants. Il est basé sur un article 
co-écrit avec Patricia Crifo : “Think Global, Invest Responsible: Why the Private Equity 
Industry Goes Green” (accepté pour publication dans le Journal of Business Ethics). 
Comme précédemment détaillé, il n’y a pas de cadre théorique ni de données disponibles sur 
la question de la RSE en Capital Investissement. Néanmoins, il a été relativement aisé de 
rassembler des éléments anecdotiques sur le sujet. Le Chapitre 3 définit et propose à partir de 
ces éléments une perspective historique sur les investissements socialement responsables en 
Capital Investissement, contextualisant l’intégration des enjeux de RSE dans cette classe 
d’actifs. La rapide intégration des enjeux environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance par 
les investisseurs en capital conventionnels est ainsi dévoilée et apparait avoir bénéficié de la 
maturation des investissements socialement responsables sur les marchés financiers côtés et 
de l’impulsion de grands acteurs traditionnels de l’industrie. 
Des hypothèses sur les caractéristiques et les déterminants de ce mouvement sont ensuite 
proposées à partir des littératures de la finance d’entreprise, de la RSE et de l’ISR. La seule 
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façon de tester de façon effective ces hypothèses a été de construire une base de données ad 
hoc. Des données sur 309 sociétés françaises de gestion de fonds de Capital Investissement 
ont donc été collectées en 2011 dans le domaine public à partir d’informations issues de la 
presse spécialisée, de communiqués de presse et des sites internet des sociétés. Pour avoir un 
aperçu des opinions ayant cours dans les fonds, ces données publiques ont été complétées 
avec des données de sondage collectées en partenariat avec Novéthic (filiale de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations) sur 74 sociétés. La construction minutieuse de cette base de données 
a nécessairement contraint sa couverture au marché français. 
Les résultats empiriques montrent que l’investissement socialement responsable en Capital 
Investissement est caractérisé par l’engagement des investisseurs et stratégiquement 
déterminé par un besoin d’amélioration de la gestion des risques et de différentiation. En 
particulier, les résultats indiquent que les fonds indépendants, qui ont besoin de lever des 
fonds et d’attirer des investisseurs, ont une plus grande probabilité de développer des 
pratiques socialement responsables que les fonds captifs, moins soumis à la compétition. 
L’intégration des enjeux de RSE dans l’industrie du Capital Investissement apparait donc en 
continuité avec la maximisation de la valeur des actionnaires et cohérente avec une 
amélioration organisationnelle et opérationnelle. Toutefois, pour cela, comme l’a mis en 
évidence le Chapitre 3, elle nécessite une réelle expertise, dont l’existence dans les fonds peut 
actuellement être mise en doute. Une forte limite du chapitre est sa nature exploratoire. Une 
extension de recherche consisterait à construire, à partir des éléments proposés, un réel cadre 
théorique de l’investissement responsable en Capital Investissement. 
 
LES INVESTISSEURS PEUVENT-ILS UTILISER LA RSE POUR IDENTIFIER LES ENTREPRISES 
LES PLUS PERFORMANTES? 
 
Les Chapitres 1 et 2 ont montré que faire de l’argent grâce à la RSE n’a rien d’une tâche 
aisée. Le Chapitre 4 vise à explorer une explication alternative de l’intérêt croissant qu’ont les 
investisseurs en capital pour la RSE, et qui n’a pas été testée dans le Chapitre 3. Des travaux 
récents suggèrent en effet que les firmes performantes sur le plan extra-financier seraient 
celles qui auraient suffisamment de ressources pour se permettre d’en dépenser une partie en 
RSE (Baron et al., 2011). Le Chapitre 4 construit sur ces faits stylisés et teste théoriquement 
puis expérimentalement si la RSE pourrait servir de signal (« money-burning ») qui réduirait 
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l’asymétrie informationnelle dans les négociations de Capital Investissement. Le Chapitre 4 
est basé sur l’article en cours : “Green Signaling in Experimental Private Equity 
Negotiations”. 
L’approche choisie diffère ici significativement des méthodologies utilisées dans les chapitres 
précédents. Déterminer l’efficacité d’un signal dans des négociations de Capital 
Investissement est déjà délicat en termes d’accès aux données, mais cela devient plus difficile 
encore quand les signaux contribuent à un bien public. D’un point de vue théorique, le 
Chapitre 4 montre que la performance environnementale peut se modéliser comme un signal 
(dit de « money-burning »), mais sa substituabilité à des signaux plus standards demeure 
incertaine. Face à ces limites et incertitudes, ce chapitre a recourt à une expérience en 
laboratoire, laquelle permet de contrôler l’environnement dans lequel sont prises les décisions 
financières et de se centrer sur l’observation des comportements qui nous intéressent. Cette 
méthodologie a ainsi permis par le passé de nombreux développements de la théorie 
financière (Pouget, 2011). Comme souvent dans les expériences en laboratoire, l’objectif étant 
de comprendre les mécanismes et non pas de tester le savoir des individus, les participants de 
l’expérience n’étaient pas spécialistes du Capital Investissement. Cette recherche a été menée 
en partenariat avec le CIRANO (Montréal, Canada), dont le laboratoire d’économie 
expérimentale a accueilli les sessions expérimentales avec l’aide, les conseils et le soutien de 
Jim Engle-Warnick.  
Un modèle non-coopératif de négociation de financement par capitaux en présence de deux 
signaux est tout d’abord proposé. La négociation théorique entre un investisseur en capital et 
une entreprise (qui peut être soit de type « haut » soit de type « bas ») a lieu de façon 
séquentielle et utilise deux types de signaux : un signal prix et un signal dit de « money-
burning » (littéralement d’ « argent brûlé », c’est-à-dire qui a l’apparence d’un gaspillage 
d’argent, et qui est indépendant de la qualité). L’expérience permet ensuite de donner un 
contenu réel à ce signal en laissant aux entreprises la possibilité d’acheter soit un signal 
« vert » (contribuant à un bien public) soit un signal « brun » (une publicité standard) selon 
les traitements. Les deux types de signaux de money-burning ont les mêmes incitations 
monétaires mais diffèrent en termes de conséquences sociales, le signal « vert » contribuant 
réellement à un bien public (compensation carbone via le site internet d’une ONG). Le design 
de l’expérience comprend 6 traitements définis par le contenu du signal (vert, brun, ou choix 
entre les deux) et son prix, les signaux pouvant être soient « chers » (accessibles uniquement 
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par les firmes de type haut) soit « peu chers » (accessibles par les deux types d’entreprises). 
Un septième traitement de contrôle, sans signal, complète ce dispositif. Dans tous les 
traitements, les paramètres du modèle ont été fixés de façon à ce que l’achat des signaux soit 
théoriquement sous-optimal, la prédiction du modèle étant que les sujets ne devraient pas les 
acheter et converger vers un équilibre non séparateur (les firmes proposent toutes le même 
prix et les investisseurs ne peuvent distinguer les entreprises de type haut et de type bas). 296 
sujets, recrutés par le CIRANO parmi la population de Montréal, ont pris part à l’expérience.  
Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que les participants ne préfèrent pas le signal vert au 
signal brun, et qu’en conformité avec les prédictions théoriques, ils ne les achètent pas. 
Toutefois, la sélection de l’équilibre dépend quand même du contenu du signal de qualité. En 
effet, lorsque le signal brun est disponible, les sujets ne l’achètent pas et convergent bien vers 
l’équilibre non séparateur. Par contre, en présence du signal vert, ils dévient de l’équilibre 
prédit en n’achetant pas le signal mais en convergeant vers un équilibre séparateur par les prix 
(des firmes de type différents proposent des prix différents, permettant leur identification par 
les investisseurs) théoriquement dominé. Le Chapitre 4 contribue ainsi à la théorie du signal 
en montrant que la performance environnementale (et les contributions à un bien public de 
façon plus générale) ne peut se substituer parfaitement à des signaux de money-burning 
standards. La présence d’un signal de contribution à un bien public semble combler la 
motivation intrinsèque des acteurs à révéler leur type via les prix (ce qui est moins couteux 
qu’avec le signal) et donc converger vers un équilibre séparateur. Dans cette expérience, 
l’asymétrie informationnelle est donc réduite dans les négociations de Capital Investissement 
mais les entreprises ne contribuent pas pour autant au bien public. Les implications en termes 
de transparence des marchés de capitaux et d’impacts sur la société sont discutées. 
 
LES PRATIQUES RESPONSABLES ET IRRESPONSABLES DES ENTREPRISES IMPACTENT-
ELLES LEUR ACCES AU FINANCEMENT PAR CAPITAUX PROPRES? 
 
Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse de doctorat a pour but de mesurer l’impact des pratiques 
responsables et irresponsables des entreprises sur leur accès au financement par capitaux 
propres. Plus précisément, son objectif est de quantifier la potentielle plus-value accordée par 
les investisseurs en capital aux entreprises qui font de la RSE, ce en termes de valorisation et 
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d’attractivité en tant qu’investissement. Le Chapitre 5 est basé sur un article en cours co-écrit 
avec Patricia Crifo et Sabrina Teyssier: “The Price of Unsustainability: An Experiment with 
Professional Private Equity Investors”.  
Comme dans le Chapitre 4, le choix de la méthodologie a été contraint par le fait que les 
données des transactions en Capital Investissement ne sont pas publiques. Remarquons que, 
même si elles l’étaient, il serait très difficile d’isoler les effets de la RSE parmi les autres 
facteurs qui influencent le prix de ces transactions. A nouveau, nous nous sommes donc 
tournés vers l’économie expérimentale. Contrairement au Chapitre 4, il était crucial que les 
participants de l’expérience soient des spécialistes du Capital Investissement pour pouvoir 
quantifier les effets réels de la RSE sur la valorisation des entreprises. Nous avons donc 
construit une expérience encadrée de terrain unique dans laquelle 33 investisseurs en capital 
professionnels ont été mis en compétition pour acquérir des entreprises fictives. Cette 
recherche n’aurait pu avoir lieu sans un partenariat sans le partenariat monté avec le Club 
Développement Durable de l’Association Française de Capital Investissement (AFIC) et la 
société de gestion Eurazéo PME, lesquelles ont apporté une aide précieuse au projet, 
notamment en assurant la crédibilité des cas et la participation des investisseurs. 
Le dispositif expérimental a permis de contrôler l’information sur laquelle se fonde la 
valorisation des entreprises et de se focaliser sur l’impact de trois piliers de la RSE : les 
facteurs Environnementaux, Sociaux et de Gouvernance. Le design de l’expérience est basé 
sur des enchères scellées au premier prix avec un « coût d’embarras » (forme de pénalité 
causée par la gêne de se tromper dans l’évaluation du prix), dont nous montrons au préalable 
qu’elles permettent aux investisseurs de révéler leur vraie valorisation des entreprises. 
Contrairement au Chapitre 4, ici, l’expérience n’a pas vocation à tester le modèle. Le modèle 
d’enchères permet plutôt de garantir l’efficacité de la révélation des prix des firmes dans 
l’expérience. Quatre traitements ont été testés, à partir de trois études de cas d’entreprises 
construites avec précaution afin d’être les plus réalistes possibles. Un des traitements a été 
mené à travers un site internet que nous avons développé.  
Les résultats sur 330 observations mettent en évidence que la performance extra-financière 
impacte le financement par capitaux propres, tant en termes de prix que d’attractivité. Le 
résultat principal est l’existence d’un effet asymétrique des enjeux de RSE, les entrepreneurs 
ayant plus à perdre des pratiques irresponsables qu’à gagner avec des pratiques responsables. 
Lorsque l’hétérogénéité entre les investisseurs est contrôlée, nous évaluons que des pratiques 
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irresponsables décroissent la valorisation d’une entreprise de respectivement 11%, 10% et 
15% pour des problèmes environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance. Les pratiques 
responsables environnementales et sociales n’accroissent la valeur des entreprises que de 5%, 
une bonne gouvernance n’étant pas récompensée en termes de valeur. Les pratiques 
irresponsables diminuent également la probabilité de l’investissement d’environ 30. Le 
Chapitre 5 conclue que les pratiques irresponsables des entreprises peuvent affecter le 
financement par capitaux propres et augmenter son coût, la RSE pouvant alors devenir une 
stratégie défensive pour protéger la valeur des entreprises et l’accès aux capitaux.  
 
PRINCIPALES CONTRIBUTIONS ET IMPLICATIONS 
 
Les cinq chapitres de cette thèse mobilisent différentes méthodologies pour traiter sous des 
angles complémentaires la question de la compatibilité de la RSE avec l’industrie du Capital 
Investissement. Ce faisant, des contributions ont été faites à différents champs de la 
littérature. Si chaque chapitre les détaille, cette section les résume de façon transversale et 
discute dans quelles mesures les fonds de Capital Investissement peuvent promouvoir le 
développement durable à travers la RSE.  
Les Chapitres 1, 2 et 5 contribuent à la littérature sur la RSE. Le Chapitre 1 ancre en effet ce 
concept en économie et propose un cadre unifié de ses déterminants. Il démontre ainsi la 
nécessité de prendre en compte la nature multidimensionnelle de la RSE. En s’y appliquant, le 
Chapitre 2 prouve que différentes politiques de RSE impactent différemment la performance 
financière. Il introduit également dans cette littérature le model averaging, une méthodologie 
qui a permis d’estimer simultanément les effets de cinq types de politiques de RSE et leur 
importance relative pour la performance financière. Cet outil statistique a par ailleurs le 
potentiel d’être facilement appliqué à d’autres champs empiriques confrontés à des problèmes 
multidimensionnels et une absence de consensus théorique. Les résultats obtenus ont 
d’importantes implications pour les praticiens et les académiques, puisqu’ils réconcilient des 
théories concurrentes sur la RSE et montrent que les diverses politiques de RSE ne sont pas 
équivalentes. Le Chapitre 5 complète ces résultats en soulignant que les sur- et sous-
performances en matière de RSE ont des effets dissymétriques sur la valeur des entreprises. 
En utilisant le cadre de la RSE et du Capital Investissement, le Chapitre 4 contribue à la 
théorie des jeux de signaux en montrant que le contenu du signal impacte la sélection des 
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équilibres. Alors qu’il existe une littérature conséquente sur la sélection d’équilibre dans les 
jeux de signaux, la nouveauté de ce travail réside dans l’observation de déviations de 
l’équilibre causées par les conséquences sociales du signal utilisé, et les motivations 
intrinsèques qui lui sont reliées. Le design expérimental contribue également à cette littérature 
en proposant une façon originale de donner du contenu aux signaux testés en laboratoire, les 
signaux utilisés dans le Chapitre 4 contribuant à un bien public réel (compensation carbone 
via le site internet d’une ONG).  
Les Chapitres 3, 4 et 5 contribuent à la littérature sur les investissements socialement 
responsables. Leur diffusion au Capital Investissement est démontrée et caractérisée dans le 
Chapitre 3. La spécificité de ces investisseurs réside dans leur capacité d’engagement 
actionnarial, plus importante que celle des investisseurs publics. Les investissements 
socialement responsables dans cette classe d’actifs sont également identifiés comme étant 
stratégiques et non pas philanthropiques, ce qui va dans le sens du mouvement de 
généralisation de ces pratiques. 
Cette thèse apporte enfin de nouveaux éléments en finance d’entreprise. Le Chapitre 4 apporte 
une contribution théorique en proposant un modèle de négociation bilatérale avec signal qui 
montre comment l’asymétrie informationnelle peut être réduite dans les négociations de 
Capital Investissement. Les Chapitres 3 et 5 démontrent que les modèles de valorisation des 
entreprises et de financement par capital devraient intégrer en plus des éléments financiers des 
informations extra-financières, puisque les investisseurs le font actuellement déjà. Ils révèlent 
donc qu’omettre la performance extra-financière pourrait biaiser les estimations 
économétriques menées sur la performance et la stratégie des fonds de Capital Investissement. 
 
Pour résumer et rassembler les conclusions des différents chapitres en une réponse globale à 
la problématique posée par cette thèse, la RSE apparait donc comme étant partiellement 
compatible avec l’industrie du Capital Investissement. En effet, les investisseurs en capital 
sont suffisamment impliqués dans les entreprises de leurs portefeuilles pour pouvoir 
activement promouvoir leur RSE s’ils le décident, et s’ils ont l’expertise nécessaire. Ils 
peuvent améliorer leur propre performance en améliorant certaines dimensions de la RSE – 
mais pas toutes. En conséquent, le régulateur peut se reposer sur eux pour contribuer à 
certains types de biens publics, dans des circonstances spécifiques.  
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La conclusion de la thèse discute de façon détaillée les implications de ses résultats pour 
l’industrie du Capital Investissement 4  et les politiques publiques. Du point de vue des 
investisseurs en capital, elle souligne que la RSE est dès à présent une stratégie que de 
nombreux fonds conventionnels mettent en œuvre pour améliorer leur business et leur 
management opérationnel. Toutefois, une bonne gestion des enjeux de RSE n’est pas triviale à 
développer. Des suggestions sont faites pour aider les sociétés de gestion qui souhaiteraient 
s’engager en matière de RSE et leur exposer les contraintes associées. Sur ce second point, la 
nécessité d’acquérir le capital humain indispensable à la bonne appréhension des sujets de 
RSE est mise en exergue. Ainsi, pour que la RSE ne dérive pas en « greenwashing », il est 
nécessaire d’y allouer des ressources.   
Du point de vue des politiques publiques, cette thèse conduit à des recommandations en 
termes de régulation de la RSE, de régulation de l’industrie du Capital Investissement, et 
d’évolution de l’administration publique. En effet, cette recherche montre que les fonds de 
Capital Investissement ont le potentiel de promouvoir certaines formes de durabilité grâce la 
RSE, tant que celle-ci fait sens économiquement. L’ensemble des chapitres de la thèse 
soutient d’une façon ou d’une autre que la RSE ne sera pas implémentée au détriment de la 
rentabilité ou de la compétitivité. L’optimum social diffère ainsi probablement de l’optimum 
entrepreneurial. Une question centrale pour les politiques publiques est donc d’évaluer les 
conséquences sociales et la contribution réelle au bien commun des investissements 
socialement responsables et de la RSE.  
En l’état actuel des connaissances sur ce point, la RSE apparait comme un outil très efficace 
pour répondre à une partie des objectifs de développement durable, particulièrement dans 
cette période de restriction budgétaire publique. En termes de régulation de la RSE, la 
conclusion de la thèse recommande donc que la régulation de la RSE se focalise sur la 
transparence, par exemple via la promotion de normes et de certifications indépendantes. En 
effet, il est crucial de renforcer la crédibilité de la RSE en s’assurant que les allégations 
environnementales et sociales ne soient ni trompeuses ni mensongères, en ligne avec la 
réglementation de la publicité.  
La transparence est également le point principal discuté pour la régulation de l’industrie du 
Capital Investissement vis-à-vis de la RSE. La conclusion souligne que d’importants accords 
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 Cette partie de la conclusion est adaptée du chapitre “L’intégration des Enjeux ESG dans le Capital 
Investissement” , Forget V.D. et  Massut, F., à paraître dans  l’ouvrage collectif Tout Savoir sur le Capital 
Investissement, G. Mougenot (Ed.), City & Work, Paris, 2013. 
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et réglementations la concernant ont été décidés pendant l’écriture de cette thèse de doctorat, 
dont les effets devraient être évalués avant toute nouvelle suggestion. Parmi ces 
réglementations, on peut ici évoquer quelques exemples de réglementations nationales visant 
à renforcer la transparence sur les impacts environnementaux et sociaux des fonds de Capital 
Investissement (par exemple le CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme au Royaume Uni depuis 
2008 ; et les décrets 224 et 225 de la loi de Grenelle II en France, qui seront mis en œuvre 
début 2013). Si ces réglementations ont et auront dans les années à venir d’importantes 
conséquences sur les marchés, leur portée sera limitée par leur ancrage national. Une 
extension de ces démarches au niveau européen est proposée afin d’atteindre les objectifs 
fixés en matière de développement durable et éviter les distorsions de marché au sein de 
l’Union. 
Enfin, la RSE et les investissements socialement responsables pourraient également 
s’appliquer aux administrations publiques. La conclusion argumente que l’Etat est un 
employeur conséquent, financeur de nombreuses entreprises via ses marchés publics, et un 
investisseur institutionnel très suivi. Par conséquent, le développement durable ne pourrait 
que bénéficier d’un engagement clair et transversal des administrations publiques pour 
améliorer leur propre responsabilité sociale. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland report, the World Commission 
on Environment and Development defined sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (1987). Within a generation, this broad concept widely spread in our society 
and public policies. The European growth strategy for the on-going decade (Europe 2020) 
hence consists in becoming a “smart, sustainable and inclusive economy” and grounds its 
sustainability objectives on competitiveness, environmental protection and social inclusion. 
As core economic actors of growth and employment, enterprises play a crucial role for our 
societies to reach those objectives. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the commitment 
of business to contribute to sustainable economic development (World Bank, 2003)
 5
 and take 
responsibility for their impacts on society (European Commission, 2011a). 
The financial and economic crisis the world had been undergoing since 2008 both tightens up 
the basic conditions needed to achieve sustainability as well as the urgency to succeed to do 
so. Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs), which make up the largest share of our 
economic, industrial and social fabric, face significant difficulties in obtaining the financing 
needed to ensure their growth and jeopardize their employment and innovation capacity 
(European Commission, 2011b). Highlighted as efficient financial tools, Private Equity funds 
are investment vehicles specialized in unlisted companies. The French Economic Analysis 
Council (Conseil d’Analyse Economique) stated in 2008: “The crisis of the financial markets 
will globally lead to a highly significant reinforcement of this kind of economy financing, up 
to a major role in the restructuring of the productive fabric of large developed economies. 
(…) Simply because thousands of SMEs, which make up a large share of our country’s 
productive structure, do not have today, and will even less have tomorrow, any other 
financing source than Private Equity”. A clear stand was taken for the positive role the 
Private Equity industry could play for economy and proposals were made to increase in an 
accelerated way this asset class. 
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 The World Bank (2003) precisely defines CSR as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable 
economic development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
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In 2011, Private Equity funds indeed invested about 45.5 billion euros in over 5 000 
companies in Europe (respectively 9.7 billion euros in 1 700 French companies), out of which 
SMEs accounted for about 85% (EVCA, 2012). Estimations are that over 10 000 European 
companies are currently hold in Private Equity funds portfolios (European Commission, 
2011b). However, strong social criticism has been raised against Private Equity both in 
Europe and the United Stated since 2007
6
, driven by highly-publicized asset striping deals. 
Criticism targets funds’ short-termism, drying-off of investment capacities, negative impact 
on enterprises’ long-term growth, unequal distribution of capital gains, and expropriation of 
companies’ founders. Important academic work was undertaken to assess the actual global 
impact of the Private Equity industry on employment and wages and results neither support 
the negative claims in Europe nor in the United states (Boucly et al., 2008, 2009; Amess and 
Wright, 2007; Davis et al., 2011). Despite long-term positive effects, concerns are grounded 
as evidence is found that Private Equity investors often accelerate restructuration processes 
and job reallocation between company sites. Structural changes can lead to strong social 
tensions, which are not necessarily taken into account and well managed by the Private Equity 
industry. As put by the French Economic Analysis Council (2008), there is a clear need «to 
favor Private Equity while making it more socially acceptable». 
This dissertation explores the coherence of CSR in the Private Equity industry and Private 
Equity potential for fostering socially responsible behaviors in their investments. Can those 
investors support sustainable development through CSR? These questions arose from the 
field, as CSR and responsible investments were emerging topics in the industry when this 
Ph.D. was set up (2008-2009). Little academic work had been conducted at the time (and still 
is) on the potentiality of responsible investment in this asset class, somewhat contentious, 
lacking transparency and yet of strategic importance for SMEs. This research on the novel 
field of CSR in Private Equity is thus exploratory.  
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has been defined by Renneboog et al. (2008) as an 
investment process that integrates social, environmental, and ethical considerations into 
investment decision making. This niche market triggered considerable academic and media 
interest over the past decade, essentially focused on the question of its financial performance 
(Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2010). The Private Equity channel has essentially been set 
aside by academics (Scholtens, 2008), at the exception of the pioneering work of Cumming 
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 This paragraph draws on the chapter “Capital Investissement et Emploi”, Forget V.D. and Massut F., 
forthcoming in Tout Savoir sur le Capital Investissement, G. Mougenot (Ed.), City & Work, Paris, 2013. 
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and Johan (2007). However, there is a strong rationale for the Private Equity setting to be well 
suited, if not better than public asset classes, to foster CSR. Indeed Private Equity investors 
are significant or majority shareholders of companies for middle to long term horizon, as they 
usually hold companies in portfolio for 4 to 7 years. They can thus actively promote CSR at 
the company board if they decide to, whereas public socially responsible investors are most 
often limited to voting with their feet. Also, socially responsible investment on financial 
markets opposes the diversification principle that grounds Markowitz (1952)’s modern 
portfolio theory (Capelle-Blancard and Giamporcaro-Saunière, 2006). Conversely, Private 
Equity is anchored in improved portfolio company selection rather than diversification. 
Responsible investment in Private Equity thus seems to be a consistent concept. 
However, it is no accident that responsible investment in Private Equity was so little tackled 
by academics so far. It is rather the consequence of a complete lack of available data. 
Measuring CSR is hard enough when researchers work on public companies, which have 
transparency and reporting requirements and can be rated by specialized agencies. It becomes 
even trickier with unlisted firms, particularly SMEs. Additionally, deal values and financial 
performance of Private Equity funds are – by essence – private information. To get around 
these issues, the dissertation thus required innovative data sources and various methodologies 
to process them. Each chapter tackles a different aspect of the research topic and resorted to 
the data and methodology that best fitted considering relevancy and feasibility. The resulting 
toolbox encompasses econometrics, game theory and experimental economics. 
Chapter 1 disentangles the economic determinants of CSR by reviewing the wide empirical 
and theoretical literature on the topic. An empirical analysis is further proposed in Chapter 2 
to understand how enterprises can manage to be both profitable and sustainable by focusing 
on the multidimensional nature of CSR. Chapter 3 then empirically assesses where the French 
Private Equity industry stands in terms of integration of CSR issues, that is sustainable 
investment, and why. Chapter 4 takes a slightly different standpoint by experimentally testing 
in the laboratory if CSR can be used by Private Equity investors to better select their 
investments. Chapter 5 turns to professional Private Equity investors to experimentally 
estimate if sustainable and unsustainable corporate practices impact equity access, and 
measures to which extent. Finally, the Conclusion section interweaves results to answer the 
research question, discusses limits of the dissertation, research paths opened, and lastly 
implications for the Private Equity industry and public policies. 
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The following sections briefly detail each chapter, motivate its methodology choice and 
limits, and provide background to contextualize contributions to the CSR, responsible 
investment, game theory and corporate finance literatures.  
 
WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CSR? 
 
As a starting point, Chapter 1 reviews the theoretical and empirical CSR literature and 
provides a unified framework of the forces driving CSR using an economic lens. It is 
based on a working paper co-written with Patricia Crifo: “The Economics of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Survey” (submitted to a peer-review journal).7  
Such a literature survey is a crucial foundation stone for the understanding of CSR in 
Private Equity, as considerable knowledge on CSR has already been amassed in other 
fields. Beyond a sole catalogue of existing research, Chapter 1 aims at proposing a 
creative synthesis of the literature to highlight both its consistency and its potential lacks.  
A practical definition of CSR is first proposed, based on the European Commission 
(2011a) framework. Whereas the concept of CSR aligns with sustainable development 
aspirations, the question of why would firms engage in it and its actual impact is far from 
trivial. Understanding CSR drivers is core to analyze why and how would firms engage 
in CSR and how this engagement is likely to impact their activities and society as a 
whole. 
In turn, CSR may arise from three categories of market imperfections, which structure the 
review. The first source of market failures driving CSR is the existence of externalities 
and public good, whose provision can be motivated by deterring public regulations , 
responding to social pressure or exerting one’s own moral duty to undertake social 
activities. The second category of CSR behavior determinants lies in imperfect 
competition, which generates product differentiation, subsequent market structures and the 
misuse of information asymmetry under the form of greenwashing. The third category of 
market imperfections behind CSR strategies is anchored in imperfect contracts, CSR 
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 Chapter 1 updates and builts upon the book chapter “A Survey of the Literature on Corporate Social 
Responsability & Financial Performance” (Forget V.D, in CSR: From Compliance to Opportunity?, P. 
Crifo and J. P. Ponssard (Eds), Editions de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 2010), published in the first year of the 
Ph.D. Here we take a broader and newer perspective on CSR, anchoring it in economics aside the sole 
question of performance. 
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being considered as the delegated responsibility of firm shareholders, firm employees and 
firm managers. For each motive, theoretical arguments and their empirical test are surveyed.  
The literature on CSR impacts on both firm performance and society is then reviewed. A 
twofold discrepancy is thus highlighted in the literature: first, a disconnection between our 
understanding of CSR drivers and impacts; and second, a knowledge gap between CSR 
financial and social consequences, the latter having received little attention. 
Among the research paths suggested, the multidimensional nature of CSR and its 
implications for performance appears little investigated. This research is the focus of 
Chapter 2. 
 
HOW CAN FIRMS SUCCEED ON BOTH FINANCIAL AND EXTRA-FINANCIAL LEVELS? 
 
The literature survey highlighted that the link between financial and extra-financial 
performance triggered a substantial body of research over the past thirty years. Beyond 
the question of the existence of such a link, which has been agreed upon (Margolis et al., 
2009), the mechanism linking profitability to CSR is complex and still academically 
debated. It is also core for investors who wish to foster sustainability. Chapter 2 builds on 
the idea (developed in Chapter 1) that CSR encompasses many diverse policies with 
variant effects on profitability that need disentangling. This chapter thus aims at 
understanding the relative importance of corporate extra-financial policies for firm 
performance. It is based on the working paper “Doing Well and Doing Good: A 
Multidimensional Puzzle” (HAL-00672037; submitted to a peer-review journal). 
Contrary to other chapters, data was readily available to tackle Chapter 2 research question. 
The non-financial rating agency Vigeo had indeed granted us access to their database, which 
we matched with the financial performance database Orbis Bureau Von Dijk. The resulting 
database covers 461 large and medium European capitalizations over 1998-2007. CSR data 
encompasses a fairly complete range of policies, namely: environmental performance, good 
business behavior with customers and suppliers, implication in local communities, human 
resources management and governance. 
Once the database ready, solving this multidimensional puzzle still remained far from 
trivial. Indeed, the link between financial performance and multiple CSR dimensions 
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encounters model uncertainty because theories are not explicit enough on which CSR 
dimension belongs to the “true” regression (and under which specification). The influential 
work of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) discusses a similar issue in growth economics, a field in 
which researchers are faced with a multiplicity of possible regressors. Ignoring model 
uncertainty generally results in biased parameter estimates, overconfident standard errors and 
misleading inference. 
Thus to tackle the multidimensional nature of CSR, the chapter introduces model 
averaging, a formal statistical framework that explicitly accounts for model uncertainty. 
Model averaging weights simultaneously all possible models depending on their quality 
and provides a probability distribution for each coefficient estimates. It has already 
proven insightful in several research fields. Beyond its original application to CSR, the 
methodology here presented is a variant that has the potentiality to be relevant to many 
economists for its straightforward implementation. However, as the methodology 
requires large datasets, Chapter 2 is limited to the study of the relationships between CSR 
and financial performance and cannot tackle the causality issue. 
Chapter 2 unveils which CSR dimensions are significantly related to financial performance, 
and which are not. It hence supports that CSR policies do not equally matter to do well and 
do good. In particular, good business behaviors with customers and suppliers stand out as 
core among all CSR dimensions. Environmental performance and human resources 
management are weakly associated with profitability in the studied data, whereas implication 
in local communities and governance are not. Strong evidence is also provided on the co-
existence of policies with optimal levels for financial performance (good-business behaviors 
with customers and suppliers and environmental performance) and policies with monotonic 
relationship (human resources management).  
Findings hence suggest that different CSR dimensions bear different optimums to be reached 
for corporations to manage to do well and do good. Hereby CSR does not come as bundle to 
be blindly promoted, but rather calls for a strategic analysis of the business model to 
carefully select an appropriate policy mix for the firm to be both profitable and 
sustainable. For Private Equity investors, these results imply a need for expertise on CSR 
as grasping where it may yield profits is not obvious. 
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WHERE DOES THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY STAND IN TERMS OF CSR, AND WHY? 
 
Chapter 3 presents literature on socially responsible investment (namely investments 
integrating extra-financial considerations) and highlights its focus on public financial markets 
at the expense of the Private Equity channel. It sets up to characterize the responsible 
investment movement in Private Equity and to analyze its drivers. It is based on a paper co-
written with Patricia Crifo: “Think Global, Invest Responsible: Why the Private Equity 
Industry Goes Green” (forthcoming in the Journal of Business Ethics). 
As pointed out earlier in this introduction, there was neither theoretical guidance nor datasets 
available on CSR in Private Equity. Nevertheless, it was fairly easy to gather anecdotal 
evidence on the issue. Chapter 3 thus first defines and provides historical insights on socially 
responsible investments and Private Equity, contextualizing the integration of responsible 
investment in Private Equity. The fast integration of Environmental, Social and Governance 
issues by mainstream Private Equity investors is thus unveiled and appears to have benefited 
from the maturation of socially responsible investment on public financial markets and the 
impetus of large conventional actors. 
Moreover, hypothesis on the movement characteristics and drivers could be drawn from 
previous CSR, socially responsible investment and corporate finance literatures. Further on, 
the only possibility to effectively characterize this movement was to build a dataset that 
would enable hypotheses testing. Thus public data on 309 French Private Equity management 
firms (99% of the French industry) was hand collected in 2011 using specialized media, press 
releases and firm websites. To get an insider perspective, survey data was also collected in 
partnership with Novethic (Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations) on 74 firms. This painstaking 
work limited data and thus the analysis to the French market.  
Empirical findings support that Private Equity responsible investing is characterized by 
investor engagement and strategically driven by a need for increased risk management and 
differentiation. In particular, results show that independent funds, which need to attract 
investors, are more likely than captive funds to develop socially responsible practices. The 
integration of CSR issues in the Private Equity industry therefore appears in line with 
shareholders’ value maximization and consistent with business improvement. A strong limit 
of the chapter is its exploratory nature. Research extensions should consider building more 
solid a theoretical framework on responsible Private Equity investing. 
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CAN INVESTORS RELY ON CSR TO IDENTIFY PERFORMING FIRMS? 
 
Making money out of CSR is not an easy road, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 4 
aims at investigating an alternative explanation of Private Equity interest for CSR that was not 
tested in Chapter 3. Recent work supports that firms with higher financial performance might 
be those who can afford to use their slack resources for CSR (Baron et al., 2011). Using 
signaling theory, Chapter 4 builds on these stylized facts to theoretically and experimentally 
investigate whether environmental performance (and more generally corporate public good 
provision) can perfectly substitute to other types of money-burning signals to reduce 
information asymmetry in Private Equity negotiations. Chapter 4 is based on the working 
paper: “Green Signaling in Experimental Private Equity Negotiations”. 
The selected approach quite strongly differs in methods from previous chapters. Empirically 
determining the effectiveness of a corporate signal on Private Equity financing is already 
challenging from a data availability point of view, but it becomes even harder when signals 
involve public good provisions. On a more theoretical level, Chapter 4 shows that 
environmental performance can be modeled as a money-burning signal, but it remains unclear 
whether it constitutes a perfect substitute for any money-burning signal. This chapter hence 
turns to the experimental laboratory, which allows controlling the financial decision 
environment and observing behaviors and has thus already enabled many developments of 
financial theory (Pouget, 2001). As usual in laboratory experimental economics, since we aim 
at testing underlying mechanisms and not personal experience, experiment participants were 
not Private Equity specialists. This research was conducted in partnership with the CIRANO 
(Montreal, Canada), whose experimental economics laboratory hosted the experimental 
sessions with the help, advice and support of Jim Engle Warnick.  
A two-signal non-cooperative model of negotiated Private Equity financing was first 
proposed. Theoretical negotiations between Private Equity investors and firms (which could 
be high or low types) occurred sequentially and involved both a price signal and a money-
burning signal. The experimental design then contextualized the money-burning signal by 
allowing firms to either purchase a “green” signal (providing a public good) or a “brown” 
signal (a standard advertisement). Money-burning signals had equivalent monetary incentives 
but differed in their social consequences, as the “green” signal actually contributed to a real 
public good (online carbon offset). The experimental design encompassed 6 treatments 
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depending on the money-burning signal content (green, brown or choice between both) and 
price, which could either be expensive (only affordable by high type firms) or cheap 
(affordable by both firm types); plus a control treatment without signaling. In all treatments, 
model parameters were chosen so that money-burning signals should theoretically never be 
purchased and subjects should converge to a (non-signaling) pooling equilibrium. 296 
subjects took part in the experiment. 
Experimental results are that green signaling is not preferred to standard advertisement and 
money-burning signals are not purchased, in line with theoretical predictions. However, 
equilibrium selection still differs depending on the money-burning signal content. While the 
availability of the brown signal leads to the predicted pooling equilibrium, subjects deviate in 
presence of the green signal and converge to a dominated separating equilibrium that occurs 
through prices. Chapter 4 hence contributes to signaling theory by showing that money-
burning signals that provide public good are not perfect substitute for standard money-burning 
signals. The presence of the public good signal appears to crowd-in actors’ intrinsic 
motivation to reveal their type through prices and converge to a separating equilibrium. In this 
experimental setting, information asymmetry is reduced in Private Equity negotiations but 
public good is not provided. Implications are discussed in terms of equity market 
transparency. 
 
DO SUSTAINABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE PRACTICES IMPACT THE ACCESS TO EQUITY 
FINANCING? 
 
The last chapter of this dissertation aims at measuring the impact both sustainable and 
unsustainable corporate practices have on Private Equity financing. More specifically, its 
purpose is to quantify whether CSR is rewarded by Private Equity investors in terms of firm 
value and investment attractiveness. Chapter 5 is based on a working co-written with Patricia 
Crifo and Sabrina Teyssier: “The Price of Unsustainability: An Experiment with Professional 
Private Equity Investors” (submitted to a peer-review journal). 
As in Chapter 4, the methodology choice was constrained by the fact that Private Equity deal 
prices are not public information. Even if they were, if would be extremely difficult to isolate 
the effect of CSR among all other factors that influence equity financing negotiations. Once 
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again, we thus turned to experimental economics. Contrary to Chapter 4, to be able to 
quantify the actual effect of CSR on firm valuation and Private Equity financing, it was core 
for experiment participants to be investment specialists. We thus built a unique framed field 
experiment in which 33 professional Private Equity investors competed to acquire fictive 
firms. This research was made possible by a partnership with the Sustainable Club of the 
French Private Equity Association and the Private Equity firm Eurazéo PME who supported 
the project, worked with us on the fictive firm case studies to ensure credence and triggered 
participants’ involvement. 
The experimental setting allowed controlling the information that grounds firm-value and 
focusing on the impact of three CSR pillars: Environment, Social and Governance factors. 
The experimental design was based on a model of first-price sealed-bid auctions with 
embarrassment cost, which we show to be incentive compatible. Contrary to Chapter 4, here 
the experiment does no test the model. It rather uses the auction model as a foundation stone 
to ensure firm price revelation. Four treatments were run based on three firm case studies 
carefully built to ensure realism. One treatment was run through a website we developed.  
Results on 330 observations highlight that non-financial performance matters for Private 
Equity financing, both in terms of equity price and access. Main finding is the existence of an 
asymmetrical effect of non-financial performance, entrepreneurs having more to lose from 
unsustainable practices than to gain from sustainable ones. When investors’ heterogeneity is 
controlled for, results unveil that unsustainable policies decrease firm valuation by 
respectively 11%, 10% and 15% for environmental, social, and governance issues. 
Sustainable environmental and social policies only increase firm valuation by 5%, governance 
having no significant impact. Unsustainable practices also decrease investment likelihood by 
about 30%. Chapter 5 concludes that unsustainable corporate policies might both prevent 
equity financing and increase its cost, sustainability thus consisting in a defensive strategy to 
protect firm value and equity access. 
  
  
11 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF CSR: A  SURVEY  
 
What are the economic determinants of CSR? 
 
Abstract  
This chapter analyzes the economics of CSR behaviors, namely business commitments to 
contribute to sustainable development and take responsibility for their impacts on 
society. The issues of why would firms engage in CSR and of its actual impacts have 
triggered academic debate over the past three decades. We give coherency to this 
literature by analyzing CSR as an answer to three types of market imperfections: the 
existence of externalities and public goods, imperfect competition and incomplete 
contracts. For each driver, theoretical arguments and their empirical tests are surveyed. 
Our framework enables us to highlight a twofold discrepancy in the literature: firstly, a 
disconnection between our understanding of CSR drivers and impacts; and secondly, a 
knowledge gap between CSR financial and social consequences, the latter having 
received little attention. 
Résumé 
Ce chapitre analyse les déterminants économiques des comportements de RSE, définie 
comme l’engagement des entreprises à contribuer au développement durable et à assumer 
la responsabilité de leurs impacts sur la société. Pourquoi les entreprises s’engagent dans 
des démarches de RSE, et quels en sont les impacts, sont deux questions académiquement 
débattues depuis trois décennies. Nous donnons de la cohérence à la littérature issue de 
ce débat en analysant la RSE comme une réponse à trois types d’imperfections de 
marché : l’existence d’externalités et de biens publics, la compétition imparfaite, et les 
contrats incomplets. Pour chacun de ces déterminants, nous passons en revue arguments 
théoriques et tests empiriques. Notre cadre analytique nous permet de mettre en exergue 
deux failles de la littérature : d’une part, une déconnection entre notre compréhension des 
déterminants de la RSE et de ses impacts ; et d’autre part, un déséquilibre entre notre 
connaissances des conséquences financières et sociales de la RSE, ces dernières  n’ayant 
que peu été explorées. 
Chapter 1 is based on a working paper co-written with Patricia Crifo (same title; HAL-00720640) 
submitted to  a peer-reviewed journal.  
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last fifty years have witnessed striking net gains in global economic development and 
human wealth creation. However, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) established 
that this growth was achieved at the costs of a ”substantial and largely irreversible loss in the 
diversity of life on Earth (...), the degradation of many ecosystem services, increased risks of 
nonlinear changes, and the exacerbation of poverty for some groups of people”. Hereby the 
international panel of experts concluded that the ability of the planet ecosystems to sustain 
future generations was jeopardized unless those problems were soon addressed by our society. 
From an economic perspective, the world imbalance depicted by the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment can be analyzed as a market failure, with some economic agents (including future 
generations) suffering negative externalities arising from other agents’ activity and wealth 
growth. Inefficient allocations resulting from market failures often justify political 
intervention in the market place (Ledyard, 2008). However, a large body of literature 
highlights that governments also suffer failures and might not necessarily be more efficient 
than markets when attempting to fix allocations (for a review on the specific case of 
environmental policy, see Hepburn, 2007). 
This paper asks whether firms, which ground our economic activity, can be part of the 
solutions for sustainable development through Corporate Social Responsibility (labeled CSR 
hereafter). Friedman (1970)’s answer to this issue is that the sole responsibility of businesses 
is to increase profits. Corporations should not substitute for elected government to provide 
public goods and spend shareholders’ money for “doing good” without benefiting from the 
required political legitimacy. Yet Bénabou and Tirole (2010) argue that CSR represents a 
response to market and redistributive imperfections because of government failures or in 
order to promote values that are not shared by law makers.  
The objective facts are that over the past two decades, corporations have struggled to become, 
or at least to appear as socially responsible. Almost two thirds of the biggest firms in 
industrialized countries have published a report on CSR or on sustainable development 
policies (KPMG, 2011). At the same time, a considerable attention in the literature has been 
given to the definition of CSR, the analysis of its determinants and the measure of its impact 
on firm performance, especially in the field of management sciences and economics of 
organizations. Unfortunately, a critical observer of this large and evolving literature will 
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necessarily note that the concept of CSR is used, explained and supported by a wide array of 
contradictory evidences and arguments between authors. The literature is also blurred by the 
interweaving of terminologies such as corporate sustainability, business sustainability, 
business ethics and CSR, relying on overlapping concepts (van Marrewijk, 2003). 
We here chose to focus on the CSR concept to capture corporate efforts towards sustainable 
development, thus acknowledging and reflecting the international spread of the terminology 
in both business and institutional spheres (OECD 2011, World Bank 2003). Multiple CSR 
definitions have been proposed, either from an economic (Baron, 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2010) or a managerial perspective (Carroll, 1979; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). This paper 
takes a clear and practical stand by using the CSR definition proposed by the European 
Commission in 2011. Indeed, this regulatory cornerstone is likely to shape corporate 
understanding and further efforts towards sustainable development. For the European 
Commission, being responsible means that, beyond legal constraints, firms take responsibility 
for their impacts on society. A prerequisite is the respect for applicable legislation and 
collective agreements between social partners. In our framework, contrary to early definitions 
(such as Carroll’s 1979), CSR thus goes beyond obeying law. Further on, socially responsible 
enterprises should integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer 
concerns into their business operations and core strategy with the double aim of maximizing 
the creation of shared value for their shareholders, stakeholders and society; and identifying, 
preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts.  
This official definition hides in practice a large range of socially responsible behaviors. The 
Global Reporting Initiative, one of the most prevalent CSR reporting framework worldwide, 
promote for instance performance disclosure on strategy and profile (including corporate 
governance, stakeholder management and performance indicators implementation); economic 
(that is flows of capital among stakeholders and the main economic impacts throughout 
society); environmental; social (labor practices, training, and decent work); respect of human 
rights; impacts on local communities (including bribery and corruption) and lastly product 
responsibility (directly affecting consumers). The sole environmental category encompasses 
thirty performance indicators, clustered in ten items: materials used and recycling; energy 
consumption and efficiency; water consumption; biodiversity protection; emissions, effluents 
and waste; impact mitigation of products and services; compliance with environmental laws; 
transport and finally global environmental expenditures. In the financial sphere, for the 
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purpose of tractability, CSR policies are often clustered into three wide domains: 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.  
Hereby the reality of the CSR concept, while being aligned with sustainable development 
aspirations, is utterly complex and the questions of why would firms engage in CSR and what 
are its actual impacts are far from trivial. The broadness of the literature dealing with CSR 
reflects this complexity. In this article, we present a survey of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the determinants and consequences of CSR using an economic lens. We give it 
coherency by analyzing CSR as an answer to different types of market and government 
failures, and we organize the literature along those. In turn, CSR may arise from three 
categories of market imperfections, which structure our review: externalities and public 
goods; imperfect competition and incomplete contracts. For each motive, theoretical 
arguments and their empirical test are surveyed. This economic perspective enables us to 
provide a unified framework of the forces driving CSR. We then review the literature on CSR 
impacts on both firm performance and society. We thus highlight a twofold discrepancy in the 
literature: first, a disconnection between our understanding of CSR drivers and impacts; and 
second, a knowledge gap between CSR financial and social consequences, the latter having 
received little attention. Figure 1.1 illustrates how we analyze the literature. 
Section 1.2 tackles a first source of market and government failures, which is the existence of 
externalities and public good. Governments may provide such goods or correct such 
externalities at the optimal level only in the case of perfect information. Otherwise, privately 
providing public goods or internalizing externalities may occur under the pressure of the 
regulator, activists such as NGOs, or altruistic actors. Section 1.3 develops the literature on 
CSR driven by imperfect competition, generating product differentiation and market 
competition strategies. Section 1.4 presents imperfect contracts as a third source of market 
failure that motivates CSR as the delegated responsibility of shareholders, employees or firm 
managers in the presence of contract incompleteness. We then present in section 1.5 the 
literature main conclusions on the impacts of CSR on firm performance on the one hand, and 
on society as a whole on the other hand, hereby highlighting the lack of knowledge on the 
latter. Future research paths are finally suggested in section 1.6. 
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FIGURE 1.1 - Structure of the CSR literature 
Structure of the literature on CSR drivers (top), subsequent policies (middle) and consequences 
(bottom) 
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1.2. CSR AS EXTERNALITY INTERNALIZATION AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 
 
Most CSR activities, based in particular on environmental and social factors, aim at reducing 
negative externalities (e.g. pollution abatement) or generating positive externalities (e.g. 
financing hospitals). Privately providing public goods hence is an important part of CSR 
activities. We present in this section three types of motivations for such private provision of 
public goods: deterring public regulations or public politics, responding to social pressure or 
private politics, or exerting one’s own moral duty to undertake social activities. Table 1.1 
summarizes the key literature on CSR as an externality Integration and private provision of 
public good and highlights how each motive relates to a different source of market and 
government failure and yields a different CSR policy. 
 
1.2.1. CSR, PUBLIC POLITICS AND REGULATION PREEMPTION 
 
A first determinant of firms’ responsible behaviors arises from the regulator action. The threat 
of fines, new regulation compliance and other regulatory costs may induce higher CSR 
activities, but CSR may also be a response to government failure. Friedman (1970)’s view on 
CSR, according to which spending someone else’s money for a general social interest 
amounts to taxes and proceeds squandering for “social” purpose without political legitimacy, 
in fact vanishes when either government fails or wishes not to crowd-out private provision of 
public goods. So do CSR activities actually substitute for or complement public regulations in 
terms of public good provision, in particular when government fails? 
On the one hand, CSR may substitute to the regulation when it preempts it. Lutz et al. (2000) 
propose a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which a minimum quality 
standard increases welfare but negatively impacts industry profits because reduced quality 
differentiation intensifies price competition. Thus to reduce regulatory costs, firms seek to 
preempt regulations before their promulgation, inducing the regulator to weaken its standards: 
welfare falls but profits increase. In the context of “corporate environmentalism”, Maxwell et 
al. (2000) identify conditions under which firms can profitably preempt regulatory threats and 
find that preemption occurs when industry organizing and lobbying costs are high. Empirical 
tests of the preemption theory are often based on case studies (see Arjaliès and Ponssard, 
2010). Focusing on the metal-finishing industry, Brouhle et al. (2009) econometrically 
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evaluate the respective influence on carbon emissions of a voluntary program and of the threat 
of formal regulation. Participation in the program and significant emission reductions were 
shown to be related to several forms of external pressure, including the regulatory threat. 
On the other hand, Maxwell and Decker (2006) note that many environmental investments 
seem to be aimed at reducing the costs of complying with existing regulations, thereby 
suggesting that firm’s environmental performance and regulation are complements rather than 
substitutes. Here the regulator acts as an enforcer of existing environmental regulations and 
responds to voluntary environmental investments by reducing the frequency with which it 
monitors the firm. The firm is motivated to take action because of the reduction of its 
expected fine. Sam and Innes (2008) empirically support this reinforcement theory by 
showing that participation in a toxic waste reduction program (US 33/50) was motivated by 
the expectation of relaxed regulatory scrutiny. Using data on approximately 4000 facilities in 
seven OECD countries, Johnstone and Labonne (2009) provide strong evidence that 
environmental certification serves as a signal to regulatory authorities. 
Beyond reinforcement theory, CSR might also complement regulations in cases of 
government failures, which have multiple origins (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010): for instance 
capture by lobbies and other interest groups; territoriality of jurisdiction (as for child labor for 
instance); or a combination of inefficiency, high transaction costs, poor information and high 
delivery costs. For instance, the regulator may share the desire to reduce costs of regulation 
and thus be willing to negotiate voluntary agreements (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). 
 
1.2.2. CSR AS A RESPONSE TO SOCIAL PRESSURE AND PRIVATE POLITICS 
 
Citizens and social activists can also make direct demands for firms to integrate their negative 
externalities, such as water pollution or toxic air emissions. Hence a major determinant of 
CSR activities would be to respond to social pressure or deter private politics. According to 
Baron (2003), the term ‘private’ means that the parties do not rely on public order 
(lawmaking), while ‘politics’ refers to individual and collective action. As emphasized by 
Van den Berghe and Louche (2005) « companies are facing a new invisible hand, that is non-
market forces exerted by NGOs, media trade-union and others, and influenced by this new 
invisible hand, they start to consider CSR as prerequisite for sustainable growth and 
welfare ». When CSR activities consist in private social redistribution and partial 
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internalization of firm externalities, our society might consider the activity and use of public 
goods by less responsible firms as socially unfair and thus withdraw its “license to operate” 
(Post et al., 2002). When does a corporation become contestable and how can CSR mitigate 
contestability? How do social activists exert pressure on firms? Why are some firms targeted 
and others not? 
The theory of contestable management states that anticipated threats of social protest can 
effectively discipline firm’s behavior. Using the instructive case of the Genetically Modified 
Organism industry boycott in France, Hommel and Godard (2001, 2002) consider that a 
firm’s contestability is characterized by its exposure to two types of threats: contestation of its 
social license to produce and innovate, based on environmental or health-related risks to the 
community attributed to the firm’s products or processes; and economic contestation from 
competitors. Hence for a corporate activity to become contestable, firms need to either be 
innovators of belong to notoriously dirty industries, and be significant actors on their market. 
The link between firm visibility on its market and CSR level has been found in many 
empirical studies (Margolis and Walsh, 2001). As such, CSR can be a strategic policy to 
prevent social contestability and protects the firm long term interests (Hommel and Godard, 
2001). 
Recent contributions from the economics of networks and social capital enrich the previous 
idea by supporting that CSR can modify business and social networks, thus providing firms 
with strategic flexibility. Burt (2001, p.32) defines social capital as “the contextual 
complement to human capital. The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better 
are somewhat better connected”. The author also defines holes in structural social networks 
and argues that individuals whose relationships span such holes gain competitive advantage 
(p.34). Quenneville-Éthier and Sinclair-Desgagné (2010) demonstrate that CSR enables firms 
to do so. Using the case of the multinational Rio Tinto Alcan in remote Canadian and French 
communities, the authors analyze how CSR may alleviate multinationals’ high exit costs from 
mono-industrial regions by reducing community dependence to these multinationals.  
Most often, social pressure is not directly exerted by citizens but rather by social activists, 
such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Defined by Baron (2001) as private 
politics, NGOs make direct demands on corporations enforced either by threats (boycott, 
negative propaganda) or rewards (endorsements), without reliance on public institutions or 
shareholders. Baron and Dirmeier (2007) highlight that the former is likelier than the latter, 
threats being more likely to decrease the level of the targeted activity. NGOs campaigns are a 
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powerful lever of social pressure designed to negatively impact sales, employee morale and 
corporate recruitment efforts. Moreover, Sinclair-Desgagné and Gozlan (2003) theoretically 
show that when NGOs wield big threat, it can induce “green” firms to distinguish themselves 
by issuing a detailed CSR report; whereas if weak, they release only moderately informed 
CSR reports as other firms do. Based on signaling theory, Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) also 
point out that information-supplying activist can alter the decisions of firms and consumers 
and enhance the social welfare of market exchange. A framework for consumers’ motivations 
for boycott participation has been proposed and tested on a case study by Klein et al. (2004). 
Focusing on facilities reporting to toxic release inventory from 1988 to 1994, Sam and Innes 
(2008) find empirical evidence that participation in voluntary programs and pollutant 
reductions were prompted by a firm’s likelihood of becoming a boycott target. 
However, not all contestable firms become the target of social activists. Visibility is increased 
by the extent of the public contact, as in consumer-oriented industries (Margolis and Walsh, 
2001) or notoriously dirty industries (Brown et al., 2006). Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) add 
that firms selling experience goods (whose quality cannot be observed before use, but is 
ascertained upon consumption, such as a bottle of wine) or credence goods (whose quality 
cannot be evaluated in normal use, such as bioorganic wine) are more likely to be socially 
responsible than firms selling search goods (whose quality is easily ascertain, such as a wine 
glass). In this literature, social pressure appears as a major driver of CSR for large, consumer-
oriented or notorious firms which commit to it in order to protect their license-to-operate.  
NGOs do not necessarily target firms with highest levels of negative externalities. Baron and 
Dirmeier (2007) indeed develop a theory of adversarial NGOs campaigns displaying that 
NGOs prefer to target sequentially one firm rather than multiple firms simultaneously, pick up 
issues with high social values, and finally target firms more likely to be responsive to the 
campaign. Baron (2009) also highlights that if citizens do not distinguish between morally 
motivated CSR and CSR induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the 
softer, morally motivated firm. In other words, this soft firm hypothesis states that social 
activists may in fact target their campaign against morally-managed firms because they have 
more to lose from the campaign than do self-interested firms. Empirical support is brought by 
Baron et al. (2008) on a large sample of firms over the 1996-2004 period. 
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TABLE 1.1 - Literature on CSR as externality integration and private public good provision  
Market and government failure sources CSR policy Literature on this CSR driver 
Related CSR impacts 
on firm performance 
Related CSR impacts on 
society 
Information 
asymmetry 
(regulator / 
firm) 
Firm 
negative 
externalities 
State 
territoriality 
of 
jurisdiction 
Other 
 
Theory Empirical tests Theory 
Empirical 
tests 
Theory 
Empirical 
tests 
yes yes no Government 
capture by 
lobbies or 
interest groups 
Voluntary 
agreement 
before 
regulation 
Regulation 
Preemption 
(Lutz et al. 2000; 
Maxwell et al. 
2000) 
Brouhle et al. 
2009 
Lutz et 
al. 2000 
 Lutz et al. 
2000, 
Fleckinger 
and Glachant 
2011 
Brouhle et 
al. 2009 
yes yes no Government 
high 
transaction/ 
monitoring 
costs 
Voluntary 
agreement 
after 
regulation 
Regulation 
reinforcement  
(Maxwell and 
Decker 2006) 
Sam and Innes 
2008; 
Johnstonne and 
Labonne 2009 
  Maxwell and 
Decker 2006 
 
yes yes yes - Shield from 
citizens’ 
pressure 
Contestability 
(Hommel and 
Godard 2001) 
Hommel and 
Godard 2001 
    
yes yes yes Monopole Investments in 
community 
Social capital (Burt 
2000) 
Quenneville-
Éthier and 
Sinclair-
Desgagné 2010 
    
yes yes yes - Shield from 
citizens’ 
pressure 
License-to-operate  
(Post et al. 2002) 
Brown et al. 
2006; Siegel and 
Vitaliano 2007 
    
yes yes yes - Shield from 
activists’ 
pressure 
Private politics 
(Baron and 
Dirmeier 2007, 
Sinclair Desgagné 
and Gozlan 2003) 
Sam and Innes 
2008 
 Baron et 
al. 2008 
Feddersen 
and Gilligan 
2001, 
Heyes and 
Maxwell 
2004 
 
no yes no - Profit 
sacrifice in 
social interest 
Bénabou and Tirole 
2010,  
Baron 2010 
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1.2.3. CSR, ALTRUISM AND PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIORS 
 
Finally, recent developments in psychology and behavioral economics can be used to examine 
CSR as a behavior of ’sacrificing profits in the social interest’ (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). In 
this interpretation, CSR is a prosocial behavior which reflects managers’ willingness to 
engage in philanthropic activities, provide public good and internalize the negative 
externalities of their corporation. Typically this corresponds to Milton Friedman (1970)’s 
view that CSR amounts to spending others’ money for individual pro-social motivations. 
Economic agents may want to promote values that are not shared by law-makers. Because 
preferences are heterogeneous, it is inevitable that some managers’ values will not be fully 
reflected in policy and projected onto their corporate decisions. Pro-social behaviors result 
from several interacting motivations, from intrinsic (genuine) altruism to extrinsic (material) 
motivation, social and self-esteem concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Image concerns may 
hence act as a cheap incentive device to induce responsible behaviors. For Baron (2010) as 
well, CSR may be viewed as self-regulation motivated by moral concerns. More precisely, he 
characterizes the scope of self-regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral 
preferences and analyzes how free-riding problems may be mitigated in this context. 
Empirically, tests of managers’ pro-social behaviors most often merge with tests of the 
agency theory in which CSR is considered as a management perquisite (Baron et al., 2008; 
Brown et al., 2006). 
Yet, pro-social motivation may also be subject to offsetting effects. Searching out excessive 
social prestige may crowd out the incentive provided by publicity on pro-social behaviors. 
The more advertised CSR activities are, the more they might be discounted as mere image-
seeking rather than altruism. In this line, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theory of pro-
social behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns 
for social reputation or self-respect. Moreover, ‘buying’ social prestige with CSR may be a 
zero-sum game. For instance, the buyer of a hybrid car feels and looks better, but makes his 
neighbors (both buyers and non-buyers of hybrid cars) feel and look worse (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2010). From a public policy perspective, pro-social behaviors stemming from image 
concerns imply another externality. In fact, the image value ‘bought’ by a responsible firm 
increases the private individual return of the firm and partly reduces the negative social 
externality costs to be corrected. Hence, CSR motivated by altruism or pro-social behaviors 
may substitute partly to publicly provided public good. 
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Finally, individuals can express their moral concerns about the ethical behavior of companies 
by means of ethical buying or ethical consumption. How firms can strategically exploit this 
consumer preference anchored in pro-social behavior is the focus of next section. 
 
1.3. CSR AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY IN IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
 
The second category of determinants of CSR behaviors lies in product market structure and 
imperfect competition. In a world populated by heterogeneous consumers including ’green’ 
actors, a subset of producers can be expected to take voluntary steps to improve their 
environmental or social performance in order to obtain a label and extract a green premium. 
Basically, firms competing in imperfect markets may, and often do, over-comply with 
existing laws, thereby developing CSR activities (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010). We 
successively consider product differentiation generated by consumers’ heterogeneity, 
subsequent market structures, and the misuse of information asymmetry under the form of 
green-washing. Table 1.2 summarizes the key literature on CSR driven by imperfect 
competition and highlights how each motive relates to a different source of market failure and 
yields a different CSR policy. 
 
1.3.1. CSR, CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
 
If a firm can identify customers willing to pay for ethical goods and if it can defend the 
resultant niche against imitators, business strategy in this context is like any other form of 
product differentiation, with the same basic economics (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010): the 
opportunity arises because of asymmetric information, economies of scale, and intellectual-
property protection. 
A large number of articles consider CSR as a product differentiation strategy, with firms 
privately producing public goods to attract ethically oriented consumers. Arora and 
Gangopadhyay (1995) propose a standard model of vertical product differentiation to capture 
consumer heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for environmental attributes. More recently, 
Besley and Ghatak (2007) examine the optimal level of CSR provision in competitive market 
equilibrium where CSR corresponds to the creation of public goods and curtailment of public 
bads jointly with the production of private goods, and firms compete for “ethical” and neutral 
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consumers. They show that in equilibrium, firms sell both ethical and neutral brands, 
consumers self-select according to their valuation of the public good, and CSR creates a 
Pareto improvement (see also Baron, 2007; Becchetti et al., 2005; Graff Zivin and Small, 
2005). 
Empirically, opinion polls indeed tend to report an increasing concern for ethical consumption 
(De Pelsmacker et al., 2005). For instance, 46% European consumers claim to be willing to 
pay substantially more for ethical products (MORI, 2000). Consumer’s willingness to pay 
appears asymmetric between sinners and saints products (the former inducing stronger 
reactions) and dependent on the CSR issue tackled, product quality and individual factors 
(Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). In the food sector, Giraud-Héraud and Hoffman (2010) point 
out how consumers might be willing to have safe and healthy food but are having difficulties 
to practically pay for it. Loureiro and Lotade (2005) also reveal using a face-to-face survey 
that consumers are willing to pay higher premiums for fair trade and shade grown coffee 
labels than for organic coffee. 
From this perspective, labels and certification play a core role in product differentiation 
strategies to reduce information asymmetry. Indeed, Darby and Karni (1973) point out that 
when consumers cannot observe the quality of a firm product, there are strong incentives for 
opportunistic behavior, and the resulting equilibrium does not maximize social welfare. As 
they cannot be evaluated in normal use, as is the case of CSR, credence qualities need 
additional costly information for consumers to believe in them. Labels can be awarded by 
social activists, as in the signaling model of Feddersen and Gilligan (2001). For Baron (2010), 
various types of organizations providing assurance (certification) and information (social 
labels) on CSR have different impacts on free-riding. Social labels allow individuals with 
stronger moral preferences to separate from those with weaker moral preferences, but are not 
able to expand the scope of self-regulation beyond that with unconditional altruism. 
Certifications can do so and attract individuals with both stronger and weaker moral 
preferences. Illustrating this effect, Bjorner et al. (2004) followed a large panel of Danish 
consumers over 1997-2001 and quantified at +13-18% the price premium for certified (the 
Nordic Swan) toilet paper. In the same line, Eichholtz et al. (2010) assembled a sample of 
about 10 000 US office buildings and evaluated that “green” (energy efficiency) certification 
increased effective rents by 7% and selling prices by about 16%. 
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TABLE 1.2 - Literature on CSR as business strategy in imperfect competition 
Market failure sources   CSR policy literature on this CSR driver 
Related CSR impacts 
on firm performance 
Related CSR 
impacts on society 
Consumer 
heterogeneous 
preferences 
Information 
asymmetry 
Entry 
barriers 
Other   Theory Empirical tests Theory 
Empirical 
tests 
Theory 
Empirical 
tests 
yes no no - Product 
differentiation 
Reinhardt and 
Stavins 2010, 
Arora and 
Gangopadhyay 
1995 
De Plelsmacker et 
al. 2005, Sen and 
Bhattacharya 2001, 
Giraud Héraud and 
Hoffman 2010 
Besley 
and 
Ghatak 
2007 
  Besley 
and 
Ghatak 
2007 
  
yes yes no - Product 
differentiation with 
label and 
certification 
Feddersen and 
Gilligan 2001; 
Baron 2010 
Bjorner et al. 2004; 
Eichholtz et al. 2010 
  Bjorner et 
al. 2004; 
Eichholtz et 
al. 2010 
    
yes yes no Market 
concentration 
Differentiation in 
concentrated 
markets 
Bagnoli and Watts 
2003, Hull and 
Rothenberg 2008 
Fernandez-Kranz 
and Santalo 2010 
        
yes yes no - Communication 
and/or 
greenwashing 
Lyon and Maxwell 
2011 
Kim and Lyon 
2011, Elfenbein et 
al. 2009 
        
no yes yes First-mover 
advantage 
Innovation and 
change of 
processes 
Porter's hypothesis 
(Porter and van der 
Linde 1995;Cerin 
2006) 
Ambec and Barla 
2006, Derwall et al. 
2006, Lanoi et al. 
2011 
        
no yes yes First-mover 
advantage 
Creation of non-
tariff barriers by 
certification 
Chambolle and 
Giraud-Héraud 
2005 
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1.3.2. CSR AND IMPERFECT MARKET STRUCTURES 
 
We analyze in turn CSR determinants pertaining to competition intensity, reduction of 
production costs, entry barriers, and market opening following innovation. 
Comparing examples of censured activities, Shleifer (2004) identifies that, when unethical 
behavior cuts costs, competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs’ incomes, thereby 
reducing their willingness to pay for ethical conduct. Thus unethical corporate behavior might 
arise from competition rather than pure greed. However, when firms compete for socially 
responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good to sales of their private 
goods, social activities can become a by-product of product-market competition. Bagnoli and 
Watts (2003) hence theoretically show that the level of private provision of public good vary 
inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market. Empirical support of this 
prediction is brought in Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010)’s explicit test of the link 
between product market competition and CSR. They find that market concentration appears 
negatively related to environmental and social ratings and that increased competition due to 
higher import penetration leads to superior CSR performance. In the same line, Hull and 
Rothenberg (2008) also show that CSR most strongly affects performance in low-innovation 
firms and in industries with little differentiation. 
Reducing production costs to increase profitability is another rationale of market pressure. 
The famous Porter’s hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) upholds that environmental 
regulation triggers innovation and production cost reduction (for instance increased input / 
output efficiency), leading to competitive advantage. Widely investigated, empirical evidence 
on Porter’s hypothesis appears mixed, as detailed in the thorough review of Ambec and Barla 
(2006). Margolis et al. (2009)’s meta-analysis concludes on a positive link between corporate 
environmental policies and profitability, driven by studies such as Derwall et al. (2005) that 
focuses on eco-efficiency. Nevertheless, recent works jointly taking into account multiple 
dimensions of CSR (environment, human resources, community involvements, etc.) 
contradict those findings (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Brammer et al., 2006). More directly, 
Cerin (2006) heavily puts into question the theoretical fundamentals of the Porter’s 
hypothesis. 
A related determinant of CSR activities lies in raising entry barriers and competitors’ costs. 
Enforced social or environmental corporate policies can raise regulatory barriers for firm 
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competitors. An insightful path is opened by Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud (2005) who 
formalize product certification as a non-tariff barrier. By reducing competition intensity on 
the protected market, CSR entrance barriers can increase firm profitability. An illustration is 
recounted in Lyon and Maxwell (2008): the Florverde Program would have enabled the 
European cut flower market suppliers to be chosen based on pesticides use, thus inducing 
Columbian producers to promote environmentally friendly practices. However, empirical 
evidence beyond specific case studies is scarce in the literature. 
The last element of competition related to CSR is innovation, which has been the focus of 
several empirical papers. Lanoie et al. (2011) use data on 4200 facilities in seven OECD 
countries and find strong support for environmental regulation stimulating environmental 
innovations. Wagner (2008) also finds that environmental management systems are associated 
with process innovation, while product innovations are more induced by information to 
consumers and eco-labeling. Based on survey data, Demirel and Kesidou (2011) show that 
eco-innovation is driven by the need for increased efficiency; whereas environmental 
regulation stimulates end-of-pipeline technologies and environmental research and 
development. Market innovation can also take social forms, as in the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid 
strategies. For instance, Murphy et al. (2012) highlight how firms can invest in social issues to 
prepare new market opportunities in emerging countries. 
 
1.3.3. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, REPUTATION AND GREENWASHING 
 
Whereas ethical consumption and agent heterogeneity can ground product differentiation and 
strategic market competition, the credence good property of CSR makes it very dependent on 
information asymmetry and increases the risk of free-riding. However, free riding on CSR can 
turn out to be highly damageable for firm reputation. 
As an increasing number of firms nowadays make a lot of effort to appear as socially 
responsible, many of them are criticized for being “greenwashers”. Greenwashing is a term 
generally used when significantly more money or time has been spent advertising being green 
(that is, operating with consideration for the environment), rather than spending resources on 
environmentally sound practices. Greenwashing in a sense echoes Bénabou and Tirole 
(2006)’s theory of pro-social behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and 
greed with concerns for social reputation. Those authors show how doubt is thus created about 
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the true motive for which good deeds are performed, which can lead to a reduction of social 
welfare (the reputation-stealing effect). A theoretical model of greenwash has been proposed 
by Lyon and Maxwell (2011), who characterize it as the selective disclosure of positive 
information about a company’s environmental or social performance, while withholding 
negative information on these dimensions.  
As put by Walley and Whitehead (1994), “it is not easy being green”. Indeed, if the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for CSR is insufficient, ethical standard adhesion costs 
represent a competitive disadvantage. An illustration is provided by Bagnoli and Watts (2003) 
who show that if conventional products are highly competitive with low prices, fewer 
consumers wish to buy “green”. Moreover, CSR being in essence a transparent activity, even 
if the early mover advantage does enhance profits, it soon erodes as competitive strategies 
copy it (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Beyond 
anecdotes, greenwashing has already been pinned down in a few empirical papers. In 
particular, Kim and Lyon (2008) compare voluntary disclosures of reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the electric utility sector against actual emissions and demonstrate that, in the 
aggregate, the program had no effect on carbon intensity. 
Yet protecting firm reputation is an important motive for CSR activities beyond 
greenwashing. Consumers’ memory can indeed be long-lasting. Kotler and Lee (2005) hence 
develop a framework that explains why charitable activities are good for business from a 
marketing perspective. Portney (2008) highlights that the firms’ belief that beyond 
compliance behavior will help curry favor with current and potential future customers is 
particularly true for firms in the food and consumer product businesses. Linking advertising, 
competition and CSR, Fisman et al. (2006) present a signaling model in which CSR may 
serve as a means of vertical differentiation in a market where quality is difficult to observe. 
Analyzing natural experiments on eBay where sellers offer identical products with and 
without charity donations, Elfenbein et al. (2009) observe behaviors in line with Fisman et al. 
(2006)’ predictions. Based on a sample of over 150,000 auctions, they observe that in the 
presence of little information about the reliability of a seller, charity commitments play a 
significant role in establishing trust. Also supporting Fisman et al. (2006)’s theoretical 
predictions, Brown et al. (2006) find that firms that advertise more intensively also give more 
to charity, while Hines and Ames (2000) report that 68% of interviewed consumers claimed to 
have bought a product or service because of a firm CSR reputation. CSR thus appears as a 
lever to build up firm reputation, considered as a strategic intangible asset. 
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1.4. CSR AS DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY IN IMPERFECT CONTRACTS 
 
The third category of market imperfections grounding CSR strategies is anchored in contract 
incompleteness. Corporations indeed consist in a nexus for a set of contractual relationships 
between individuals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Yet when two parties enter into a 
relationship in which assets will be used to generate income, it might be too costly to detail all 
specific rights of control (Grossman and Hart, 1986), yielding distortions and inefficiencies. 
To reduce these inefficiencies, organizations (such as firms) create institutions to allocate 
ownership over physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1990), authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) 
or power (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Firm contract incompleteness particularly affects 
relationships between shareholders, employees and managers, which might require the 
extension of corporate responsibility towards environmental, social and governance issues. 
This section hence surveys the literature on CSR considered as the delegated responsibility of 
successively firm shareholders, then firm employees and lastly firm managers. Table 1.3 
summarizes the key literature on CSR driven by imperfect contracts and highlights how each 
motive relates to a different source of market failure and yields a different CSR policy. 
 
1.4.1. CSR AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS 
 
Shareholders hold a major stand with full legitimacy to ask, in addition to fiduciary duties, the 
firm they own to engage in CSR. In a review of shareholder activism to promote CSR, 
Sjöström (2008) underlines that five key themes emerge in the literature: (i) shareholder 
proposals in the United States; (ii) the effects of shareholder activism on corporate policy and 
practice; shareholders activism by respectively: (iii) NGOs; (iv) unions and (v) pension funds. 
In a recent empirical work, Dam and Scholtens (2012) demonstrate that ownership types 
matter for CSR policies in Europe. We here focus on the literature about shareholder 
delegated responsibility undertaken by socially responsible investors. We first present 
literature describing those investors and then their impacts on CSR. 
In both Europe and the United States, about 1 dollar out of 9 is estimated to incorporate 
environmental, social and governance considerations in the investment decision process 
(Eurosif, 2010; Social Investment Forum, 2010). The socially responsible investment markets 
is often described as having a « striking » growth, but recent work suggests it to rather be a 
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niche market “less growing than buzzing” (Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2010). A survey of 
the sustainability and ethical indices usually used by investors is provided by Hoti et al. 
(2007), along their risk evaluation. The impact of socially responsible investors on firms’ 
business strategies can be a very powerful determinant of CSR policies (Lee, 2008). Chatterji 
et al. (2009) distinguish four motivations of social investors: financial (believing that CSR 
increases firm performance), deontological (not willing to profit from unethical or heinous 
actions), consequentialist (rewarding good behavior and providing incentive) and expressive 
(expressing personal identity to yourself or others). Delegated responsibility covers essentially 
those last three points. Investors are also highly aware of regulatory context and opportunities, 
as illustrated in Takeda and Tomozawa (2008)’ investigation of stock price reactions to the 
release of environmental management ranking (issued by a Nikkei newspaper) in Japan from 
1998 to 2005. Their results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 
2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental 
policies. 
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of responsible investors on CSR strategies relates 
to the abundant literature on the links between financial performance and CSR that will be 
detailed in section 1.5. This literature focuses on the trade-off between different types of 
performance. One possibility is that environmental or social performance improves to the 
detriment of classical financial performance. Another possibility is that both types of 
performance are correlated, in the short run, or at least in the long run. One way to answer 
these issues is to analyze the impact of responsible practices on the cost of capital. Heinkel et 
al. (2001) demonstrate that 20% of social activists are needed in the market for it to impact 
firm’s capital cost, which is empirically verified by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). Also in line 
with these findings, Gollier and Pouget (2012) theoretically show that socially responsible 
investors can affect corporate strategy via voting (or via engagement) and analyze how 
activist investors can design profitable and socially effective strategies.  
Other types of studies provide insightful information on the link between socially responsible 
investments and performance. Modeling socially responsible investments as a composite 
commodity which combines a financial investment product with a charitable giving vehicle, 
Graff Zivin and Small (2005) show that rents are not necessarily lower in case of natural 
monopolies, niche markets, imperfect information, regulatory distortions, anti-takeover laws 
and other market imperfections. Empirically, Van de Velde et al. (2005) display no 
performance difference between socially responsible and conventional funds when they 
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control for style differences within the portfolio. Barnett and Salomon (2006) combine 
modern portfolio and stakeholder theories, and hypothesize that the financial loss born by a 
socially responsible fund due to poor diversification is offset as social screening intensifies 
because better-managed and more stable firms are selected into its portfolio. Focusing on 
French mutual funds, Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2012) support this finding. Galema et al. 
(2008) explain why so studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between socialIy responsible 
investments and performance by showing that they impacts stock returns by lowering the 
book-to-market ratio and not by generating positive alphas in a linear regression model. In 
view of those studies, socially responsible investments thus appear as an increasing and 
effective lever which can penalize firms with insufficient CSR, at least without harming 
investors’ profitability, likely improving it on the long run. 
 
1.4.2. CSR AS DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES 
 
The second category of firm stakeholders whose responsibility can be delegated through CSR 
is the labor force. We first present the literature on the interactions of global CSR and 
employees, before focusing on proactive human resources policies. 
As a starting point, CSR can appear as a signal for corporate culture and thus contribute to 
shaping worker identity and incentives (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Brekke and Nyborg 
(2008) demonstrate in their model that ”green” firms can recruit motivated employees with 
team work values and hereby secure firm survival and long-term performance. Based on 
propositions from social identity theory and signaling theory, Turban and Greening (1997) 
also propose that CSR can attract good employees, which is empirically supported by 
Backhaus et al. (2002). Albinger and Freeman (2000) nonetheless precise that CSR 
attractiveness only concerns highly qualified employees. High level of CSR can also reduce 
costly employee turnover (Portney 2008). Motivated employees might also be likely to accept 
lower wages than the fair market value because they are compensated through the knowledge 
that their work satisfies their personal values, as illustrated by Frank (1996) in an experiment 
on Cornell University graduates. Lanfranchi and Pekovic (2011) also observe that employees 
working for ”green” firms are significantly more likely to report a higher feeling of usefulness 
in their job and to describe themselves as fairly valued than other workers in France in 2006. 
Whereas those employees do not claim to be more actively involved in their job, they are 
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nevertheless significantly more likely, ceteris paribus, to work uncompensated for 
supplementary work hours. 
Proactive human resources policy in itself appears to increase firm performance through 
productivity. This positive link is found by Jones and Murrell (2001) on the stock returns of 
the 51 firms included in the ‘Working Mother List’; by Galbreath (2006) on employee 
treatment in Australia; or by Edmans (2011) on the stock returns of the ‘100 Best Companies 
to Work For in America’. Analyses tackling joint CSR dimensions also find a positive link 
between the human resources dimension and financial performance (Barnett and Salomon, 
2006; Brammer et al., 2006). 
In sum, while socially responsible investment appears as an effective lever to penalize firms 
for insufficient CSR, proactive CSR can enhance employee productivity through various 
paths. Both are linked to what investors and potential future employees believe the firm true 
CSR level is. People beliefs and firm reputation are also deeply related to the level of pressure 
society exerts on companies. 
 
1.4.3. CSR as the Delegated Responsibility of Firm Managers  
 
Finally, CSR can be the delegated responsibility of those who manage the firm: CEOs and the 
boards of directors, the latter linking the former to shareholders. The whole purpose of 
governance is to organize the relationships and responsibilities between those three layers. A 
specific case is CEOs-owners, which we first detail, before surveying the literature on CSR 
and respectively firm managers and boards. 
Regarding the role of CEOs in CSR strategies, founding and owning CEOs have all power to 
choose their firm’s CSR level in line with their business model and personal objectives. 
Examples of such owners involve Yvon Chouinard, founder of the outdoor company 
Patagonia, or Frank Riboud, CEO of the food and water company Danone. Nevertheless, 
putting aside the large population of small and medium size enterprises, firms are seldom both 
owned and managed by the same people. Baron (2007) discusses a model of social 
entrepreneurship in which social entrepreneurs prefer to create CSR firms. For them and their 
shareholders, corporate giving is then a good substitute for personal giving. Managers might 
also be asked by pro-social shareholders to allocate efforts between financial and extra-
financial targets, raising issues of relevant incentive structures. Interesting insights are 
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brought to this expanding case by the multi-tasking literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). For instance, Cavaco and Crifo (2010) provide a theoretical framework in which 
shareholders delegate CSR to managers, CSR decisions being formalized as a multi-task 
agency problem with moral hazard.  
When CEOs are neither owners nor backed up by philanthropic shareholders, according to 
Friedman (1970), their responsibility is then to ensure profitability. If CEOs embark firms on 
CSR, they might misappropriate shareholder funds for opportunistic reasons. Anchored in the 
agency theory, such a CSR could thus be a perquisite for managers who like the accolades of 
the advocates of broadened social performance (Baron et al., 2008). Bringing the argument a 
step forward, Cespa and Cestone (2007) build an entrenchment theory portraying CSR 
strategies as a way for inefficient managers to ensure stakeholders’ support to reinforce their 
own position at the expense of the shareholders. The authors provide several illustrations of 
how incumbent CEOs relied on activists and media support to buttress their positions, for 
instance in takeover battles in the European telecom, banking and energy industries. However, 
company value and manager rotation increase when shareholders engage in an explicit 
protection of the stakeholders that does not go through the manager, hence depriving her of 
activists’ support. Such a finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized 
institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder 
protection even in the case of managerial replacement. 
If the agency theory proves right, a twofold prediction should be empirically verified: first, 
CSR increases with slack resources and discretion available to management; second, the 
causality is orientated from firm performance to CSR. If Baron et al. (2008) indeed find that 
responsive corporate social performance increases with slack resources, few other studies 
successfully investigated yet the true causality (Margolis et al., 2009). Using a different 
approach, Reinhardt et al. (2008) suggest that the relationship between CSR and CEO 
compensation may be close to flat at some levels of firm performance, and that CEOs may 
trade off compensation against CSR activities.  
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TABLE 1.3 - Literature on CSR as delegated responsibility in imperfect contracts  
Sources of market failures CSR policy Literature on this CSR driver 
Related CSR impacts on firm 
performance 
Related CSR impacts 
on society 
Contract 
incomplete 
Costly 
detailed 
rights of 
controls 
Heterogeneous 
preferences  
  Theory Empirical tests Theory Empirical tests Theory 
Empirical 
tests 
yes yes of shareholders Shareholder 
activism, 
responsible 
investments 
Sjöström 2008, 
Chatterji et al. 2009, 
Heinkel et al. 2001; 
Gollier and Pouget 
2012. 
Takeda and 
Tomozawa 2008, 
Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2009, 
Dam and Scholtens 
2012 
Heinkel 
et al. 
2001 
Capelle-Blancard 
and Monjon 2012, 
Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2009, 
Galema et al. 2008 
Gollier 
and 
Pouget 
2012 
 
yes yes of employees Shaping of 
employee identity 
and incentives 
Turban and Greening 
1997, Brekke and 
Nyborg 2007 
Backhaus et al. 
2002, Lanfranchi 
and Pekovic 2011 
Brekke 
and 
Nyborg 
2005 
Jones and Murrel 
2001,  
Galbreath 2006, 
Edmans 2011 
  
yes yes of managers Social 
entrepreneurship 
Baron 2007      
yes yes of managers Perquisite for 
managers and 
agency costs 
Agency theory (Baron 
et al. 2008) 
Baron et al. 2008, 
Brown et al. 2006 
 Baron et al. 2008, 
Frye et al.  2006 
  
yes yes of managers Managers' 
entrenchment and 
agency costs 
Entrenchment theory 
(Cespa and Cestone 
2007) 
Frye et al. 2006         
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However this is not empirically verified by Frye et al. (2006) in their comparison of CEOs’ 
compensations of firms listed in the Domini Social Index with other firms in similar 
industries. Socially responsible firms nonetheless have a higher CEO turnover when firm 
performance is bad, which put into question the entrenchment theory. Moreover, stock option 
grant does not increase CEO risk taking behaviors in socially responsible firms as it does in 
conventional ones. Reinhardt et al. (2008) conclude that it might be anyway less costly for 
investors and shareholders to accept a degree of principal-agent slack than to eliminate it 
completely, because excessively constrained managers may be ineffective. 
Firm management does not only hold on its CEO, but also on its board of directors. The 
board’s impact on CSR activities seems to have seldom been tackled both empirically and 
theoretically. Some empirical studies nonetheless display a link between CSR and 
governance, which raises questions about the link between governance and performance. 
Indeed, Brown et al. (2006) show that firms with larger boards of directors are associated with 
significantly more cash giving and with the establishment of corporate foundations, whereas 
Jo and Harjoto (2011) highlight that engagement in CSR is positively associated with board 
independence and institutional ownership. Gompers et al. (2003) support the hypothesis that 
well-governed companies outperform their poorly governed counterparts by about 8.5%. 
However, Core et al. (2006) challenge their results. An interesting input on the impact of 
regulatory environment is brought by Bauer et al. (2003) in their examination of the impact of 
corporate governance on firm valuation in Europe. They find substantial differences between 
the U.K. market and the Eurozone markets: the lower the governance standards, the stronger 
the relationship between governance and firm value. 
 
1.5. CSR AND PERFORMANCE 
 
In previous sections, we identified and surveyed the major determinants of CSR, showing 
they were anchored in market and government failures. Understanding those drivers is core to 
analyze why and how firms would engage in CSR and how this engagement is likely to 
impact their activities. We now precisely focus on this impact by surveying the large literature 
investigating the link between CSR and firm performance, before discussing research on the 
actual impact of CSR on society. 
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1.5.1. CSR AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
The link between CSR and firm performance has triggered considerable academic work, as 
witnessed by the numerous surveys dedicated to this literature (e.g. Griffin and Mahon, 1997; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Portney, 2008; Scholtens, 2008; Van 
Beurden and Gossling, 2008). The active debate on whether this link actually exists can be 
considered as closed by the extensive meta-analysis conducted by Margolis et al. (2009) on 
251 studies: ”The effect of corporate social performance on corporate financial performance 
is small, positive and significant. Corporate social performance does not destroy shareholder 
value, even if its effect on the value is not large”. However, many scholars still consider that 
much research is still needed to fully understand the drivers of this relationship, or, put 
differently, how firms succeed on both financial and social levels (Horváthová, 2010; Surroca 
et al., 2010). In the same line, Blanco et al. (2009) provide an in-depth review of empirical 
studies that analyze the relationship between voluntary environmental management of 
manufacturing firms and their economic results over thirty years. They conclude on a 
prominent absence of penalty for being green, which is affected by the typology of the firm, 
the methods utilized for implementing environmental initiatives, the intensity of the 
abatement efforts and stockholders’ valuation of green firms. 
Our economic analysis of the CSR literature allowed the identification of its distinct drivers 
anchored in various market failures, yielding different CSR policies. Little work (particularly 
empirical) on CSR impacts actually clearly relates to CSR driver and avoids overlooking the 
theoretical mechanisms behind the relationship. Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 present by CSR driver 
key theoretical and empirical papers that shed led on these mechanisms.  
Empirical research on the topic should also avoid the numerous biases and problems of 
previous work that have been pointed out in the literature among which: omitted variables in 
the determinants of profitability (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000); model misspecification and 
endogeneity (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010); limited data (small samples, old periods; 
Horváthová, 2010); cross-sectional analysis invalid in the presence of significant firm 
heterogeneity (Elsayed and Paton, 2005); linearity assumptions (Barnett and Salomon, 2006 ; 
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2012); and wide diversity of measures used to assess financial 
performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Another problem also lies in the direction and 
mechanisms of causation. Whether CSR would lead (or not) to superior firm performance, or 
whether financial performance would rather be a necessary condition for CSR is a major stake 
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to investigate (see Margolis et al., 2009). For instance, Wagner (2010) uses panel data to 
disentangle the effects of CSR, advertising and R&D over time. Problems of measurement of 
CSR have also been pointed out and are core to understand the potentiality of CSR as a 
sustainable development tool. Iwata and Okada (2011) consider the effect of two different 
environmental issues (waste and greenhouse gas emissions) on financial performance using 
panel data on Japanese manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2008 and show that the responses of 
financial performance are different depending on each environmental issues. 
The complex nature of CSR leads to another promising empirical research path. Recent work 
suggests that it should be a specific combination of firm policies that would likely lead to 
superior corporate performance. During the 1990s, this complementarity between different 
managerial practices has proven a useful explanation of the Solow paradox, whereby “you can 
see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). Indeed, 
several researchers have shown that only those firms that have adopted both computerization 
and complementary innovative human resources management practices (teamwork, multi-
tasking, quality circles, etc.) did enjoy superior performance (e.g. Ichniowski and Shaw, 
2003). By analogy, the apparently ambiguous relationship between CSR and firm 
performance could presumably be explained by taking into account the complementarity 
between the multi-dimensional facets of CSR, which relate to the different mechanisms we 
reviewed. Taking into account CSR as a multi-dimensional strategy is all the more important 
since, as pointed out by Bénabou and Tirole (2010), firms can do well on some dimensions 
and poorly on others. Such a research would renew the debate on the link between CSR and 
performance. 
 
1.5.2. CSR AND EXTRA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
If CSR amounts to privately provided public goods, it is important to be able to evaluate its 
impact not only on economic and financial performance, but also on social performance. Lee 
(2008) and Abeysuriya et al. (2007) already called for more attention to the social side of the 
equation. The key question of whether firms can be efficient actors of sustainable 
development definitely needs to be tackled, all the more as it has drawn little attention in the 
CSR field. We first present the theoretical literature on CSR impact on welfare depending on 
its origin (public politics; private politics; product differentiation), before analyzing some 
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empirical findings. Tables 1, 2 and 3 present by CSR driver key papers on these issues. We 
conclude by proposing research paths to extend the required toolbox for more comprehensive 
analysis. 
Theoretical results on the impact of CSR on social welfare are mixed (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2008), as CSR is not necessarily beneficial, depending very much on the context in which it 
occurs. For Besley and Ghatak (2007) who examine the optimal level of CSR provision, CSR 
can create a Pareto improvement in equilibrium. Whereas CSR can be a less costly substitute 
for government mandates and hence increase welfare, it can also distort regulatory decisions 
in a way that lowers it. Maxwell and Decker (2006) found in their enforcement theory that, 
despite the fact that all agents in the model act voluntarily, their actions may lead to a 
suboptimal level of environmental investment. Fleckinger and Glachant (2011) demonstrate in 
their model that the impact of self-regulation on social welfare depends on the set of policy 
instruments available to the regulator (mandatory regulation or voluntary agreements). For 
Lyon and Maxwell (2008), overall, the impact of preemptive CSR depends upon whether it is 
undertaken unilaterally or through a voluntary agreement with the regulator, and whether the 
regulator is welfare-maximizing or influenced by particular interest groups. 
In terms of private politics, is social pressure from NGOS beneficial for the society as 
negative externalities are reduced? To answer this issue, Heyes and Maxwell (2004) compare 
the relative merits of two types of self-regulation mechanisms: mandatory through an 
international organization setting a constraining (environmental or social) standard, and 
voluntary through an NGO operating labeling schemes. Their model shows that the level of 
industry resistance to the standard is greater when an NGO exists than when it does not 
(voluntary labels being more attractive when defeating the international organization 
proposal). In turn, though the anticipation of industry resistance leads the international 
organization to decrease the stringency of its standard, the NGO may serve a ‘back-stop’ 
function and encourage more stringent international standard. Moreover, the authors show 
that when both the voluntary and mandatory schemes coexist, the existence of NGOs 
increases welfare. However, by inducing firms to lobby against government standards, it is 
also possible that the existence of NGO labeling schemes can undermine government 
regulatory programs that would be of even greater value (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). 
CSR used as a pure market tool lacks studies on its actual impact on society. Intuitively, CSR 
certification might increase the sales of environmentally (e.g. recycled) or socially (e.g. fair 
trade) friendly products, thus increasing the utility of consumers who switch from 
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conventional to green products. If green products substitute to conventional ones, as on a 
mature market with stable sales, social welfare might increase. However, if the market is 
expanding, the increasing overall sales might generate social damage. One can think for 
instance of the debate generate by green products whose global life-cycle analysis turn out to 
be more polluting than conventional products. Moreover, Faucheux and Nicolai (1998) argue 
that the state intervention is needed to avoid firm competition driven technological lock-ins. 
Applying the Coase theorem and thus bringing transactions costs and property rights to fore, 
Cerin (2006) also highlights that strong public support is necessary to create private incentives 
for exploring significant economic and environmental win-win innovations. 
Empirical tests of those theoretical predictions are still scare in the CSR literature, at least 
from the economics and management science perspective. An interesting example is the 
evaluation done by Brouhle et al. (2009) of two environmental policy levers (a voluntary 
program and the threat of formal regulation) on emissions in the metal-finishing industry. 
They find that participation in the voluntary program yielded little, if any, additional 
reductions in emissions. However, while participants do not appear to take advantage of the 
program initially, they make greater strides in reducing emissions than non-participants in 
later years. Another input is brought by Dam and Scholtens (2008) who demonstrate that 
firms with high level of CSR are less likely to relocalize their production in countries with 
weak environmental regulation (the pollution heaven hypothesis). However, little studies 
tackle the impacts of CSR on multiple aspects simultaneously, as conducted for instance in 
product life-cycle analysis. 
From this perspective, the toolbox to evaluate CSR impact on society could likely benefit 
from the experience gathered in other fields. For instance, lessons from public policy analysis 
and development economics might be drawn and transferred to analyze the respective impact 
of various CSR policies on public welfare. Methodologies such as impact evaluation methods 
relying on experimental and quasi- experimental designs could also be insightful. 
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1.6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter proposed a comprehensive framework to analyze the economic determinants of 
CSR, giving coherency to a broad and expanding literature. We surveyed how CSR is driven 
by market imperfections, namely the existence of corporate externalities and public goods, 
imperfect competition and contract incompleteness. Understanding the economics of CSR is 
core to take a step out of the long lasting debate of whether engaging in CSR generates profits 
for corporations and to provide directions to understand how firms can succeed on both 
financial and social levels. Our review highlighted two crucial gaps in the literature, which 
open further research paths.  
First, a disconnection appears between the analysis of drivers of CSR and of its actual 
impacts, the latter most often lacking anchorage in the former. We highlighted several market 
and government failures driving distinct CSR policies, but the respective consequences of 
these policies are seldom disentangled. At a micro scale, long-term empirical studies at the 
industry level might yield relevant data to succeed to do so. At a more macro level, a new 
research avenue is also triggered by the trade issues raised by the worldwide expansion of 
CSR, particularly under the impulse of multinationals. Indeed, while CSR can answer some 
market failures (such as negative externalities), economists might wonder whether it might 
not be used to create other distortions, such as entry barriers in developed countries. If so, 
what are the global consequences of CSR on welfare? Analyzing the extent to which 
governments are responsible for and should or not regulate private provision of public good is 
a challenge for academics. 
The second gap identified lies in the imbalanced evaluation of the financial and social impacts 
of CSR. Further analyses of the social consequences of CSR are needed, as they have been 
most often set aside. A lack of relevant data likely grounds this literature orientation. New 
methodologies drawn from development economics and field experimental economics might 
contribute usefully to such research. In its 2009 report, the Global Environment Outlook of 
the United Nations Environmental Program stated that efforts to slow the rate or extent of 
change to enhanced resource efficiency and mitigation measures have resulted in moderate 
successes but have not succeeded in abating the scope and speed of adverse environmental 
changes. It also highlights that ”the lack of reliable and consistent time-series data on the 
state of the environment is a major barrier to increasing the effectiveness of policies and 
programs. (...) All countries should undertake to monitor and assess their own environment 
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and integrate social, economic and environmental information to inform decision-making 
processes”. No less can be said about CSR and corporations, as it has become core to evaluate 
whether CSR achieves its promises to society.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PUZZLE 
 
How can firms succeed on both financial and extra-financial levels?  
 
 
Abstract  
How to generate profits while providing public good is still academically debated. This 
chapter argues that CSR encompasses many diverse policies with variant effects on 
profitability. As theoretical guidance lacks to predict which most matters economically, 
this multidimensional puzzle is shown to encounter model uncertainty which is solved by 
applying a model averaging methodology to a unique database matching the economic 
and social performances of large European firms. Results support that CSR policies do 
not equally matter to do well and do good, good business behaviors with customers and 
suppliers being core. Strong support is also brought to the co-existence of policies 
monotonically related to profitability (human resources) and policies with an optimal 
level (environmental policies).  
Résumé 
La possible conciliation de la rentabilité et de la provision de bien public fait l’objet d’un 
important débat académique. Ce chapitre soutient que la RSE englobe des politiques 
diversifiées, dont les effets sur la rentabilité sont variables. En l’absence de cadre 
théorique prédisant quelle politique prédomine économiquement, ce puzzle 
multidimensionnel rencontre un problème d’incertitude de modèle. Le chapitre le résout 
par une méthode de model averaging, qui est appliquée à une base de données unique sur 
la performance économique et sociale de grandes entreprises européennes. Les résultats 
montrent que les politiques de RSE n’équivalent pas économiquement, les bonnes 
pratiques commerciales avec les clients et fournisseurs étant cruciales. La coexistence de 
politiques liées de façon monotone à la rentabilité (ressources humaines) avec des 
politiques présentant un niveau optimal (environnement) est mise en évidence.  
 
Chapter 2 is based on a working-paper (same title, HAL-00672037) submitted to a peer-reviewed 
journal. I am grateful to Vigeo for granting me access to their data on extra-financial rating.   
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the European Commission (2011a), a ‘socially responsible’ firm takes 
responsibility for its impact on society beyond legal constraints. More precisely, the promoted 
socially responsible firm should integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and 
consumer concerns into its business operations and core strategy with a double aim: 
maximizing the creation of shared value for its shareholders, stakeholders and society; and 
identifying, preventing and mitigating its possible adverse impact. Corporate Social 
Responsibility (labeled CSR hereafter) hence amounts to firms privately providing public 
good and reducing their negative externalities. Decades of active academic debate cover the 
ground between such a definition and Friedman’s famous New York Times Magazine article 
title, back in 1970: ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ (Friedman, 
1970). Most research developed the argument along which a firm providing public good 
might neither be sacrificing profits nor, as put by Friedman, doing ‘hypocritical window-
dressing’, but rather creating value on the long run. 
Indeed, a large corpus of empirical literature tested over the last three decades the link 
between firm financial performance and social performance (see for literature surveys 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Portney, 2008). In the most extensive survey 
and meta-analysis up-to-date, Margolis et al. (2009) conclude that corporate social 
performance has a small, positive and significant effect on corporate financial performance 
and that it does not destroy shareholder value. However, the mechanisms behind this 
relationship are complex and not well understood. Thus many scholars along these authors, 
such as Horváthová (2010) and Surroca et al. (2010), underline the need to investigate further 
how organizations can succeed in both economically “doing well” and socially “doing good”.  
Imagine a firm manager whose task precisely is to succeed in “doing well and doing good”, 
or, put in the European Commission words, to create shared value for her shareholders, 
stakeholders and society. Hereby her job consists in the selection and implementation of 
corporate policies both generating profits (at least achieving financial equilibrium) and 
providing public good (or reducing a social ill). Such policies might encompass highly diverse 
actions, for instance: investment in pollution abatement processes; publication of a sustainable 
development report; nondiscrimination in the workplace; or long-term partnerships with local 
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suppliers. Of course, each policy will differently impact both firm and society. CSR is thus in 
essence a multidimensional construct (Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991).  
The few empirical analyses tackling the multidimensional nature of CSR simultaneously 
estimate the effects of different clusters of policies on firm performance and find that they 
diverge. Hillman and Keim (2001) distinguish direct stakeholders management, positively 
related to financial performance, from social issues, negatively linked. Brammer et al. (2006) 
observe that environment and local community involvement appear negatively correlated with 
financial performance, whereas human resources are weakly positively linked. Using panel 
data and a supermodularity approach, Cavaco and Crifo (2010) observe the existence of a 
complementarity premium on specific CSR dimensions (human resources and business 
behaviors towards customers and suppliers), while other practices are relative substitutes 
(environment and business behaviors). Hereby, to understand how firms can profit from 
socially responsible policies, it appears core to consider their specific effects.  
This chapter argues that it is also essential to understand the relative importance of the 
multiple dimensions encompassed in the CSR concept for firm economic performance. 
Indeed, previous literature shed light on the diverging effects the multiple CSR dimensions 
might have on CSR. Yet among these effects, which is likely to dominate? In other words, 
among the wide range of socially responsible policies, which most matter economically – and 
which do not? This question is crucial for shareholders, but also for firm stakeholders and 
society as it is likely to impact the type of public good provided by the firm.  
 
Yet such a multidimensional puzzle is not trivial to solve as theoretical guidance lacks to 
predict how various CSR dimensions are linked to financial performance when taken 
simultaneously. Indeed, most theoretical work either analyzes CSR as a whole (e.g. Cespa and 
Cestone, 2007; Baron, 2009) or focuses on one specific dimension (e.g. environment in 
Sinclair Desgagné and Gozlan, 2003). Reflecting theoretical knowledge, most empirical 
studies use either data on a single CSR dimension (such as eco-efficiency in Derwall et al., 
2005) or aggregate CSR performance measures (based of the widely-use KLD data for 
instance), either in a linear way (as in Hillman and Keim, 2001), or using weights (for a 
review and a discussion of efficient composite CSR performance indicators, see Chen and 
Delmas, 2010).  
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Theoretical predictions might even compete. For instance, product differentiation based on 
environmental attributes might create a market opportunity (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) 
while generating agency costs (perquisite) for managers who like the accolades of 
environmentalists (Baron et al., 2011). Potential theories are not mutually exclusive, a 
phenomenon referred to as “open-endedness” of theories by Brock and Durlauf (2001). 
Specification of the link between CSR and financial performance is also debated: while most 
literature investigated a monotonic relationship between social and financial performances, 
Barnett and Salomon (2006) and Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2012) made instead a strong 
case of a hump-shape relationship. 
The “doing well and doing good” research hence typically encounters two dimensions of 
model uncertainty, namely theory and specification uncertainty (Doppelhofer and Weeks, 
2009), which have not been dealt with so far in the literature. The link between financial 
performance and multiple CSR dimensions encounters model uncertainty because theories are 
not explicit enough on which CSR dimension belongs to the “true” regression (and under 
which specification). The influential work of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) discusses a similar 
issue in growth economics, a field in which researchers are faced with a multiplicity of 
possible regressors. As stated by the authors, in many applications “we do not have the luxury 
of having a large enough sample size to allow us to draw conclusions on the importance of 
potential regressors.(…) Some empirical economists have therefore resorted to simply 
"trying" combinations of variables which could be potentially important determinants of 
growth and report the results of their preferred specification. Such "data-mining" could lead 
to spurious inference”. Indeed, ignoring model uncertainty generally results in biased 
parameter estimates, overconfident standard errors and misleading inference (Doppelhofer, 
2008).  
 
This chapter sets out to tackle model uncertainty in the “doing well” and “doing good” debate 
and to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of CSR. To do so, it introduces in the 
literature a formal statistical framework that explicitly accounts for model uncertainty, namely 
model averaging. Model averaging was designed to specifically address model uncertainty by 
simultaneously weighing evidence for multiple models depicting alternative working 
hypotheses (Doppelhofer, 2008). It allows researchers to examine all possible models, to 
weigh each model according to quality, and to provide a probability distribution for each 
coefficient estimate (Eicher et al., 2012).  
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This powerful technique has already proven insightful in several research fields hampered by 
model uncertainty, such as growth economics (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004), macroeconomic 
forecasts (Wright, 2008), policy evaluation (Brock and Durlauf, 2007) and finance (Pesaran et 
al., 2009). Other fields of applications include trade flows (Eicher et al., 2012), labor 
economics (Tobias and Li, 2004) and health economics (Jackson et al., 2009). 
Various methodologies have been proposed to succeed in implementing model averaging. 
This paper develops an approach built on information-theoretic model averaging and thick 
modelling (as proposed by Kapetanios et al., 2008, and Pesaran et al., 2009). In particular, 
corrected Akaike Information Criteria model averaging (AICc MA) and Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criteria model averaging (SIC MA) are discussed. Beyond their original 
application to the CSR literature, these methods have the potentiality to be relevant to many 
empirical economists for their relevancy and their straightforward implementation. They are 
here applied to a database that matches the economic performance of 461 large European 
firms over the 1998-2007 period with CSR measures provided by the non-financial rating 
agency Vigeo. This original data enables the study of a fairly complete range of socially 
responsible corporate policies, namely: environmental policy, good business behaviors with 
customers and suppliers, implication in local communities, human resources management and 
governance. However, data availability limits the analysis to the question of the relationship 
between CSR dimensions and financial performance, causality being beyond its scope. 
The introduction of model averaging in the “doing well” and “doing good” debate brings 
novel and robust results. First, it unveils the composition of profitably-linked CSR. This 
composition appears heterogeneous, with different CSR dimensions having different 
importance. In particular, good business behaviors with customers and suppliers are shown to 
remain crucial. Results also provide strong evidence of the coexistence of corporate policies 
monotonically linked to economic performance (human resources management) and policies 
with optimal levels (environment), hence reconciling competing theories. Consequences for 
corporations and policy makers are discussed. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 details the methodology. 
Section 2.3 presents data. Section 2.4 displays results and discusses main findings. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
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2.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
This section first presents the basic empirical framework to study the link between CSR and 
financial performance, before introducing model averaging and thick modelling. Finally, it 
discusses their inputs and limits. 
 
2.2.1. BASIC EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Following previous literature (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al, 2009), the basic model to 
estimate the link between firm performance and CSR is as follows:  
                                                                 
                                                  (1) 
with i the number of firms and t the year of observation.  
     is the firm financial performance, measured in this paper either by returns on assets 
(ROA) or returns on capital employed (ROCE).        is a global CSR measure (here the 
global Vigeo rating).  
       is a solvability ratio control that captures the fact that the more stable a firm, the 
likelier it is to engage in CSR.        controls for firm size and is measured as the logarithm 
of net sales. Larger firms are indeed more likely to encounter major environmental hazards 
(Konar and Cohen, 1997), to have larger resources devoted to social investments and to be 
more exposed to social pressure.        controls for research and development intensity. 
Based on a large corpus of theoretical literature linking research and development to long 
term economic performance, Waddock and Graves (1997) and later on McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) highlight its importance as a control variable. Risk, firm size and R&D intensity 
are expected to have positive estimates.            controls for the firm financial leverage 
(debt-to-equity ratio) and provides a good indicator of management risk tolerance, which can 
impact decision making and arbitrage between short and long term performances (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997). As such it is expected to negatively impact ROCE and ROA.  
Industry dummies (j) are introduced because industrial processes, scale savings, associated 
pollution levels, stakeholders’ activism, exposure and financial risks are sector specific 
(Margolis et al., 2009). Country (k) is also controlled for as regulations, social demand and 
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stakeholders’ pressure vary between European countries. Year dummies account for the 
evolution over the studied period of CSR regulation, public awareness and firm involvement. 
Finally     is the time variant error term of firm i at year t.  
In this model, data is considered cross-sectional whereas firms count in average three 
observations over the studied period of time. Yet a panel approach taking temporality into 
account is prevented by data availability, as discussed in section 2.3. Both White’s test and 
Breusch-Pagan’s test show some heteroscedasticity in the data. Hence Rogers (1993)’s 
estimators based on clusters (firms) are used instead of standard OLS to account for 
dependent and non-identically distributed error terms. Results are presented in Tables 2.3 and 
2.4. 
 
CSR is now disaggregated into five dimensions:       (environmental performance),      
(good business relationships with customers and suppliers),       (corporate governance), 
     (human resources policy) and       (involvement in local communities). These variables 
will be discussed in section 2.3. Overlooking the model uncertainty issue, we could make the 
random assumption that all CSR dimensions matter to explain financial performance (i.e. 
belong to the true model explaining financial performance) and test the following model: 
                                                               
                                                          
                           (2) 
Results for ROA and ROCE are presented in Table 2.5. Estimates obtained with this method 
will be compared to those obtained with model averaging, now presented. 
 
2.2.2. MODEL AVERAGING AND THICK MODELLING  
 
This section presents the chosen theoretical framework of model averaging and thick 
modelling. It limits itself to discussing the properties relevant to this paper. For a 
comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to Pesaran et al. (2009) and Kapetanios et al. 
(2008). 
Let us start with a set of models. This set is denoted   ⋃   
 
    where   is the i-th of the 
m models considered. In this paper, the space of models  consists of all the possible subsets 
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of candidate regressors potentially explaining financial performance, including all five CSR 
dimensions considered. Our interest is a parameter Δ. The Bayesian framework provides a 
probability distribution for Δ given  and the observed data D. The relevant information data 
set at time t is denoted   . The probability distribution   ( |    ) of the parameter of 
interest over the space of models considered is given by:  
  ( |    )   ∑   ( |     )  (  |  )
 
       (3) 
where   ( |     ) is the conditional probability distribution of   given a model   and the 
data   . It can easily be obtained from standard model specific analysis.   (  |  ) is the 
posterior probability of Mi, that is the conditional probability of the model   being the true 
model given the data   .  
In the Bayesian Model Averaging (BAM) framework, weights used to combine the models 
under consideration are their respective posterior probabilities   (  |  ) . This approach 
requires specifications of the prior probability of model   and has been the focus of a large 
corpus of literature.  
An alternative to BAM consists in approximating the weights   (  |  )  by information 
criteria weights, such as Akaike weights or Schwartz weigths. This approach is developed in 
Kapetanios et al. (2008) as the information theoretic Model Averaging, building on the 
influential work of Burnham and Anderson (2002). Applications are expanding and include 
growth economics (Wagner and Hlouskova, 2009), finance (Hansen, 2008), tourism 
development (Wan and Zhang, 2009), health economics (Claeskens et al., 2006) and 
environmental economics (Layton and Lee, 2006).  
 
A first weighting scheme proposed in the literature and implemented in the paper is based on 
Akaike’s information criteria (1973, 1974), known as AIC. AIC is defined as: 
           ( )  (4) 
AIC has two components: the negative loglikelihood –ln (L), which measures the lack of 
model fit to the observed data, and a bias correction factor, which increases as a function of 
the number of model parameters k. More technically, this criterion is an extension of the log-
likelihood theory and is based on the Kullback–Leibler information, which can be 
conceptualized as a ‘distance’ between full reality and a model. Difference in AIC between 
two models can thus be analyzed as an estimate of the difference between the Kullback–
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Leibler distance for the two models. For in-depth analysis of AIC’s theory, uses and limits, 
see Konishi and Kitagawa (2007).  
AIC has been criticized for its propensity at over-fitting models, meaning that it tends to 
select too many variables. Hurvich and Tsai (1989, 1995) hence introduced the corrected AIC 
(AICc), which is AIC with a second order correction for small size samples:  
         ( (   )(   )) (     )  (5) 
with k the number of model parameters and n the number of observations. As n increases, 
AICc converges to AIC and is asymptotically efficient in both regression and times series. For 
linear regression, AICc has better bias properties than does AIC. Burnham and Anderson 
(2004) thus advocate employing AICc regardless of sample size, which is done in this paper. 
The reader can refer to McQuarrie and Tsai (1998) for further comparisons of AIC and AICc 
with several competitor criteria for linear regression problems.  
Difference between information criteria    is used to rank models. Following Burnham and 
Anderson (2002), the likelihood of the model   given the data is equivalent to    ( 
 
 
 
 
 ). 
Model likelihoods are normalized to sum up to 1 and referred to as Akaike weights. Akaike 
weight    for model   writes:  
       (     ) ∑    (       ) 
 
     (6) 
where ∑     
 
   . wi can be interpreted as the probability of selecting model i as being the 
best if analyses were repeated using independent samples from the same population. This 
paper implements the use of corrected Akaike weights, based on AICc.  
Let us now go back to our parameter of interest Δ. Following Burnham and Anderson (2002), 
the averaged estimate  ̂̅ of Δ is provided by  
 ̂̅  ∑     ̂ 
 
    (7) 
with    the parameter of interest in model    and  ̂  the estimate of    in model   . Δ 
unconditional standard error is given by: 
  ̂  ( ̂̅)   ∑    √   ̂ ( ̂  )   ( ̂    ̂̅)
 
         (8) 
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The second weighting scheme considered in this paper is based on the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criteria (Schwarz, 1978), further on SIC, defined as:  
         ( )        ( ) (9) 
Baltagi (2001) points out that SIC is consistent, meaning that as the sample goes to infinity, 
the probability that it will choose the correct model from a finite number of models goes to 1. 
A drawback of this property is that in small samples, SIC tends to select underfitting models. 
Consequently model selection based on SIC tends not to pick up enough variables in the 
‘best’ models. Hereby SIC based model averaging tends to bias downwards variable weights. 
This paper considers both approaches to information-theoretic model averaging: the corrected 
Akaike weights model averaging (AICc MA) and the SIC weights model averaging (SIC 
MA). 
 
Other weighting schemes have been discussed in the model averaging literature. Hjort and 
Claeskens (2003) discussed the Focused Information Criterion. Hansen (2007) proposed 
Mallows model averaging (MMA). Wagner and Hlouskova (2009) compare AIC MA, SIC 
MA and MMA. They further introduce, for any given weighting scheme, the so-called 
inclusion weight as the classical counterpart of the Bayesian posterior inclusion probability of 
a variable.  
 
A last refinement used in this paper is the combination of information-theoretic model 
averaging with thick modelling. As detailed in Pesaran et al. (2009), thick modelling consists 
in applying model averaging not to all of the models but only to a given number of top 
performing models. Individual models are here ranked according to the AICc or SIC criteria. 
The space of models  under consideration for model averaging is thus reduced to the top 
performing    space of models (say the top 25%). Thick modelling has been proposed, 
among others, by Granger and Jeon (2004). Applications include Stock and Watson (1999)’s 
in the context of macroeconomic time series and Aiolfi et al. (2001)’s on forecasts of excess 
returns.  
 
In this chapter the Base Model (1) is first estimated using OLS. Then AICc MA is applied as a 
benchmark to the Base Model set of variables with global CSR. As year, industry and country 
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controls are kept in all models, the model population counts 2
5
= 32 possible models based on 
five variables (global CSR, Risk, Leverage, Size and R&D) and all are considered, including 
Base Model (1). In a second step, global CSR is disaggregated into five CSR dimensions 
(Environment, Business behavior towards clients and customers, Community involvement, 
Human resources and Governance). Base Model (2) is estimated using OLS. The new model 
population counts 2
4+5 
= 512 models and model averaging combined with thick modelling is 
done on the top 100 models based on AICc and SIC rankings. Base Model (2) might be or not 
in these top 100 models, depending on its quality. 
 
2.2.3. INPUTS AND LIMITS OF THE APPROACH  
 
This paper implements thick modelling, AICc model averaging and SIC model averaging to 
account for model uncertainty. This section discusses the inputs and limits of the approach 
(beyond the issue of model uncertainty, which has already been discussed in the introduction). 
As highlighted by Doppelhofer (2008), the use of model averaging was limited until recent 
developments in computing power and statistical methods. Here, model fitting and subsequent 
model averaging is done thanks to the R / java glmulti package (Calcagno and de Mazancourt, 
2010), which renders the implementation of those tools highly straightforward. 
A second input of the approach deals with the multicollinearity likely to arise when one 
considers simultaneously many dimensions of CSR. Calcagno and de Mazancourt (2010) 
found that BIC variable selection successfully distinguishes the effects of variables correlated 
at 70% (which exceeds the 62% correlation between CSR dimensions observed in data here). 
The proposed methodology can thus help bypass the multicollinearity issue when present. We 
should nevertheless note that this issue is limited in the dataset here used (see section 2.3). 
Moreover, this paper tests for curvilinear versus monotonic relationships between the 
different CSR dimensions and financial performance. Indeed, CSR dimensions are here 
introduced as three-level factors (below average / average / above average). The effect of 
being above sector average on one CSR dimension is thus separately estimated from the effect 
of being bellow sector average. This paper hence tests for the existence of optimal levels and 
identifies different specifications for different CSR dimensions.  
Limits of the tools presented are essentially given by data availability. Indeed, model 
averaging and thick modelling need large datasets for estimations to be reliable. To ensure 
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sufficient data availability, it was not here possible to use data as panel data. Hence causality 
between corporate social and financial performance is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Similarly, data availability constrained control variables used in the regressions. For instance, 
advertisement intensity could not be controlled for.  
The relevancy of model averaging is thus anchored in data availability, completeness and 
quality and restricted to empirical fields with sufficient observations.  
 
2.3. DATA 
 
Two sources of data are matched in this research. CSR data is provided by the leading 
European extra-financial rating agency Vigeo and financial data comes from the database 
Orbis (Bureau Von Dijk). The database obtained is a non-cylindrical panel. Firm is the 
primary stratification level with 1 to 8 observations per firm (3 observations in average) over 
the 1998 – 2007 time period. The sample contains 1577 observations on 457 large European 
listed firms belonging to 17 different countries and 14 industrial sectors. Data is survivorship-
bias-free in the sense that Vigeo systematically rates firms of the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 (a 
quarterly-reviewed index that covers large, mid and small European capitalizations), 
including firms that exited the index, merged or disappeared over the studied period of time.  
The availability of data on research and development expenses limits the sample to 622 
observations on 207 firms. Estimations will thus be done on both the restricted sample (with 
the R&D intensity control) and the full sample (without). Differences between the samples are 
essentially twofold. First, firms of the restricted sample have communicated their R&D 
expenses, likely implying an increased transparency. Second, firms of the restricted sample 
have significantly higher global CSR rating than other firms. Little difference is observed in 
terms of industry, year or country distributions between full and restricted samples.  
Vigeo measures extra-financial performance and provides firm ratings based on disclosed 
information, dialog with the firm and international or European reference frameworks. In 
particular, this paper uses data on five CSR dimensions: Environment (integration of 
environmental issues into corporate policy, product manufacturing, distribution, use and 
disposal); Governance (balanced power within the board of directors, respect of shareholders’ 
rights, remuneration of key executives and directors, audit and internal controls); Customers 
and Suppliers (respect of business integrity, including sustainable and transparent 
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relationships with customers and suppliers); Community Involvement (integration of the firm’s 
impacts on local communities and responsible societal behavior) and Human Resources 
(proactive human resources corporate policy, including career development, continuous 
improvement of labor relations, quality of working condition). Weak multicollinearity 
between CSR dimension ratings is assessed by variance inflation factors (VIF) ranging from 
1.12 to 2.19 (see Table 2.1).  
As a starting point, this paper postulates that all five CSR dimensions equally matter. 
Consequently, a Global CSR rating is calculated as their arithmetic mean as usually done on 
such data in this literature (e.g. Hillman and Keim, 2001). Secondly, CSR dimensions are 
considered separately. For the purpose of the paper, their ratings are transformed into three-
level categorical factors: Worst (worst-in-class firms; 30%); Average (40%); and Best (best-
in-class firms; 30%).  
Financial measures are given in 2005 USD. Financial performance is measured by two 
accounting-based ratios: return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE). 
ROA is the operating income divided by total assets. As such, it measures firm efficiency in 
generating income from its assets and thus indicates firm profitability, financial leverage put 
aside. ROCE is the net operating profit after tax divided by capital employed. It thus provides 
shareholders with a comparison of earnings with capital invested in the firm.  
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2.1 and comparisons of ROA and ROCE means 
and medians by CSR dimension in Table 2.2. For a complete description of variables and 
data, the reader can refer to the Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2.1 -  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. VIF 
Global CSR rating 1578 3.04 0.66 1.17 4.83  
Human resources rating 1578 3.03 0.91 1.00 5.00 1.59 
Best 516 4.12 0.32 4.00 5.00  
Worst 484 1.91 0.27 1.00 2.00  
Corporate governance rating 1578 2.97 0.92 1.00 5.00 1.14 
Best 463 4.13 0.34 4.00 5.00  
Worst 498 1.86 0.35 1.00 2.00  
Customers & suppliers rating 1578 3.05 0.89 1.00 5.00 1.59 
Best 534 4.10 0.30 4.00 5.00  
Worst 472 1.93 0.26 1.00 2.00  
Community involvement rating 1578 3.07 0.95 1.00 5.00 1.46 
Best 556 4.17 0.37 4.00 5.00  
Worst 498 1.93 0.26 1.00 2.00  
Environment rating  1578 3.06 0.91 1.00 5.00 1.65 
Best 517 4.17 0.38 4.00 5.00  
Worst 475 1.92 0.28 1.00 2.00  
ROA 1577 7.86 6.81 -21.29 34.80  
ROCE 1566 14.65 11.44 -77.47 98.41  
Risk (Solvency ratio) 1578 35.54 15.86 -12.66 82.72  
Financial Leverage (Debt to equity ratio) 1578 0.79 0.99 -2.85 7.48  
R & D intensity 622 5.04 6.51 0.00 71.55  
Size (Ln(sales)) 1578 15.76 1.43 6.77 19.55  
Table 2.1 presents the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
variables used. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measures multicollinearity between the ratings of the five 
dimensions of CSR taken into account. “Best” (respectively “Worst”) indicates the ratings of the 30% top 
(bottom) firms above (under) sectoral average.  
 
 
TABLE 2.2 - Comparison of ROA and ROCE means and medians by CSR dimension 
CSR dimension ROA  ROCE 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median  Obs. Mean Std. Dev Median 
Human resources rating          
Best 516 7.62 6.96 6.31  512 14.10 12.11 12.73 
Worst 483 7.53 6.93 6.77  478 11.66 11.23 12.77 
Corporate governance rating          
Best 463 8.32 6.94 7.15  459 15.37 12.11 13.47 
Worst 497 7.56 6.70 6.46  491 14.13 11.23 12.07 
Customers & suppliers rating          
Best 534 8.13 6.88 6.86  530 15.03 11.65 13.39 
Worst 471 7.53 6.64 6.69  469 14.15 11.17 12.53 
Community involvement rating          
Best 556 7.60 6.72 6.20  552 14.03 10.27 12.53 
Worst 498 7.78 6.96 7.03  494 14.46 11.76 12.84 
Environment rating           
Best 517 7.60 6.73 6.72  518 13.73 11.45 12.61 
Worst 474 7.76 6.56 6.71  466 14.80 14.80 13.60 
Table 2.2 presents means (with standard deviations) and medians of respectively ROCA and ROCE by CSR 
dimension.  
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TABLE 2.3 - OLS and AICc model averaging estimations for Return On Assets (ROA) with global CSR predictor  
   OLS (i)   AICc Model Averaging (ii)   
Explanatory  Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D)  Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D) 
Global CSR  1.20 ** (0.56)  0.29  (0.36)  0.59 ++ (0.40)  0.25  (0.13) 
Risk   0.20 *** (0.04)  0.14 *** (0.02)  0.21 +++ (0.00)  0.22 +++ (0.00) 
Financial leverage  -0.67 * (0.36)  -0.46 ** (0.22)  -0.09  (0.04)  -0.81 ++ (0.16) 
Size  0.56  (0.36)  0.25  (0.29)  1.07  (0.10)  0.32  (0.08) 
R&D intensity  -0.03  (0.11)  No  0.10  (0.01)   No 
              
R
2
  39.45   24.83    No    No  
F-statistic  9.46 ***  7.13 ***   No    No  
Observations  622   1577   622    1577  
No. firms  207   461   207    461  
No. models  1   1   32    16  
Table 2.3 compares the OLS estimations of the base model (1) explaining ROA to the AICc Model averaging results based on the set of variables used in model (1) with a 
global CSR variable. Two different samples are used in each case: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D 
variable. 
(i) For OLS, figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(ii) For AICc Model Averaging, estimates are the averaged parameter estimates ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. Figures in brackets are the unconditional 
variance (  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation (7)). Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.4 - OLS and AICc model averaging estimations for Return on Capital  Employed (ROCE) with global CSR predictor 
   OLS (i)   AICc Model Averaging (ii)   
Explanatory  Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D)  Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D) 
Global CSR  2.11 *** (0.86)  0.60  (0.46)  1.37 +++ (1.03)  0.40  (0.13) 
Risk   0.10  (0.06)  0.03  (0.03)  0.05 ++ (0.00)  0.15 +++ (0.00) 
Financial leverage  -2.56 *** (0.82)  -2.09 *** (0.44)  -2.69 +++ (0.48)  -3.24 +++ (0.47) 
Size  0.37  (0.68)  -0.19  (0.35)  0.89  (0.33)  -0.22  (0.13) 
R&D intensity  -0.04  (0.16)  No    0.08  (0.02)  No   
                 
R
2
  32.29   16.36    No    No  
F-statistic  6.88 ***  8.00 ***   No    No  
Observations  618   1566   618    1566  
No. firms  206   457   206    457  
No. models  1   1   32    16  
Table 2.4 compares the OLS estimations of the base model (1) explaining ROCE to the AICc Model averaging results based on the set of variables used in model (1) with a 
global CSR variable. Two different samples are used in each case: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D 
variable. 
 (i) For OLS, figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(ii) For AICc MA, estimates are the averaged parameter estimates ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. Figures in brackets are the unconditional variance 
(  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation (7)). Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.5 - OLS estimations for Return On Assets (ROA) and Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) with CSR dimensions  
    ROA    ROCE   
Explanatory 
 Restricted sample (with 
R&D) 
 Full sample (without R&D)  Restricted sample (with 
R&D) 
 Full sample (without R&D) 
Human Resources 
Best  0.30  (0.66)  -0.31  (0.41)  -0.74  (1.14)  -0.31  (0.77) 
Worst  -1.33 ** (0.71)  -0.76 * (0.46)  -2.19 ** (1.08)  -1.44 * (0.85) 
Customers & Suppliers 
Best  0.24  (0.62)  0.11  (0.41)  0.41  (1.06)  0.55  (0.77) 
Worst  -1.31 * (0.78)  -1.03 ** (0.50)  -2.14 * (1.10)  -1.57 * (0.86) 
Governance 
Best  1.27  (0.61)  0.41  (0.40)  1.62 * (0.97)  0.34  (0.73) 
Worst  0.37 ** (0.66)  0.01  (0.43)  0.38  (1.04)  0.05  (0.73) 
Environment 
Best  -1.46 ** (0.68)  -1.02 ** (0.41)  -1.87 * (1.06)  -2.11 *** (0.69) 
Worst  0.17  (0.83)  -0.29  (0.44)  0.15  (1.19)  -0.15  (0.76) 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  0.02  (0.69)  -0.72  (0.42)  0.09  (1.02)  -1.43 * (0.78) 
Worst  -0.75  (0.76)  -0.36 * (046)  -1.56  (1.13)  -0.74  (0.81) 
Risk    0.20 *** (0.03)  0.15 *** (0.02)  0.11 * (0.06)  0.04  (0.05) 
Financial leverage   -0.65 * (0.37)  -0.46 ** (0.22)  -2.48 *** (0.81)  -2.07 *** (0.47) 
Size   0.71  (0.42)  0.34  (0.28)  0.66  (0.69)  0.10  (0.51) 
R&D intensity   -0.03  (0.11)  No  -0.03  (0.16)   No 
               
R
2
   40.15   25.82    33.81    17.70  
F-statistic   8.39 ***  7.60 ***       5.28 *** 
Observations   622   1577   618    1566  
No. firms   207   461   206    457  
No. models   1   1   1    1  
Table 2.5 provides the OLS estimations of the base model (1) for ROA and ROCE. Two different samples are used for each performance variable: a sample restricted to data 
with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.6 - AICc model averaging results on 100 best models explaining return on assets (ROA) with CSR dimensions 
   Restricted sample with R&D  Restricted sample without R&D  Full sample without R&D 
Explanatory: 
  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var.  
No. 
Models 
Weight 
Human 
Resources 
Best  0.48 (0.50) 50 0.57++  0.57 (0.57) 55 0.69++  -0.15 (0.09) 44 0.22 
Worst  -0.76 (0.82) 50 0.57++  -1.01 (0.93) 55 0.69++  -0.15 (0.09) 44 0.22 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Best   0.07 (0.07) 43 0.26  0.06 (0.06) 49 0.24  -0.17 (0.31) 55 0.85++ 
Worst  -0.33 (0.33) 43 0.26  -0.29 (0.28) 49 0.24  -1.35 (0.58) 55 0.85++ 
Governance Best  0.08 (0.03) 40 0.11  0.08 (0.03) 40 0.11  0.03 (0.01) 42 0.10 
Worst  0.03 (0.02) 40 0.11  0.03 (0.01) 40 0.11  0.01 (0.00) 42 0.10 
Environment Best  -0.63 (0.75) 45 0.42  -0.64 (0.77) 45 0.42  -0.33 (0.28) 46 0.32++ 
Worst  -0.32 (0.39) 45 0.42  -0.30 (0.37) 45 0.42  -0.21 (0.15) 46 0.32++ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  -0.04 (0.02) 38 0.09  -0.05 (0.02) 42 0.10  -0.13 (0.07) 44 0.20 
Worst  -0.04 (0.01) 38 0.09  -0.04 (0.02) 42 0.10  -0.15 (0.08) 44 0.20 
                 
Risk   0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.22 (0.00) 100 1.00+++ 
Financial 
Leverage 
  -0.11 (0.05) 44 0.28+  -0.13 (0.07) 48 0.32+  -0.87 (0.15) 62 0.94++ 
Size   1.13 (0.09) 100 1.00+++  1.17 (0.10) 58 1.00+++  0.33 (0.08) 51 0.71+ 
R&D intensity   0.10 (0.01) 35 0.60  No     No    
                 
Observations   622     622     1577    
Table 2.6 presents AICc Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Assets (ROA) using CSR dimensions. Three different samples are used to 
ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; the same restricted sample without the R&D intensity variable; and the full sample 
without the R&D variable. 
“Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation (7)). “No. 
models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.7 - SIC Model Averaging results on 100 best models explaining Return on Assets (ROA) with CSR dimensions 
 
   Restricted sample with R&D Full sample without R&D 
Explanatory   Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight  Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight 
Human Resources Best   0.04 (0.01) 41 0.07  -0.00 (0.00) 41 0.01++ 
Worst   -0.09 (0.03) 41 0.07  -0.01 (0.00) 41 0.01++ 
Customers & Suppliers Best   0.00 (0.00) 32 0.02+  -0.02 (0.01) 44 0.13+++ 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 32 0.02+  -0.22 (0.15) 44 0.13+++ 
Governance Best   0.00 (0.00) 23 0.00  0.00 (0.00) 40 0.00 
Worst   0.00 (0.00) 23 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 40 0.00 
Environment Best   -0.02 (0.00) 33 0.02++  -0.01 (0.00) 42 0.01++ 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 33 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 42 0.01++ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best   -0.00 (0.00) 26 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 41 0.01 
Worst   -0.00 (0.00) 26 0.00  -0.01 (0.00) 41 0.01 
             
Risk    0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.22 (0.00) 100 1.00+++ 
Financial Leverage    -0.02 (0.00) 43 0.06  -0.54 (0.27) 51 0.59+++ 
Size    1.23 (0.08) 70 1.00+++  0.17 (0.06) 48 0.35++ 
R&D intensity    0.06 (0.00) 39 0.35+++  No    
             
Observations    622     1577    
Table 2.7 presents SIC Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Assets (ROA) using CSR dimensions. Two different samples are used to 
ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation 
(7)). “No. models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.8 -  AICc Model Averaging results on 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) with CSR Dimensions 
   Restricted sample with R&D  Restricted sample without R&D  Full sample without R&D 
Explanatory 
  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight 
Human 
Resources 
Best  0.03 (0.08) 34 0.22+  0.03 (0.12) 45 0.28+  0.12 (0.10) 44 0.16 
Worst  -0.39 (0.50) 34 0.22+  -0.53 (0.79) 45 0.28+  -0.10 (0.09) 44 0.16 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Best  0.27 (0.41) 46 0.41+  0.24 (0.38) 47 0.40+  -0.46 (0.91) 51 0.66++ 
Worst  -0.84 (1.49) 46 0.41+  -0.80 (1.42) 47 0.40+  -1.76 (2.47) 51 0.66++ 
Governance Best  0.12 (0.08) 28 0.11  0.13 (0.09) 38 0.12  -0.05 (0.04) 42 0.10 
Worst  0.09 (0.06) 28 0.11  0.09 (0.06) 38 0.12  0.01 (0.01) 42 0.10 
Environment Best  -0.40 (0.52) 36 0.23  -0.39 (0.50) 40 0.23  -0.88 (1.54) 47 0.40+ 
Worst  -0.24 (0.02) 36 0.23  -0.24 (0.31) 40 0.23  -0.42 (0.63) 47 0.40+ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  0.01 (0.04) 31 0.15  0.01 (0.06) 44 0.19  -0.02 (0.03) 43 0.13 
Worst  -0.22 (0.20) 31 0.15  -0.28 (0.31) 44 0.19  -0.11 (0.07) 43 0.13 
                 
Risk   0.04 (0.00) 54 0.61+++  0.05 (0.00) 50 0.69+++  0.15 (0.00) 64 0.99+++ 
Financial 
Leverage 
  -2.69 (0.47) 100 1.00+++  -2.66 (0.50) 98 1.00+++  -3.28 (0.47) 100 1.00+++ 
Size   1.16 (0.25) 80 0.94  1.22 (0.24) 59 0.96  -0.18 (0.10) 47 0.36+ 
R&D intensity   0.12 (0.02) 44 0.53  No     No    
 
Observations   618     618     1566    
Table 2.8 presents AICc Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) using CSR dimensions. Three different samples 
are used to ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; the same restricted sample without the R&D intensity variable; and the 
full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation (7)). “No. 
models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE 2.9 - SIC Model Averaging results on 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) with CSR dimensions 
   Restricted sample with R&D Full sample without R&D 
Explanatory   Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight  Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight 
Human Resources Best   0.01 (0.00) 28 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 35 0.00 
Worst   -0.04 (0.00) 28 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 35 0.00 
Customers & Suppliers Best   0.03 (0.00) 35 0.04+++  -0.03 (0.00) 40 0.03+ 
Worst   -0.09 (0.03) 35 0.04+++  -0.08 (0.03) 40 0.03+ 
Governance Best   0.01 (0.00) 20 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 32 0.00 
Worst   0.00 (0.00) 20 0.00  0.00 (0.00) 32 0.00 
Environment Best   -0.01 (0.00) 26 0.01  -0.01 (0.00) 38 0.01 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 26 0.01  -0.02 (0.00) 38 0.01 
Community 
Involvement 
Best   0.01 (0.00) 26 0.01++  -0.00 (0.00) 34 0.00 
Worst   -0.03 (0.00) 26 0.01++  -0.00 (0.00) 34 0.00 
             
Risk    0.02 (0.00) 49 0.27+++  0.15 (0.00) 64 0.97+++ 
Financial Leverage    -2.89 (0.43) 93 0.99+++  -3.23 (0.48) 100 1.00+++ 
Size    1.22 (0.27) 63 0.91++  -0.03 (0.00) 46 0.07 
R&D intensity    0.07 (0.01) 35 0.29  No    
             
Observations    618     1566    
Table 2.9 presents SIC Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) using CSR dimensions. Two different 
samples are used to ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation 
(7)). “No. models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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2.4. RESULTS 
 
This section presents and discusses main findings: CSR policies do not appear to equally 
matter to do well and do good (section 2.4.1), business behaviors with customers and 
suppliers standing out as core (section 2.4.2). The coexistence of CSR policies with and 
without optimal level is highlighted (section 2.4.3.). Section 2.4.4. discusses result robustness, 
including regarding endogeneity issues. Implications for corporations seeking to do well and 
do good and for public policies are suggested in section 2.4.5.  
As a benchmark, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 compare Base Model OLS (using Global CSR 
rating) results to AICc MA results for respectively ROA and ROCE. CSR is then 
disaggregated into five dimensions, which are used as explanatory variables. Table 2.5. 
presents OLS results for ROA and ROCE. Then AICc MA and SIC MA are used with the five 
CSR dimensions on top 100 performing models (thick modelling). Tables 2.6 and 2.8 
respectively present AICc MA results for ROA and ROCE and can be compared with tables 
2.7 and 2.9 displaying SIC MA results for ROA and ROCE. Table 2.10 presents models used 
to test for endogeneity robustness. 
 
2.4.1. CSR POLICIES DO NOT EQUALLY MATTER TO DO WELL AND DO GOOD 
 
Results obtained with the Global CSR measure support the existence of a positive link with 
financial performance. Indeed, global CSR rating parameter is estimated to be positive and 
significant at the 5% level for ROA (1.20) and at 1% for ROCE (2.11) with standard OLS on 
the restricted sample only. The global CSR averaged estimate is also positive (0.25 to 0.59 for 
ROA in Table 2.3, 0.40 to 1.37 for ROCE in Table 2.4) but CSR importance (as measured by 
Akaike’s weight) only exceeds 0.50 for the restricted sample. However, further results 
obtained by disaggregating CSR into multiple cluster of policies (dimensions) show that this 
global positive relationship hides divergent effects. 
To explain ROA, CSR dimensions that stand out as important variables with AICc MA on the 
full sample are Customers and Suppliers, which clearly stands out (weight 0.85, Table 2.6), 
weakly followed by Environment (weight 0.2, Table 2.6). On the restricted sample, important 
variables are Human resources (weight 0.57 to 0.69, Table 2.6) and more weakly Environment 
(weight 0.42, Table 2.6). With SIC MA, only Human Resources on the restricted sample and 
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Customers and Suppliers on the full sample are not driven to null weight (Table 2.7). To 
explain ROCE, Customers and Suppliers (weight 0.40 to 0.41, Table 2.8) stand out as the 
important variable both on the restricted and the full samples, weekly followed by 
Environment (weight 0.40, Table 2.8), particularly on the full sample. Human Resources 
comes third with a weaker effect than observed for ROA. SIC MA once again proves very 
selective but Customers and Suppliers dimension is the only CSR dimension kept (Table 2.9).  
Hereby a main finding of the paper is that all CSR dimensions do not equally matter to do well 
and do good. A hierarchy clearly stands out between CSR dimensions, robust and consistent 
across various samples. This hierarchy is dominated by the Customers and Suppliers 
dimension. The Human Resources and Environment dimensions appear to have a significant 
but lesser impact. Finally, the Governance and Community Involvement dimensions do not 
seem to be linked to financial performance. Let us now focus on the Customers and Suppliers 
dimension. 
 
2.4.2. GOOD BUSINESS BEHAVIORS WITH CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS REMAIN CORE 
 
The Customers and Suppliers CSR dimension relates to respect of customers, in terms of 
information and product safety; sustainable and transparent relationships with suppliers; and 
more generally, business integrity. This paper shows that, among all CSR dimensions, 
performance along this policy is the most strongly associated with profitability.  
For both performance measures (ROA and ROCE) and for both model averaging methods 
(AICc MA and SIC MA, on the full sample), a negative link appears between financial 
performance and both “best” and “worst” business behaviors with customers and suppliers. 
For instance, AICc MA on full sample shows that being “worst-in-class” on good business 
behaviors decrease ROA by -1.37% (Table 2.6) and ROCE by -1.76% (Table 2.8) compared 
with average firms; whereas being “best-in-class” decreases ROA by -0.17% (Table 2.6) and 
ROCE by -0.46% (Table 2.8.). The existence of an optimal level of good business behaviors 
with customers and suppliers is thus supported.  
Let us note that since causality is not dealt with, we cannot distinguish between mechanisms. 
For instance, low performance on this dimension (for instance, late payment of suppliers) 
might decrease profitability (because reactive suppliers will stop working with the firm, 
preventing quick corporate adaptation to market changes); or conversely, low profitability 
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might constraint firms to harden their practices with their suppliers (because they don’t have 
sufficient cash flows to pay them on time). However, results show that performance on this 
CSR dimension has a strong correlation with financial performance.  
As early as 1995, Jones (1995) has shown that companies involved in repeated transactions 
with stakeholders on the basis of trust and cooperation are motivated to be honest, trustworthy 
and ethical because the returns to such behavior are high. Whereas it seems fairly intuitive that 
promoting good-business behaviors with suppliers and customers is likely to create value, at 
least on the long run, few studies actually quantify it. Part of the effect of this CSR dimension 
might capture the synergies between reputation, advertising and CSR, which have been more 
studied (e.g. Brown et al., 2006). Disentangling consumer relationships, supplier relationships 
and advertisement effects on financial performance would thus be an interesting path for 
further research. 
 
2.4.3. COEXISTENCE OF CSR POLICIES WITH AND WITHOUT OPTIMAL LEVEL 
 
The second major finding of this paper is the coexistence of CSR policies monotonically 
linked to profitability and of CSR policies with optimal levels. 
On the one hand, a monotonic relationship is found between the Human Resources variable 
and financial performance. This dimension here refers to a proactive human resources 
corporate policy, including career development, continuous improvement of labor relations 
and quality of working conditions. Being worst-in-class is found to be negatively linked with 
financial performance whereas being best-in-class in positively related, indicating a 
monotonic relationship. This finding is in line with previous works showing that human 
resources policies can help recruiting motivated employees with team work values, securing 
firm survival and long-term performance (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008) and reducing costly 
employee turnover (Portney, 2008). Empirically, similar findings are made by Galbreath 
(2006) who studies employee treatment in 38 top Australian firms; Jones and Murrell (2001) 
who focus on the stock returns of the 51 firms included in the ‘Working mother’ list; and 
Brammer et al. (2006), who use the stock returns on the UK market. 
On the other hand, curvilinear relationships between financial performance and respectively 
environmental performance and good business behaviors with customers and suppliers are 
found on all samples, for both financial performance measures and with both methods. The 
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Environment dimension here encompasses the integration of environmental issues into 
corporate policy, product manufacturing, distribution, use and disposal. This finding is a major 
step in the CSR literature as it reconciles divergent studies such as Derwall et al. (2005), who 
find a positive link between corporate environmental policies and financial performance, and 
Brammer et al. (2006)’s, who found a negative link. In line with Barnett and Salomon (2006) 
and Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2012), who made a strong case for a curvilinear 
relationship, results here point out that the link between environment policies and corporate 
performance depends on the level considered.  
A step further, findings highlight that the specification of the CSR-profitability link (that is 
curvilinear versus monotonic) depends on the CSR dimension considered. Indeed, an optimum 
level is here shown for environmental performance and for good business behaviors with 
customers and suppliers, but not for human resources management. Of course, the linear 
relationship observed between human resources management and profitability does not imply 
that corporations can infinitely invest is their employees’ well-being and that it would yield 
infinite profits. A fair assumption could be that firms with slack resources spend some to 
improve workforce management (by developing training program for instance) and that 
human capital investment increases linearly with slack resources. Another potential 
explanation could be that improved human resources management increases productivity and 
profitability, up to an optimum level with is not reached by firms in the studied sample. 
Qualifying in more details these relationships by focusing on causality with panel data would 
appear as a promising extension of this research. In particular, the optimal CSR to implement 
for corporations to be profitable might depend on specific firm characteristics, such as 
industry. 
 
2.4.4. RESULTS ROBUSTNESS 
 
Result robustness can first be assessed by comparing control variable estimations across 
models and samples. As a benchmark, Base Model OLS estimates are thus compared with 
AICc MA results on Global CSR (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). For both methods, the same 
controls are significant (for OLS) and important (for MA). When significant, control 
parameters estimated by OLS are of expected signs. Two samples are also used for each 
variable: a sample limited to the R&D intensity data availability (622 observations) and a full 
sample without R&D intensity (1577 observations). In both samples and for both financial 
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performance measures the control estimates are (but for the R&D intensity control for ROCE 
in full sample) in line with previous literature. The inclusion or not of the R&D variable also 
little biases the estimations. Most estimations are thus made on the full sample. 
When CSR is disaggregated into five dimensions, averaged control estimates remain 
consistent across methods (AICc MA and SIC MA) and performance measures (ROA and 
ROCE) as shown by the comparison of Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. For both ROA and ROCE 
and on both samples, AICc MA results for control variables are consistent in terms of 
estimate signs, estimate values and variable importance. This consistency supports result 
robustness.  
To evaluate robustness of model averaging estimations and variable weight significance, a 
specific test is needed. A permutation test (also called randomization test) is thus built and 
conducted. Test results give us a probability equivalent to a p-value. 1000 permutations were 
used to compute the test, meaning the smallest possible p-value obtained is 0.001 (weight 
significance test appears in tables as: “ +” p<0.10; “++” p<0.05;  “+++” p<0.01). 
Finally, endogeneity might bias results. It is a well-known pitfall in many empirical fields, 
including CSR research (as pointed out by Garcia-Castro et al., 2010), and needs to be tested 
for and dealt with if important. The idea is that firms might be more likely to engage in CSR 
policies would their performance allow or encourage them to do so. A lagged performance 
variable is thus introduced in OLS models and AICc MA models to check whether controlling 
for endogeneity drastically changes results. A drawback of lagged variables is that they 
reduce sample size, which is crucial for model averaging performance. Table 2.10 presents 
results to be compared with Table 2.5 (for OLS on ROA and ROCE), Table 2.6 (for AICc 
MA on ROA) and Table 2.8 (for AICc MA on ROCE). Results lead to the conclusion that 
AICc MA estimates are robust to the introduction of the lagged variable, hence to the 
endogeneity issue. 
 
2.4.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATIONS SEEKING TO DO WELL AND DO GOOD AND FOR 
PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
Clearly, this chapter results do not imply that to succeed in being socially responsible and 
“doing well” and “doing good” a firm should heavily invest on its business behaviors towards 
its customers and suppliers, improve its human resources policies, cut down its environmental 
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performance and drop all policies regarding its community involvement and governance. 
Indeed, several limits of this study have been acknowledged, starting with the causality 
between CSR dimensions and financial performance, which ought to be the focus of further 
work. Indeed, long-term effects of socially responsible policies and reverse causality are here 
bypassed. For instance, being proactive in environmental policies might be costly at year t and 
only possible for firms with excess cash-flows. However, this environmental policy might be 
well communicated to customers, which might then be willing to pay more for the firm 
product at year t+1. Supporting the existence of interactions between CSR dimensions, 
Cavaco and Crifo (2010) found complementarities between good business behaviors and 
proactive human resources policy, but substitutability between the latter and environmental 
performance. 
However, this chapter establishes that CSR is a heterogeneous construct: policies 
encompassed in this wide concept are differently associated with corporations’ economic 
performance; some bear optimum levels (environment) while others don’t (human resources); 
some have little impact (governance) while others weight significantly on the accounting 
ratios (good business behaviors). Hereby CSR does not come as a bundle to be bluntly 
promoted. Instead, at the corporation level, it calls for a strategic analysis of the firm’s 
business model in order to carefully select the appropriate CSR policy mix, with a special 
attention to business integrity towards customers and suppliers.  
In terms of public policies, results highlight that for CSR to become a mainstay of the Europe 
2020 sustainable development strategy, it needs to be detailed at an implementable policy 
level, as different policies have diverging effects. It also needs to be built with corporations, as 
they are core actors to identify which dimensions of CSR can penalize their profitability and 
which are more relevant to create shared value. In particular, these paper findings suggest that 
policies targeting the supply chain and customers are more likely to be successfully seized by 
firms as they are strongly linked with profitability. Conversely, since an optimum level has 
been found for the environmental performance, high levels of performance along this 
dimension might be harder to reach by voluntary corporate policies.  
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TABLE 2.10 -  Endogeneity robustness test 
   OLS (i)    AICc Model Averaging (ii)    
  ROA  ROCE  ROA   ROCE  
Explanatory   Estim.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Estim.  Std. 
Dev. 
 Estim Uncond 
var 
Nb 
model 
Weight  Estim Uncond 
var 
Nb 
model 
Weight 
Human 
Resources 
Best  -0.29  (0.34)  -0.46  (0.69)  -0.05 (0.01) 43 0.13  0.07 (0.04) 35 0.10 
Worst  -0.22  (0.40)  -0.54  (0.68)  -0.03 (0.01) 43 0.13  -0.05 (0.03) 35 0.20 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Best  -0.56 * (0.39)  -0.82  (0.67)  -0.58 (0.12) 48 0.98+++  -0.91 (1.29) 50 0.73+++ 
Worst  -1.28 *** (0.33)  -1.85 ** (0.74)  -1.32 (0.15) 48 0.98+++  -2.14 (2.55) 50 0.73+++ 
Governance Best  -0.17  (0.37)  -0.31  (0.77)  -0.04 (0.02) 45 0.32  -0.08 (0.06) 34 0.12 
Worst  -0.58  (0.39)  -1.45 ** (0.64)  -0.21 (0.11) 45 0.32  -0.14 (0.09) 34 0.12 
Environment Best  -0.62  (0.39)  -1.43 * (0.74)  -0.17 (0.08) 44 0.27+  -0.52 (0.76) 46 0.31+ 
Worst  -0.12  (0.39)  0.32  (0.78)  0.04 (0.08) 44 0.27+  0.20 (0.28) 46 0.31+ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  0.13  (0.41)  -0.07  (0.78)  0.00 (0.00) 43 0.08  0.74 (1.22) 44 0.35 
Worst  0.00  (0.36)  -0.63  (0.74)  -0.00 (0.00) 43 0.08  0.57 (0.86) 44 0.35 
Risk    0.08 *** (0.02)  0.01  (0.03)  0.08 (0.00) 95 1.00+++  0.12 (0.00) 47 0.96+++ 
Financial 
leverage 
  -0.26  (0.17)  -1.72 *** (0.44)  -0.13 (0.03) 37 0.40++  -2.44 (0.44) 85 1.00+++ 
Size   0.28  (0.18)  0.16  (0.32)  0.20 (0.03) 39 0.67+  0.04 (0.01) 36 0.14 
ROCE-1 lag       0.55 *** (0.07)       0.38 (0.00) 100 1.00+++ 
ROA-1 lag   0.60 *** (0.04)      0.60 (0.00) 100 1.00+++      
                  
R
2
   56.86   48.11    No     No   
F-statistic   30.18 ***  16.68 ***   No     No   
Observations   1116   1109   618     1566   
No. firms   382   384   206     457   
No. models   1   1   32     16   
Table 2.10 compares the OLS estimations of the base model (1) to the AICc MA results when lagged variable are introduced in models to control for potential endogeneity 
issues. Two different samples are used in each case: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
 (i) For OLS, figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(ii) For AICc MA, estimates are the averaged parameter estimates ( ̂̅ in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. Figures in brackets are the unconditional variance 
(  ̂  ( ̂̅) in equation (7)). Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01.  
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2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper contributes to the question of how corporations can profitably become “socially 
responsible”, as defined and promoted by the European Commission. It highlights that this 
issue constitutes a multidimensional puzzle hampered by model uncertainty, because theory 
lacks to predict relevant profitability predictors among all CSR dimensions. To account for 
model uncertainty, model averaging is introduced in the literature. 
This powerful tool enables to unveil which CSR dimensions are significantly related to 
financial performance, and how. In particular, good business behaviors with customers and 
suppliers stand out as core among all CSR dimensions. Environmental performance and 
human resources management are also weakly associated with profitability in the studied data, 
whereas implication in local communities and governance are not. Strong evidence is also 
provided on the co-existence of policies with optimal levels for financial performance (good-
business behaviors with customers and suppliers and environmental performance) and policies 
with monotonic relationship (human resources management). Findings hence suggest that 
different CSR dimensions bear different optimums to be reached for corporations to manage 
to do well and do good. 
This research opens a new path to better analyze drivers of how firms can be profitable and 
socially responsible. Further work taking into account temporality and causality is still needed 
before providing reliable CSR strategy advice to organizations seeking to profitably adhere to 
the principles of CSR. However, this paper findings highlight that firms do not necessarily 
have interest to promote all CSR dimensions to create value for their shareholders. This result 
raises questions in terms of the value shared with stakeholders and society and the public good 
effectively provided. Hereby, further research paths could cover the social side of the 
equation. In particular, little is known about the type and efficiency of the public good 
privately provided by corporations under the impulse of public policies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THINK GLOBAL, INVEST RESPONSIBLE: WHY THE PRIVATE 
EQUITY INDUSTRY GOES GREEN 
 
Where does the Private Equity industry stand in terms of CSR, and why? 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter sets up to analyze the growth of socially responsible investment (SRI) in Private 
Equity and shows that it benefited from the maturation of the concept on public markets and 
the impetus of large conventional actors. Hypotheses on the characteristics and drivers of the 
movement are proposed and tested on a unique database covering the French Private Equity 
industry in 2011. Results support that Private Equity SRI is characterized by investor 
engagement and strategically driven by a need for new value creation sources, increased risk 
management and differentiation. In particular, independent funds are more likely than captive 
funds to develop SRI practices. 
 
Résumé 
Ce chapitre analyse la croissance de l’investissement socialement responsable (ISR) en 
Capital Investissement. Il montre qu’elle a bénéficié de la maturation du concept d’ISR sur les 
marchés côtés et de l’impulsion de grands acteurs conventionnels. Il propose alors des 
hypothèses sur les caractéristiques et déterminants de ce mouvement et les teste sur une base 
de données unique couvrant l’industrie française du Capital Investissement en 2011. Les 
résultats permettent de caractériser l’ISR en Capital Investissement comme étant marqué par 
l’engagement des investisseurs et stratégiquement déterminé par un besoin de création de 
nouveaux leviers de valeur, d’amélioration de la gestion des risques et de différentiation. En 
particulier, les fonds indépendants ont une probabilité supérieure aux fonds captifs de 
développer des pratiques ISR.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 is based on a paper co-written with Patricia Crifo (same title) and forthcoming in the 
Journal of Business Ethics (DOI. 10.1007/s10551-012-1443-y). We thank Novéthic for granting us 
access to survey data.   
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is an investment process that integrates social, 
environmental, and ethical considerations into investment decision making (Renneboog et al., 
2008). As such, it differs from conventional investments in a twofold way. First, socially 
responsible investors apply a set of investment screens to select or exclude assets based on 
non-financial criteria, in addition to financial criteria. Second, those investors often engage in 
shareholder activism to foster Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies in the firms 
they own. SRI is a niche market that has been expanding over the past decade, reaching in 
2010 about 3 070 billion USD in the United States, representing 12.2% of assets under 
management (Social Investment Forum, 2010) and 3 800 billion EUR in Europe in 2010 
(Eurosif, 2010). SRI markets are also expanding in Canada (EIA, 2005), Australia (SIO, 
2005) and Asia (ASRIA, 2011). 
Consequently, SRI structure, performance and evolution triggered research in management, 
economics and finance fields. However, most academic work focuses on SRI provided on 
public financial markets. The potential impact of the Private Equity channel on a firm’s non-
financial policies and performance has received less attention (Scholtens, 2006; Cumming and 
Johan, 2007), partly because it is still at its early steps. Discarding from previous literature, 
this paper unveils responsible investment practices among Private Equity investors and their 
specificities compared to both standard Private Equity and public markets’ SRI. Light is shed 
on their surprisingly fast integration of Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria 
and drivers of this movement are empirically analyzed in the French context.  
Here, the term ‘Private Equity’ industry refers to specialized investment firms whose business 
is to invest in unlisted companies, thus encompassing both venture capital and buyouts. On a 
theoretical level, Private Equity has been identified as highly efficient at maximizing 
shareholders’ value by reducing agency costs and providing strong incentive to management 
(e.g. Jensen 1986, 1989; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). As such, combining extra-financial 
and financial consideration through CSR does not appear in direct line with Private Equity 
investors’ practices as it would amount to spend cash flows to provide public good. In fact, on 
an empirical level, the phenomenal growth curve of the Private Equity industry in Europe and 
the United States over the 2000-2007 period drew media and regulatory concerns about its 
effect on business and society. In particular, buyouts have been pointed out for their 
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potentially negative social impact (Financial Services Authority, 2006; Bocquet Report, 
2007).  
Hereby, the question of the characterization of a socially responsible investment movement in 
Private Equity is by far not trivial and the analysis of its drivers is challenging both 
empirically and theoretically. The pioneering work of Cumming and Johan (2007), first to 
consider the direct intersection between SRI and Private Equity, analyzes the factors that 
influence institutional investors to allocate capital to socially responsible Private Equity 
investments. The authors forecast an increasing demand by institutional investors to invest 
responsibly and call for further research on the factors that give rise to fund managers offering 
such investment alternatives to their investors.  
This exploratory chapter hence sets up to analyze the responsible investment movement in 
Private Equity. First, it establishes that the industry benefited from the maturation of SRI on 
public financial markets. In particular, the Private Equity approach of SRI appears to be a 
mainstream approach initiated by large conventional players. Hypotheses on the 
characteristics and drivers of the responsible investment movement in Private Equity are 
econometrically tested with multivariate analysis on a unique database covering the French 
Private Equity industry, third world largest after the United States and the United Kingdom. 
France has also been identified as a proactive SRI market (Arjaliès, 2010). Main findings are 
that SRI in Private Equity is characterized by investor engagement and strategically driven by 
a need for new value creation sources (in a lesser extent), increased risk management and 
differentiation. In particular, results show that independent funds, which need to attract 
investors, are more likely than captive funds to integrate ESG issues in their investing 
practices.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 defines and provides 
historical insights on SRI and Private Equity to establish where this industry stands in terms 
of socially responsible practices. Section 3.3 builds testable hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents 
data. Section 3.5 displays results. Main findings are discussed in section 3.6 as well as the 
potential evolution of the socially responsible Private Equity movement in light of the 
upcoming regulatory context. Section 3.7 concludes on potential further research paths. 
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3.2. PRIVATE EQUITY AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
 
As a starting point, this section briefly reviews the parallel development of the SRI concept on 
the one hand and of the Private Equity industry on the other hand, hence contextualizing the 
integration of responsible investment in Private Equity.  
 
3.2.1. THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT CONCEPT, FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM 
 
SRI involves two main approaches. The first consists in using screens to either avoid 
(negative screening) or seek out (positive screening) specific investments when building a 
portfolio. Screens can be ethical, normative (based on social or environmental international 
norms), sectorial or best-in-class (selecting most CSR proactive firms, whatever their sector). 
The second main SRI approach is engagement or shareholder activism: shareholders’ voting 
rights are used to directly foster CSR in portfolio companies. Both approaches share the 
integration of a consideration of ESG issues in investment practices. Eccles and Viviers 
(2011) add to this definition that this integration be done “with the primary purpose of 
delivering higher-risk-adjusted financial returns”8. 
Over the 2000’s, SRI shifted from a marginal niche market to a mainstream practice, a 
phenomenon called ‘SRI mainstreaming’ and based on the progressive penetration of SRI 
(extra financial) criteria into conventional investment funds focused on financial criteria only 
(Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Bourghelle et al., 2009). Dunfee (2003) concludes that SRI has 
the potential to become a mainstream phenomenon practiced by ordinary investors.  
Louche and Lydenberg (2006) precise that this movement is likelier is the European that in 
the United States’ financial landscape. Indeed, Arjaliès (2010) show that this potential has 
been realized by assets managers in the French market as a result of a deliberative and 
organized social movement, which aimed at changing the institutional logics of the asset 
management field. The French legislative context also mattered for the development of long 
term investing and SRI in France and potentially the emergence of SRI mainstreaming: 
creation of a Pension trust Fund (Fonds de Reserve des Retraites) in 2001 with a specific SRI 
policy, Laws on Employee Savings in 2001 and 2003 promoting long term investing, New 
                                                             
8
 Such has not always been the case, as illustrated in Renneboog et al. (2008)’s review of the SRI maturation 
from the 17th century Quakers ideology to nowadays. 
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Economic Regulation Act in 2001 and Grenelle 2 Act in 2011 introducing compulsory 
responsibility reporting for listed and non-listed firms. France therefore constitutes a very 
interesting market to investigate SRI in other types of assets. 
 
3.2.2. THE SURGE AND CRISIS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
Parallel to the development of the SRI market but on a whole different scale, Private Equity 
witnessed a striking growth curve over 2000s, until the financial crisis. To grasp the economic 
role of those investors and how responsible investment can fit in their practices, let us first 
describe their business. 
Private Equity holds a key role in our economies because it finances innovation and unlisted 
companies, most of them being small and medium size enterprises. It acts as a financial 
intermediary between investors (the ‘Limited Partners’) and companies. A limited partnership 
links the Private Equity firm, who acts as ‘General Partners’ and manages the fund, to the 
Limited Partners who provide the capital. Limited Partners neither manage the funds they 
invest in nor intervene at the investee company level, yet they regularly assess the quality of 
the investments made by General Partners. Typically, Limited Partners are institutional 
investors (banks, insurance companies and pension funds) but also count family offices, 
individuals, corporations and Government agencies.  
Private Equity funds exist for a fixed period (usually 10 years) over which investment cycles 
occur: General Partners acquire companies (acquisition stage), hold them in portfolio for 4 to 
7 years (holding stage),  and sell them (exit stage) to redistribute capital and dividends to the 
Limited Partners. Private Equity investors are thus significant or majority shareholders of 
companies for middle to long term horizon 
9
.  
Depending on the growth stage on the company and the complexity of the deal (Morrell and 
Clark, 2010), the industry can be broken down in different segments. Venture capital usually 
invests in younger companies in innovative or technological industries as minority 
shareholders. Buyouts target larger companies in more mature industries and encompass 
Growth capital, Transmission Capital and Distressed Capital depending on the company stage 
                                                             
9
 Note that while General Partners in Private Equity funds have some discretion in how they value their portfolio, 
valuation is still subject to the fiduciary duties the general partner owes the fund. 
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and needs. Leveraged buyouts (LBO), most common in Transmission Capital, are specific 
deals in which a small share of equity is invested and leveraged by a large acquisition debt.  
The surge of Private Equity financing first occurred in the United States over the 1980s, a 
decade of intense corporate restructuring in the face of international competition and 
deregulation (Jensen, 1993). It was driven by LBO and often relying on junk bond financing. 
As the junk bond market crashed, many LBO defaulted and investee companies went to 
bankruptcy, so that the Private Equity industry nearly disappeared in the early 1990’s (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). However, remaining Private Equity funds acted as a substitute for 
weak capital markets over the 1994-2004 period (Boucly et al., 2009) and the industry 
underwent a steady growth. In 2001, venture capital investments were almost 100 times larger 
than they were in 1977, whereas bank lending to small firms stayed constant at the best over 
the same period (Ueda, 2004). The 2000s thus witnessed a new boom of the Private Equity 
and LBO peaked in the 2006-2007 due to a period of euphoric credit markets (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009).  
The 2008 financial crisis led fundraising and debt markets to plummet and ended the Private 
Equity surge (Figure 3.1). From then on, competition rocketed up and returns had to 
increasingly come from value creation, such as selecting underdeveloped companies and 
accelerating their growth, rather than financial leverage effect (Boucly et al., 2009). Price 
competition and consequent quest for value creation had nevertheless started prior to the 
crisis, as shown by Jin and Wang (2002) and Gaspar (2009). This paper conjectures that 
responsible investing practices are part of this value creation quest. 
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FIGURE 3.1 – French Private Equity market (data AFIC 2011 and UN PRI 2011) in 
amounts of funds raised, funds invested and UN PRI signatories  
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3.2.3. INTEGRATION OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRACTICES BY PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS 
 
The official intersection of Private Equity and SRI can be dated back to 2009, a period of 
liquidity dearth. Indeed, the first major move towards responsible investment in Private 
Equity was the adoption (February 10, 2009) of guidelines covering environmental, health, 
safety, labor, governance and social issues by large conventional players, namely the United 
States Private Equity Council, representing 13 of the world’s largest Private Equity investors. 
Within a month, the Private Equity United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (UN 
PRI) were launched and its Board stated (March 2009):  
“We also need to recognize that investors can, and should, be part of the response to this crisis 
and that responsible investment has an important role in mitigating future such market 
failures.(...). This crisis demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of our underlying 
investments, and how they may have been putting not only the companies involved at risk, but 
the entire economy.” 
Between February 2009 and August 2011, 107 Private Equity companies became UN PRI 
signatories, among which world leader funds of funds and General Partners. National 
associations are major actors in this change, as witnessed by the Australian Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association asking its members to “seriously consider signing the UN PRI” 
in August 2009 or the responsible investing guidelines provided in June 2010 by the British 
Association (BVCA, 2010). In France, the Sustainable Development Project of the French 
Association for Private Equity (AFIC) was launched in April 2010 by conventional Private 
Equity firms. Key figures also encourage the SRI movement in Private Equity, such as Lord 
Mandelson, the United Kingdom secretary of state for business, innovation and skills, who 
emphasized that embracing CSR issues into Private Equity investment approach made “good 
business sense” (September 2009).  
Henceforth, SRI in Private Equity can be conjectured as a mainstream approach initiated by 
large players and structurally neither thought of nor developed as a niche market. Typically, 
socially responsible Private Equity hence essentially differs from conventional Private Equity 
in that it integrates ESG issues in its investing practices.  
Let us finally note that despite its quick evolution, SRI in Private Equity is still at its first 
steps. The UN PRI estimate that the share of total Private Equity market subject to integration 
by PRI signatories worldwide was 5% in 2009 and 8% in 2011. As about 10% of the AFIC 
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members are UNPRI signatories, France appears as an active and interesting field to 
investigate in details the SRI movement in Private Equity.  
 
3.3. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES ON CHARACTERISTICS AND DRIVERS OF THE RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT MOVEMENT IN PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Does responsible Private Equity present specificities compared to SRI on financial markets? 
This section builds testable hypotheses on the characteristics of socially responsible investing 
in Private Equity and respectively its strategic and responsive drivers. Based on previous 
section, we here define socially responsible investing in Private Equity as the integration of 
ESG concerns in conventional investing practices. 
 
3.3.1. HYPOTHESES ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
A straightforward conjecture is that difference between SRI on financial markets and socially 
responsible Private Equity might directly arise from the specificities of Private Equity itself. 
Drawing from the corporate finance literature, four characteristics of Private Equity are hence 
here detailed: information asymmetry reduction; agency costs cut; governance engineering 
and operational engineering. Impacts on ESG criteria integration are conjectured and lead to 
testable hypotheses.  
First, asymmetric information between informed managers and the public market has been 
shown to cause under-investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Private Equity investors reduce 
this information asymmetry by monitoring the companies they select (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1997) and evaluating them better than a standard financial institution would (Ueda, 2004). As 
such, ESG integration appears as another tool to reduce information asymmetry and improve 
business.  
Second, the agency theory framework has been applied to the Private Equity setting by Jensen 
(1986, 1989), leading to the free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen argues that managers in 
companies with excess cash flows have an incentive to waste organizational resources on 
personal ends, rather than pay out the excess cash to shareholders through dividends. 
However financing by equity investors leads to high debt level (particularly for leverage 
Can Private Equity Funds Foster CSR? 
80 
 
buyouts) which affects the free cash flows of the firm for debt servicing, preventing 
opportunistic behaviors of managers (see Desbrières and Schatt, 2002). Private Equity tight 
hand on agency costs will naturally lead investors to carefully consider CSR in their portfolio 
companies, to avoid managerial entrenchment strategies (Baron et al., 2011; Cespa and 
Cestone, 2007). Being a socially responsible Private Equity investor hence means fostering 
CSR in portfolio companies while reducing agency costs.  
Both arguments foster the following hypothesis: 
 H1: Socially responsible Private Equity firms integrate ESG issues in mainstream 
business (as opposed to considering it as a niche market segment). 
 
Third, governance engineering has been shown to be another Private Equity strength (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). Private Equity investors usually have significant impact (if not 
complete control) on portfolio company board and are much more involved in governance 
than public companies board. For instance, it is not unusual that they initiate a management 
change. Managing governance issues is thus already core in Private Equity business. Hereby, 
the gap between managing “G” to full “ESG” issues is more easily filled in by Private Equity 
investors than public investors. 
 H2a: Private Equity firms are more likely to favor Governance aspects within the ESG 
issues. 
 
Forth, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argue that a property of Private Equity investors is 
operational engineering. Typically, Private Equity firms possess industry and operational 
expertise by their choice of human capital. They are thus able to advise companies at the core 
of their business to enhance value creation. Distinguishing value-creation CSR from 
managerial entrenchment requires a sound understanding of the firm environment and 
markets, which Private Equity possesses. Engagement thus appears a necessity to consistently 
be a socially responsible Private Equity investor. The previous hypothesis can thus be 
completed by: 
 H2b: Socially responsible Private Equity is characterized by investor engagement. 
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Understanding CSR potentiality needs sound expertise. Indeed, CSR encompasses many 
dimensions, with various effects on financial performance (Brammer et al., 2006). Yet 
expertise on strategic CSR is still scarce, all the more considering the recent interest of the 
industry for ESG issues. It is thus more likely for large Private Equity firms benefitting from 
wide human capital resources to be able to appropriately acquire CSR expertise. This firm 
size effect might also be linked to a form of mainstreaming.  
 H3: The integration of ESG issues is more likely to be implemented in large Private 
Equity firms in terms of workforce. 
 
3.3.2. HYPOTHESES ON STRATEGIC DRIVERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
The idea of strategic ESG integration refers to the reconciliation of social and long term 
economic interests of corporations. Experts in profit maximization and agency costs 
reduction, Private Equity investors would opportunistically analyze CSR as a strategic 
resource to improve the bottom line performance of companies (McWilliams et al., 2006). In 
their survey, Cumming and Johan (2007) indeed find that socially responsible institutional 
investment programs are more common among investors expecting greater economic returns 
from those investments. The following potential strategic drivers for responsible Private 
Equity are identified: value-creation; risk management; new market creation; differentiation 
and related compliance to Limited Partners demand. 
 
Hypothesis on Value Creation as a Strategic Driver 
 
Can a Private Equity fund create value by integrating ESG criteria in investment practices?  
As a starting point, empirical comparisons of public SRI performance to standard portfolios 
lead to rather lukewarm results, the former either achieving similar or lower yields than the 
latter (Bauer et al., 2005; Kreander et al., 2005) 
10
.  
However, as previously underlined, Private Equity investors structurally differ from public 
investors. Beyond governance and operating engineering, they typically do not build large and 
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 Recent work suggests that whereas SRI underwent a learning period in which it underperformed standard 
portfolio, it since caught up with conventional funds performance (Climent and Soriano, 2011). 
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diversified portfolios based on modern portfolio theory but rather select and follow a few 
companies in which they are significant active shareholders over a long-term horizon. More 
specifically, the Private Equity investment cycle consists in: (i) an acquisition stage over 
which firms can be screened on ESG issues; (ii) a 4 to 7 years of holding stage over which 
firms are monitored and value can be created; and (iii), an exit stage where investors can 
benefit from the created value. Value creation in the Private Equity context should thus be 
analyzed through the lens of the link between CSR and financial performance, rather than SRI 
versus standards portfolios.  
The link between CSR and performance has elicited much interest over the last three decades. 
Recent literature reviews (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Portney, 2008; Reinhardt et al., 2008; 
Margolis et al., 2009) converge to a consensus on the absence of a financial penalty associated 
with CSR. Yet generating over-performance with proactive CSR does not come 
straightforward, leading academics to advocate research on how corporations can succeed in 
both performing on social and financial levels. Literature reviews also highlight that value can 
be created through different channels: increase input-output efficiency to get a competitive 
advantage (Derwall et al., 2005); reduction of costly employee turnover and the recruitment of 
motivated, hence more productive, employees (Turban and Greening, 1997; Brekke and 
Nyborg, 2008); and answer to consumers’ demand and increase companies reputation and 
consumer loyalty, leading to long-term increased brand and company values (Kanter, 1999; 
Porter and Kramer, 2002; Kotler and Lee, 2005).  
The following hypothesis is thus proposed. 
 H4: Creating value in companies owned is the most important motive of socially 
responsible investing in Private Equity. 
 
Hypothesis on Risk Management as a Strategic Driver 
 
Another strategic rationale for promoting CSR in companies is improved risk management. 
As the company’s cash flow is used to service the acquisition debt, Private Equity investors’ 
greater risk is that the company will not achieve the cash flow necessary (Le Nadant and 
Perdreau, 2006). This is particularly crucial in the case of leveraged buyout transactions, in 
which investors are hence most interested in the company’s future capacity to generate large 
and steady levels of cash flow. Scholtens (2006) identifies three specific risks particularly 
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associated with ESG management default. A first direct risk is present when the investor takes 
possession of collateral, would it for instance poses a threat to the environment, as fines, 
decontamination or compliance to standards can become costly. A second indirect risk arises 
from changes in environmental or social legislation (or consumer preferences), which can 
affect company’s revenues and thereby its default probability. Finally, a reputational risk is 
also present where actions of borrowers may negatively feedback on its financiers. Hence the 
following hypothesis is proposed. 
 H5: Improving risk-management is the most important motive of socially responsible 
investing in Private Equity. 
 
Hypothesis on New Markets Creation as a Strategic Driver 
 
Environmental issues can create new business opportunities and offers wide innovation 
possibilities. This opening up of previously undiscovered market has early been highlighted as 
a rational for CSR (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Vogel, 2005). 
The Private Equity industry already seized the opportunity of exploiting this “market for 
virtue” (Vogel, 2005), as witnessed by their increasing involvement in the renewable energy 
and clean technology markets. Structurally, part of the Private Equity business exists to 
finance and support new companies and new markets. 
Indeed, business angels, seed capital and more globally speaking venture capital provide 
equity to managers creating or developing businesses. Typically, venture capital is oriented 
towards innovative firms (health sector, biotechnologies, informatics, energy sector) that can 
exploit new market opportunities based on consumers’ new demand. Conversely, buyouts 
usually target more mature markets with steady cash flows (services, consumer goods, 
chemistry, industry) in which CSR rather consists in a transversal approach than in the 
development of brand new products 
11
.The following hypothesis can thus be proposed. 
 H6: Venture capitalists are more likely than other Private Equity investors to develop 
specialized green funds in order to open new markets. 
                                                             
11
 However, cleantech funds could sometimes differ from responsible investment “per se”. For instance, 
investing in solar panels might not necessarily imply that a full ESG risk analysis has been conducted. Vogel 
(2005, p. 3) hence points out that if socially responsible firms can benefit from green markets, “there is also a 
large place for their less responsible competitors”. The gap between green funds and socially responsible 
investing could also be suggested at the industry level by the co-existence in the French Private Equity 
Association of a “Sustainable Growth Club” and a “Green Techs Club”. 
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Hypotheses on Differentiation and Related Compliance to Limited Partners 
Demand as Strategic Drivers 
 
Differentiation can drive responsible investment in Private Equity firms under a twofold 
motivation: reducing competition intensity and capturing Limited Partners’ preferences.  
Competition intensity between Private Equity firms rocketed up with the financial crisis and 
the crash of equity raised worldwide (in France, equity raised dropped by 71% in 2009). and 
competition for fund raising will keep on increasing over the next years as a consequence of 
the Basel III global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity, which ranked 
Private Equity funds as being among the most risky and illiquid assets. 
However, competition is likely to be heterogeneously perceived by Private Equity funds 
depending on whether they are captive funds or independent funds. A captive fund is 
significantly owned by its Limited Partners (typically a bank or a corporation); hereby 
fundraising is eased. On the contrary, an independent fund is owned by the Private Equity 
firm partners and needs to compete to raise funds. Previous literature already highlighted 
different behaviors (rather than mimetic processes) between captive and independent funds 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann, 2002; Hellman et al., 2008) 
Integrating ESG criteria might thus be used by Private Equity firms as a differentiation tool to 
attract Limited Partners
12
. Since fundraising competition is likely to be tougher for 
independent funds than captive funds, they might also be more induced to differentiate by 
offering CSR attributes to their investors. 
 H7a: Independent funds are more likely than captive funds to integrate ESG issues as 
a differentiation tool to attract investors. 
 
Another related motivation for CSR differentiation in the Private Equity context might also be 
to capture Limited Partners’ preference. Theoretical and empirical work previously found that 
individual investors may derive non-financial utility from investing in SRI funds (Bollen, 
2007; Renneboog et al., 2008). Moreover, different investors exhibit differences in solvency 
                                                             
12
 CSR has already been shown to be a means of differentiation in otherwise competitive environments (Arora 
and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Fisman et al., 2007), and to most strongly affect performance in low-innovation firms 
and in industries little segmented (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), as is the case of the Private Equity industry.  
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and returns requirements, extent of regulatory oversight, corporate objectives and accounting 
rules (Cumming and Johan, 2007). They might also differ in their CSR commitments (Cox et 
al., 2004; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1994). Among long-term 
investors, the regulatory constraints which European Pension funds already face (see 
Renneboog et al. (2008)’ review of Pension funds European regulations) are likely to increase 
their interest for French responsible investments. The following hypothesis is thus proposed. 
 H7b: Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-funds, as Limited Partners 
are more likely to integrate ESG issues. 
 
3.3.3. HYPOTHESIS ON RESPONSIVE DRIVERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Strategic drivers of responsible investing are typically opposed to responsive drivers. Whereas 
the former imply a proactive use of CSR to generate profits, the latter hints that sacrificing 
profits to provide environmental or social performance will hinder the firm from social 
pressure. Supporting this dichotomy, Baron et al. (2011) empirically show that responsive 
CSR increases with the firm’s slack resources and not strategic CSR.  
The Private Equity industry has been the focus of intense criticism over the past few years, 
both in Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe countries, which was blamed for short-termism 
impacting employees, drying-off of investing capacities and prevalence of short-term 
financial profits over long-term industrial growth in companies financed by the Private Equity 
industry. Yet, evidence that non-financial stakeholders suffer Private Equity short-termism is 
thus at best mixed (Boucly et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2011; Amess and Wright, 2007).  
However, the financial crash the world economy underwent drew public attention to the 
funds’ activity. The Private Equity recent surge also made it clearly visible. A General Partner 
hence stated in the British Venture Capital Association report (2010): “General Partners must 
accept that, now that they are managing large amounts of money, they face increased scrutiny 
from governments”. Grounded or not, the reputation of Private Equity has been tarnished and 
its social interest is now contested.  
Cases of visible polluting industries increasing their environmental and/or social performance 
under social pressure are many in the CSR literature. The “license to operate” concept 
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proposed by Post et al. (2002) well summarizes that a firm can hardly survive long when its 
social interest is contested and its actions have lost legitimacy.  
However, social pressure is likely to focus on specific Private Equity actors, namely large 
visible firms and/or LBO. Indeed, Cumming and Johan (2007) indicate that socially 
responsible Private Equity investment programs are more common among larger institutional 
investors. This finding is in line with larger companies tending to be more scrutinized than 
smaller ones. Second, LBO have been more subject to social criticism than other types of 
Private Equity, even though Venture Capital’s drawbacks have also been pointed out 
(Hellmann et al., 2008; Ueda, 2004). LBO and Transmission funds being both larger and 
more subject to criticism than other Private Equity funds types, the following hypothesis can 
be proposed.  
 H8: Large and thus visible Private Equity firms as well as leveraged buyouts 
specialists are more likely to formalize socially responsible investing and to publicly 
communicate it to protect their reputation and license-to-operate. 
 
The following section now presents the data on which the established hypotheses are tested.  
 
3.4. DATA AND METHOD 
 
3.4.1. THE FRENCH PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
Second largest market in Europe after the United Kingdom, the French Private Equity market 
(comprising both venture capital and buyouts) is also the third market worldwide in amounts 
invested behind the United States market (AFIC, 2010).  
The French Private Equity industry is usually segmented in: seed and venture capital (9.4% 
funds invested), growth capital (35.9%) and transmission capital transactions (54.7%; data 
AFIC, 2010). Leveraged buyouts (LBO) mainly occur in Transmission Capital and essentially 
deal with divestments of subsidiaries within groups (“spin-offs”; 64.1%); transmission of 
family businesses (30.8%) and to a minor extent with stock market-listed companies going 
private (“PTPs”; 5.1%).  
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The French Private Equity market is hence representative of the continental European market.  
However, some differences appear compared to Anglo-Saxon markets and are worth noticing. 
For instance, PTPs are limited in France compared to the United States and the United 
Kingdom industries due to regulatory constraints (Le Nadant and Perdreau, 2006). Another 
specificity of the French Private Equity market arises from lower debt pressure (Desbrières 
and Schatt, 2002) as well as the substantial part of their personal wealth French managers 
usually invest in the company's capital (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002).  
 
3.4.2. SAMPLING AND STRUCTURAL DATA 
 
The sample gathers observations on 309 Private Equity firms in 2011, all located in France. It 
is thus close to the whole French industry, and include 278 out of the 280 members of the 
French Private Equity Associations, non-members of the Association and French local Private 
Equity firms sponsored by the French Sovereign Wealth Funds (FSI). We focus on the Private 
Equity firm level rather than on the Private Equity fund level. Hence a firm in our sample 
usually managed several funds simultaneously
13
. 
Equity Data was collected from the Private Equity firms’ website, press releases and 
specialized media
14
. Data includes main characteristics such as the Private Equity firm age 
(Firm Age) and the number of funds it manages (Funds), which both give information on the 
firm experience (Cumming et al., 2009); as well as the number of companies financed by the 
firm at the time of data collection (Companies). Firm size is measured in terms of asset 
managed (Assets managed) and number of investors (Workforce).) The firm activity is given 
by dummy variables indicating whether it engages in venture capital, transmission (buyouts), 
growth capital, mezzanine, distressed capital or funds of funds transactions. 
Data is also collected on the ownership structure of the Private Equity firms, as it has been 
shown to impact the provision of capital (Cumming et al., 2008). We distinguish the number 
of shares owned by another Private Equity firm, individual owners-managers (Partners), 
                                                             
13
 We are thus not able to control for style drift (see Cumming et al., 2009) that is the deviation from stated 
objectives of the funds. Indeed we focus on the Private Equity organization, not the Private Equity fund, and a 
Private Equity firm may comprise more than one fund and may thereby provide investors investment products 
across a range of stated investment styles. 
14
 Specialized media used to built the database include the 2010 and 2011 Private Equity Firms Guide (“Le 
Guide des Sociétés de Capital Investissement”) and the http://investing.businessweek.com website. 
Can Private Equity Funds Foster CSR? 
88 
 
banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and the French State (via government 
funds). Limited Partners are accounted for by dummy variables indicating whether the firm 
manages capital provided by an industrial corporation, a sovereign wealth fund, individual 
investors, pension funds, family offices or if they are captive. A dummy variable also 
indicates whether the firm manages at least a fund specialized in sector industry. Management 
style is grasped by variables on the firm CEO gender and background. Geographical 
investment scope is also controlled for as a growing body of work suggests that international 
differences in legal and institutional factors can affect Private Equity and SRI allocations (e.g. 
Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming et al., 2010). In particular, dummy variables indicate 
whether the firms invest only in a specific French district, in European countries, or in non-
European countries (“international scope”).   
Data on public responsible investment practices is also gathered: signatory of the UNPRI and 
of the French National Association Ethics Chart; management of green or social funds; web 
communication on responsible investment practices; and interest as proxied by answer to 
responsible investment surveys.  
Variable description and descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.1 and the correlation 
matrix in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Continuous variables were checked for outliers using the 
Grubbs test (Grubbs, 1969). To limit influential points, the logarithm of the variable “assets 
managed” was used in regressions. 
 
3.4.3. SURVEY DATA 
 
Whereas structural and investment data can be collected in the public domain, such is not the 
case of strategies behind responsible investment practices. To get an insider perspective, the 
database is thus completed with survey data.  
The survey was built in partnership with Novethic
15
, a subsidiary of the French public 
institution and long-term investor Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, and sent to 308 Private 
Equity firms in March 2011. The questionnaire comprises items on practical ESG integration 
and formalization; dedicated resources; greenhouse gas emission assessment; positive or 
                                                             
15
 Our research was conducted in full independence and without any biases for the best representativeness to be 
obtained. In fact Novethic granted access to their data and did not interfere in our study, nor used our results 
(they conducted independent descriptive research on this topic, not academic one). 
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negative screening; support provided to the company portfolio to foster CSR; belief in the 
importance of ESG integration for Limited Partners and firm reputation. Questionnaires were 
emailed and filled online. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.2.  
We obtained a response rate of 24.0% (74 respondents out of 308 firms). This rate compares 
favorably with those observed in previous surveys on responsible investing in Private Equity: 
7% (100 answers out of 1114 Dutch institutions) in Cumming and Johan (2007); 20% (84 
answers out of 415 UK firms) in BVCA (2009). In a survey on Private Equity deal structures 
in Italy, Cumming and Zambelli (2010; 2011) obtained a 47% response rate (27 out of 57 
funds) and note that rates observed in previous surveys in finance range from 19% in the 
United States (Brau and Fawcett, 2006) to 60% in the United Kingdom (Wright and Robbie, 
1996).  
To limit social desirability bias, the questionnaire made no reference to “socially responsible 
investment” or to “ethics” (Neumann, 2003; Vyvyan et al., 2011). To stimulate frank answers, 
the anonymity of respondents was ensured (Kuckertz and Wagner, 2009). Questionnaire 
wording (translated from French)
16
 is presented in Appendix B. 
Another common bias in surveys arises from self-exclusion of respondents. Following Moore 
and Reichert (1983) and Kuckertz and Wagner (2009), the issue of the survey sample 
representativeness is dealt with by comparing firm characteristics of the respondents to the 
non-respondents. As our sample covers the whole French Private Equity industry, this 
comparison provides us with a robust test of our survey representativeness. Univariate tests 
were used (t-tests for normally distributed variables; test of proportions for categorical data). 
Detailed results can be found in Table B.2 in Appendix B.  
The conducted tests lead us to conclude that there is no statistical difference between 
responding and non-responding groups in terms of firm age, structure of ownership, 
geographical investment scope, and industry sector investment scope. Little bias is observed 
in terms of spread between activities (venture capital, growth capital, mezzanine, funds of 
funds, reversal, and leveraged buyouts, the latter being slightly overrepresented) and between 
Limited Partners categories (funds with institutional Limited Partners being slightly 
overrepresented).  
  
                                                             
16
 The original French questionnaire is available upon request. 
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TABLE 3.1 - Descriptive statistics on public data 
Variable name  Definition  Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Main characteristics       
Firm Age  Years elapsed since firm foundation
(1)
  310 13.2 11.7 0 102 
Workforce  Number of employees  286 13.2 27.2 1 371 
Funds   Number of funds managed by the firm
(2)
  302 5.0 8.7 0 65 
Companies   Number of companies hold in portfolio  288 39.7 74.2 0 700 
Assets managed  Millions of Euros of assets managed
(3)
  295 876.2 2951.7 0 32000 
         
Ownership: Percentage of firms shares...       
Listed  ... listed on a Stock market (in %).  303 0.01 0.09 0 1 
PE firm  ...  owned by another Private Equity firm (in %).  274 0.16 0.34 0 1 
Partners  ...  owned by the firm Partners (in %).  274 0.42 0.47 0 1 
Bank  ... owned by a Bank (in %).  274 0.18 0.33 0 1 
Insurance 
company 
 ... owned by an insurance company (in %)  274 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Industry  ... owned by an industrial corporation (in %).  274 0.05 0.19 0 1 
French state  ... owned directly or indirectly by the French State (in %).  274 0.11 0.26 0 1 
Other  ... owned by other shareholders (in %).  274 0.03 0.14 0 1 
         
Limited Partners: Dummy variable equal to 1 if....., 0 otherwise       
LP Industry  ....the firm manages funds provided by an industrial corporation  271 0.19 0.39 0 1 
LP Captive 
 
... the firm is captive and essentially manages funds provided by a single bank 
or insurance 
 
271 0.32 0.47 0 1 
LP Sovereign  ...the firm manages funds provided by a Sovereign Wealth Funds  274 0.39 0.49 0 1 
LP Individuals   ... the firm manages funds provided by individuals  273 0.21 0.41 0 1 
LP Institutional  ... the firm manages institutional funds (except pension funds)  267 0.76 0.43 0 1 
LP Pension funds  ... the firm manages funds provided by pension funds  267 0.26 0.44 0 1 
LP Family offices  ... the firm manages funds provided by family offices  266 0.37 0.48 0 1 
(1) 
The age of firms founded in 2011 has been rounded to 0.  
(2)
 Depending on their legal form, some firms do not manage « funds » as legally defined. 
(3) 
 Two firms were in 
the process of raising fund and did not managed assets in 2011. 
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TABLE 3.1 continued 
 
Variable name   Definition  Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Activity        
Venture Capital  Percentage of funds invested in venture capital  303 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Transmission  Percentage of funds invested in transmission capital  303 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Growth  Percentage of funds invested in growth capital  303 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Mezzanine  Percentage of funds invested in mezzanine  303 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Distressed
 
Capital  Percentage of funds invested in distressed capital  303 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Funds of funds 
 
Percentage of funds invested in funds of funds 
 
303 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Investment scope: Dummy variable equal to 1 if...., 0 otherwise       
Minority  .... the firm invests as a minority shareholder  242 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Regional scope  ... the firm invests only in a specific French district  311 0.92 0.27 0 1 
European scope  ... the firm invests in other European countries than France  311 0.58 0.50 0 1 
International 
 
scope  ... the firm invests in other countries than European countries  311 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Sector  ...  the firm manages at least one fund specialized in a sector  302 0.36 0.48 0 1 
         
Management: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Chairman ..., 0 otherwise       
Gender  ... is a woman  299 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Founder  ... founded the firm  290 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Engineer  ... has a French “Grandes Ecoles” Engineer background   256 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Business school  ...has a French Business School background  254 0.47 0.50 0 1 
International  ... has an international background  254 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Other  ... has a different French background  254 0.46 0.50 0 1 
         
Public Responsible Investment Practices: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm.... , 0 otherwise       
UNPRI  ... is a UNPRI signatory  316 0.09 0.28 0 1 
AFIC Chart  ... is signatory of the French Private Equity Association Ethics Chart  317 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Green or Social fund  ... manages at least one fund with a social or environmental target  302 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Communication   ...has a website referring to responsible investing practices  297 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Interest  ... answered to responsible investment survey  308 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Table 3.1 summarizes the public data on the characteristics of French Private Equity firms. 
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TABLE 3.2 -  Descriptive statistics of survey data 
 
  All respondents  UNPRI signatories 
  Number of 
observations.  
Mean Standard 
deviations 
 Number of 
observations.  
Mean 
Formalization        
ESG Chart  74 0.35 0.48  22 0.59 
ESG formation of PE firm employees   74 0.46 0.50  22 0.73 
ESG issues managed by a specialized employee  69 0.20 0.40  22 0.36 
ESG issues managed by a non-specialized employee  69 0.35 0.48  22 0.36 
ESG issues directly managed by investors  69 0.26 0.44  22 0.23 
ESG issues managed by a specialized third party  69 0.03 0.16  22 0.05 
        
Engagement        
ESG Chart sent to portfolio companies   74 0.26 0.42  22 0.36 
Monitor E. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.20 0.40  22 0.41 
Monitor S. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.53 0.50  22 0.64 
Monitor G. performance of portfolio companies  74 0.66 0.48  22 0.68 
Demand ESG reporting to portfolio companies  74 0.22 0.41  22 0.41 
ESG issues brought to company’s supervisory board  74 0.23 0.42  22 0.32 
ESG issues in shareholders’ pact  74 0.18 0.38  22 0.18 
Visit companies and plants  74 0.26 0.44  22 0.27 
        
Screening        
Sectorial or normative exclusion  74 0.84 0.37  22 0.73 
Already discarded investment on ESG grounds  74 0.45 0.50  22 0.59 
        
Value financial performance driver        
ESG impact measured  66 0.17 0.38  21 0.29 
Already bargained lower company price on ESG 
grounds  
 74 0.12 0.33  22 0.18 
ESG issues matter for risk management  74 0.64 0.48  22 0.77 
ESG issues matter to increase company value  74 0.43 0.50  22 0.54 
        
LP demand driver        
ESG Chart communicated to Limited Partners  74 0.24 0.43  22 0.41 
ESG reporting communicated to Limited Partners  74 0.12 0.33  22 0.32 
ESG performance matters to Limited Partners  74 0.51 0.50  22 0.73 
        
Reputation driver        
ESG Chart public  74 0.05 0.23  22 0.18 
ESG reporting public  74 0.01 0.12  22 0.05 
ESG issues matter for reputation and image risk  74 0.46 0.50  22 0.59 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the survey data collected. Statistics are given for all respondents and for 
the sub-sample of respondents which also are signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investing.  
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However, as expected (Kuckertz and Wagner, 2009), replies contain a disproportionate 
number of companies particularly concerned about responsible investing as shown by the 
significantly larger proportions of UN PRI and AFIC Ethic Chart signatories, firms 
communicating about CSR on their website; and firms managing green or social funds.  
Hereby survey answers will be used in further regressions as a proxy for firm’s interest in 
responsible investment practices. Respondents are also significantly larger than non-
respondents in terms of assets managed, workforce, number of funds and companies in 
portfolio. We explain the firm size bias as being related to the overrepresentation of firms 
interested in responsible investing practices, as discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.3. Nonetheless, 
the sample still includes a wide range of firm size (from 0.7 to 28 000 millions of Euros 
managed; median 318 millions of Euros). Those elements lead us to conclude that our survey 
sample well represents the French Private Equity industry.   
 
3.5. MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive statistics on public and survey data provide first elements of analysis (Tables 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3). Probit regressions are then used to analyze the factors driving the probability that 
a Private Equity firm implements responsible investment practices. Three public indicators of 
responsible investing are empirically investigated: being a UN PRI signatory (Tables 3.4 and 
3.5); managing a fund specialized on environmental or social issues (Table 3.6); and 
communicating on responsible investing on website (Table 3.7). Using those three alternative 
measures of responsible investing enables us to check whether they have similar underlying 
drivers.  
For all three dependent variable, we also provide four regression models (“model 1” to 
“model 4” in Table 3.4 to 3.5) to show result robustness to alternative subsets in the sample 
and alternative explanatory variables (as in Cumming and Johan, 2007). Control variables 
include other responsible investment practices, so we can identify the specificity of our 
dependent variables. For instance, when estimating drivers of UNPRI signature (Tables 3.4 
and 3.5), we control for four other variables grasping the global fund engagement in 
responsible practices (namely signature of the AFIC Chat, management of green or social 
funds, SRI communication and answers to SRI survey). These controls allows us to better 
identify if UNPRI signature, management of green or social funds (Table 3.6) and 
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communicating on responsible investing on website (Table 3.7) are each driven by specific 
factors.  
Results are now presented and discussed. 
 
3.5.1. RESULTS ON CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Results confirm hypothesis H1: Responsible Private Equity firms do not belong to an SRI 
niche market but rather integrate ESG issues in mainstream business. Indeed, we find that 
12% firms manage at least one environmental or social fund (Table 3.1). Yet only 6 firms 
(less than 2%) specialize on such funds. Most of those who do manage green funds also 
manage classic funds. Signatories of the UN PRI and firms who answered survey, i.e. firms 
who have an interest for CSR issues, are widely conventional Private Equity funds.  
Results also confirm hypothesis H2a: Private Equity firms are more likely to favor 
Governance aspects within the ESG issues. Table 3.2 displays that Governance was 
monitored by 66% responders, significantly exceeding Environment (20%) and Social (53%) 
issues. 
Results support hypothesis H2b: Socially responsible Private Equity investors is characterized 
by investor engagement. Indeed, we see from table 3.2 that 23% brought ESG issues to 
company’s supervisory board; 53% responders used direct monitoring of social issues in 
company (64% among UN PRI signatories); 26% visited companies or plants and 22% 
demanded ESG reporting to portfolio companies (41% for UN PRI). However, ESG issue 
management is not legally enforced though the shareholders’ pact. We can note that 
engagement is also associated with ESG screening. 84% firms already discarded an 
investment opportunity of ESG grounds (see Table 3.2). Let us note that this high percentage 
might be driven up by governance issues, at the core of the Private Equity business.  
. 
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TABLE 3.3 - Comparison of means and medians by UN PRI signature 
CSR dimension UNPRI signatory  UNPRI non signatory 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median  Obs. Mean Std. Dev Median 
Age 281 12.96 10.87 11.00  28 15.21 18.83 10.00 
Workforce 258 11.86 27.04 7.00  28 25.54 26.50 14.50 
Companies 260 36.47 62.66 16.00  28 70.25 140.48 20.50 
Log(Assets managed) 265 4.73 1.89 4.65  28 6.45 1.92 6.20 
PE firm 247 0.16 0.34 0.00  26 0.21 0.38 0.00 
Partners 247 0.41 0.47 0.00  26 0.52 0.45 0.63 
Bank 247 0.18 0.34 0.00  26 0.10 0.27 0.00 
Insurance company 247 0.03 0.16 0.00  26 0.04 0.20 0.00 
Industry 247 0.05 0.20 0.00  26 0.04 0.20 0.00 
French state 250 0.12 0.26 0.00  26 0.08 0.27 0.00 
LP Industry 243 0.19 0.40 0.00  27 0.15 0.36 0.00 
LP Captive 243 0.31 0.46 0.00  27 0.41 0.50 0.00 
LP Sovereign 246 0.40 0.49 0.00  27 0.30 0.46 0.00 
LP Individuals  245 0.20 0.40 0.00  27 0.30 0.47 0.00 
LP Institutional 239 0.78 0.74 1.00  27 0.93 0.27 1.00 
LP Pension funds 239 0.24 0.44 0.00  27 0.48 0.51 0.00 
LP Family offices 238 0.38 0.49 0.00  27 0.26 0.45 0.00 
Venture Capital 274 0.43 0.50 0.00  28 0.32 0.48 0.00 
Transmission 274 0.60 0.49 1.00  28 0.64 0.49 1.00 
Growth 274 0.60 0.49 1.00  28 0.54 0.51 1.00 
Funds of funds 274 0.10 0.29 0.00  28 0.19 0.39 0.00 
Mezzanine 274 0.07 0.26 0.00  28 0.07 0.26 0.00 
Minority 217 0.78 0.42 1.00  24 0.75 0.44 1.00 
Regional scope 282 0.18 0.39 0.00  28 0.04 0.19 0.00 
European scope 282 0.55 0.50 1.00  28 0.79 0.42 1.00 
International 
 
scope 282 0.21 0.41 0.00  28 0.18 0.39 0.00 
Sector 274 0.35 0.48 0.00  27 0.41 0.50 0.00 
Founder 263 0.43 0.50 0.00  27 0.44 0.50 0.00 
Engineer 229 0.28 0.45 0.00  27 0.33 0.48 0.00 
Business school 227 0.49 0.50 0.00  27 0.33 0.48 0.00 
International 227 0.22 0.42 0.00  27 0.22 0.42 0.00 
AFIC Chart 288 0.65 0.48 1.00  28 0.89 0.32 1.00 
Green or Social fund 275 0.12 0.32 0.00  26 0.15 0.37 0.00 
Communication  270 0.14 0.34 0.00  27 0.63 0.49 1.00 
Interest 280 0.19 0.39 0.00  28 0.79 0.42 1.00 
Table 3.3 presents means (with standard deviations) and medians for control variables of respectively UNPRI 
signatories and non-signatories. Bold lines highlight variables whose medians differ depending on UNPRI 
signature. 
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TABLE 3.4 - Multivariant analysis (Probit) on UNPRI signature drivers 
  model 1  model 2 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.  Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
 
Firm characteristics Age  -1.95e-05 -0.06   5.53e-06 0.02  
 Workforce      5.76e-04 2.18 ** 
 Companies  -9.09e-05 -1.33   -1.49e-04 -1.94 * 
 Log(Assets 
managed) 
 8.33e-03 2.10 **     
Ownership PE firm  4.44e-02 1.47   -4.85e-03 -0.40  
Partners  4.78e-02 1.67 *     
Bank  4.21e-02 1.28      
Insurance company  4.71e-02 1.09   1.66e-02 0.71  
Industry  6.11e-02 1.77 *     
French state  4.87e-02 1.56      
Limited Partners LP Industry      -8.87e-03 -1.37  
LP Captive      -4.79e-03 -0.56  
LP Sovereign      1.39e-02 1.03  
LP Individuals   1.98e-02 1.19   4.52e-03 0.40  
LP Institutional  4.98e-03 1.15   3.20e-03 0.85  
LP Pension funds  1.03e-02 0.94   7.55e-03 0.77  
LP Family offices  -1.23e-03 -0.15   -1.15e-02 -1.45  
Activity Venture Capital  9.43e-03 0.74   4.54e-03 0.42  
Transmission  -6.27e-03 -0.52   1.15e-03 0.12  
Growth  -1.97e-02 -1.34   -2.68e-02 -1.65  
Funds of funds  3.71e-02 0.85   3.40e-03 0.17  
 Mezzanine  2.27e-01 1.94 *  2.11e-01 1.90 * 
Investment scope Minority  1.90e-02 2.02 **  1.97e-02 2.07 ** 
Regional scope  5.97e-03 0.28   -5.89e-04 -0.04  
European scope  -3.36e-02 -1.61   -9.30e-03 -0.77  
International 
 
scope  -6.66e-03 -0.91   -8.37e-03 -1.36  
Sector  1.22e-03 0.13   1.30e-02 1.12  
Founder      4.76e-03 0.62  
Management Engineer  -9.16e-03 -1.24   -8.09e-03 -1.14  
Business school  -1.29e-02 -1.35   -1.03e-03 -0.12  
International  1.82e-02 1.11   1.35e-02 0.98  
Responsible 
investment practices 
AFIC Chart  2.17e-02 1.84 *  2.13e-02 1.98 ** 
Green or Social 
fund 
 -7.70e-03 -1.35   -7.50e-03 -1.45  
Communication   1.08e-01 2.85 ***  9.68e-02 2.64 *** 
Interest  1.44e-01 3.45 ***  1.69e-01 3.51 *** 
Nb. of obs.   166    163   
Nb. of obs. where =1  21    21   
Pseudo R2   53.08    52.67   
Loglikehood function (L)  -29.57    -29.64   
LR-Chi-2 statistics  66.91 ***   65.97 ***  
Maximum-likelihood probit models. Marginal effects on the change in the probability of becoming a UNPRI 
signatory are reported.  Pseudo R2 is calculated by McFadden’s formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log 
(LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides a test of the model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits 
significantly better than a model with no predictors. Two-tailed tests were used.  *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
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TABLE 3.5 -  Multivariant analysis (Probit) on UNPRI signature drivers - continues 
  model 3  model 4 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.  
 Age         
Firm characteristics Workforce         
 Companies         
Ownership Log(Assets 
managed) 
 1.84e-02 3.23 ***  1.98e-02 2.86 *** 
PE firm  1.40e-01 1.78 *     
Partners  1.27e-01 1.69 *     
Bank  1.02e-01 1.30      
Insurance company  6.09e-02 0.72      
Industry  1.44e-01 1.71 *     
French state  1.44e-01 1.79 *     
Limited Partners LP Industry         
LP Captive         
LP Sovereign         
LP Individuals          
LP Institutional         
LP Pension funds         
LP Family offices         
Activity Venture Capital      4.73e-03 0.23  
Transmission      -1.05e-02 -0.46  
Growth      9.89e-03 0.50  
Funds of funds      9.74e-03 0.29  
 Mezzanine      6.01e-03 0.17  
Investment scope Minority         
Regional scope      -9.57e-03 -0.26  
European scope      -1.03e-02 -0.40  
International 
 
scope      -3.67e-02 -2.09 ** 
Sector         
Founder         
Management Engineer         
Business school         
International         
Responsible 
investment practices 
AFIC Chart  5.11e-02 2.05 **  5.39e-02 2.11 ** 
Green or Social 
fund 
 -1.44e-03 -0.05   -1.76e-02 -0.68  
Communication   1.56e-01 3.69 ***  1.97e-01 4.10 *** 
Interest         
Nb. of obs.   257    281   
Nb. of obs. where =1  24    26   
Pseudo R2   30.89    31.18   
Loglikehood function  -55.11    -59.63   
LR-Chi-2 statistics (L)  49.27 ***   54.03 ***  
Maximum-likelihood probit models. Marginal effects on the change in the probability of becoming a UNPRI 
signatory are reported. Pseudo R2 is calculated by McFadden’s formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log 
(LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides a test of the model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits 
significantly better than a model with no predictors. Two-tailed tests were used. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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TABLE 3.6 - Multivariant analysis (Probit) on Green or Social funds management drivers  
  model 1  model 2   model 3   model 4 
 Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
   Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
 
 Age 5.11e-08 1.92 *  4.41e-11 1.71 *         
Firm 
characteristics 
Workforce     -6.53e-11 -1.65 *         
 
 
Ownership 
Log(Assets 
managed) 
-2.19e-07 -1.11       -1.91e-02 -2.12 **  -9.13e-03 -1.12  
                
PE firm -3.40e-07 -0.20   -2.07e-09 -1.47   -7.60e-04 -0.01      
Partners -3.10e-08 -0.04       -2.51e-02 -0.31      
Bank 9.63e-07 0.93       1.14e-02 0.13      
Industry 4.12e-06 1.90 *      7.94e-02 0.78      
French state -3.26e-06 -1.76 *      6.60e-02 0.70      
                 
Limited Partners LP Industry     6.70e-07 1.22          
LP Captive     1.13e-11 0.02          
LP Sovereign     3.32e-10 0.42          
LP Individuals  -1.69e-07 -0.34   1.47e-05 1.55          
LP Institutional 5.99e-07 1.66 *  6.69e-10 1.46          
LP Pension funds 4.86e-04 1.83 *  1.64e-07 1.46          
LP Family offices -1.52e-07 -0.24   1.60e-09 0.52          
                 
Activity Venture Capital 3.24e-05 1.99 **  1.56e-06 1.72 *      5.55e-02 1.99 ** 
Transmission -7.88e-03 -2.16 ***  -1.80e-04 -1.72 *      -7.36e-02 -2.35 ** 
Growth 7.63e-05 2.08 **  1.49e-05 1.46       7.66e-02 2.68 *** 
Funds of funds 4.04e-03 1.56   3.18e-05 1.34       1.85e-02 0.38  
                 
Investment scope Minority -1.37e-04 -1.40   -2.75e-09 -0.62          
Regional scope -3.49e-07 -0.71   -1.06e-09 -0.96       3.87e-02 0.84  
European scope -4.87e-05 -1.37   -1.09e-07 -1.09       -1.63e-03 -0.05  
International 
 
scope -1.85e-07 -0.45   -1.17e-10 -0.55       2.21e-02 0.64  
Founder     -5.30e-09 -1.00          
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TABLE 3.6 - continued  
  model 1  model 2   model 3   model 4 
 Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
   Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
  Marginal 
effect 
z-
stat. 
 
 Founder     -5.30e-09 -1.00          
Management Engineer 9.95e-05 1.59   1.03e-07 1.44          
Business school 6.58e-09 0.01   -1.65e-10 -0.28          
International 2.05e-04 1.38   1.32e-06 1.70 *         
                 
Responsible investment 
practices 
AFIC Chart -3.53e-07 -0.26   -7.03e-06 -1.36   6.45e-02 1.77 *  2.82e-02 0.97  
UNPRI 4.48e-08 0.05   5.10e-06 1.14   -3.57e-02 -0.80   -2.85e-02 -0.82  
Communication  2.09e-02 2.18 **  1.36e-03 2.00 **  3.95e-01 5.16 ***  3.40e-01 5.40 *** 
Interest 1.35e-05 1.27   2.27e-07 1.50          
Nb. of obs.  174    167    257    281   
Nb. of obs. where =1 14    14    27    30   
Pseudo R2  65.03    65.97    24.25    32.56   
Loglikehood function -17.03    -16.37    -65.43    -64.38   
LR - Chi-2 statistics 63.34 ***   63.47 ***   41.88 ***   62.15 ***  
Table 3.6 presents results obtained by fitting maximum-likelihood probit models (model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4).  It reports marginal effects on the change in the 
probability of managing a Private Equity funds specialized on green or social issues (change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous variable; discrete 
change in the probability for dummy variables). Pseudo R2 is calculated by McFadden’s formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log (LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides 
a test of the model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits significantly better than a model with no predictors. Two-tailed tests were used.  *p<0.10;**p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
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TABLE 3.7 -  Multivariant analysis (Probit) on CSR communication drivers  
  model 1    model 2    model 3    model 4  
 Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.  
 Age -6.38e-4 -0.31   2.19e-4 0.13          
Firm 
characteristics 
Workforce     1.31e-3 1.06          
 
 
Ownership 
Log(Assets 
managed) 
3.92e-3 0.18       3.53e-2 2.99 ***  2.65e-2 1.99 ** 
                
PE firm -3.31e-1 -2.21 **  -1.04e-1 -1.23   -2.49e-1 -2.34 **     
Partners -1.91e-1 -1.49       -1.78e-1 -1.95 *     
Bank -3.23e-1 -2.16 **      -2.82e-1 -2.58 ***     
Industry -7.42e-3 -0.03 *      -8.05e-2 -0.60      
French state -3.00e-1 -1.78       -2.07e-1 -1.57      
                 
Limited 
Partners 
LP Industry     -1.49e-3 -0.02          
LP Captive     1.74e-2 0.28          
LP Sovereign     4.23e-2 0.60          
LP Individuals  1.35e-1 1.70 *  9.22e-2 1.36          
LP Institutional -9.51e-2 -1.14   -9.25e-2 -1.31          
LP Pension funds -3.45e-2 -0.55   -2.33e-2 -0.42          
LP Family offices -8.54e-2 -1.41   -1.08e-1 -1.96 **         
 
Activity Venture Capital 2.95e-2 0.42   -2.52e-2 -0.37       7.73e-3 0.17  
Transmission 5.44e-2 0.72   5.96e-2 0.90       1.55e-2 0.35  
Growth -6.15e-2 -0.88   -8.54e-2 -1.28       -1.89e-2 -0.45  
Mezzanine -8.07e-2 -0.92   -5.88e-2 -0.76       -6.80e-2 -1.00  
Funds of funds -4.55e-2 -0.44   -3.23e-2 -0.37       -3.41e-2 -0.56  
                 
Investment 
scope 
Minority -4.85e-2 -0.52   -5.77e-2 -0.72          
Regional scope 1.42e-1 0.97   6.78e-3 0.06       -1.18e-2 -0.15  
European scope 1.95e-1 2.53 **  1.70e-1 2.53 **      6.75e-2 1.25  
International 
 
scope 
8.82e-2 1.13   8.92e-2 1.23       5.30e-2 1.00  
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   TABLE 3.7 - continued 
 
 
  model 1    model 2    model 3    model 4  
 Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.   Marginal 
effect 
z-stat.  
 Founder     8.25e-2 1.32          
Management Engineer 8.68e-2 1.25   9.57e-2 1.53          
Business school -2.12e-2 -0.36   1.83e-2 0.34          
International 8.04e-2 1.06   7.51e-2 1.10          
                 
Responsible 
investment 
practices 
AFIC Chart 3.31e-4 0.00   4.23e-2 0.75   6.94e-3 0.14   1.12e-2 0.24  
UNPRI 3.17e-1 2.54 **  2.10e-1 1.99 **  2.88e-1 2.96 ***  3.15e-1 3.38  
Green or social 
funds  
6.48e-1 3.54 ***  7.02e-1 4.04 ***  5.17e-1 5.36 ***  5.19e-1 5.48 *** 
Interest 4.18e-2 0.61   4.63e-2 0.72   4.04e-2 0.77   6.45e-2 1.25  
Nb. of obs.  174    167    257    281   
Nb. of obs. where =1 36    35    43    48   
Pseudo R2  45.34    46.16    33.62    33.51   
Loglikehood function -48.49    -46.16    -77.06    -85.42   
LR - Chi-2 statistics 80.44 ***   79.16 ***   78.03 ***   86.10 ***  
Table 3.7 presents results obtained by fitting maximum-likelihood probit models (model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4).  It reports marginal effects on the change in the 
probability of the Private Equity firm to communicate on its website about corporate social responsibility, socially responsible investment or the management of ESG issues 
(change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous variable; discrete change in the probability for dummy variables). Pseudo R2 is calculated by 
McFadden’s formula, which is: Pseudo R2= 1 – log L / log (LR). The LR-Chi2 statistics provides a test of the model robustness by indicating that the model as a whole fits 
significantly better than a model with no predictors. Two-tailed tests were used. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Finally, results partly confirm hypothesis H3: socially responsible investing is more likely in 
large Private Equity firms in terms of workforce. Indeed, the probability of being a UN PRI 
signatory (Table 3.4) increases with workforce size, yet in a small extent. Precisely, the 
probability of being a UN PRI signatory increases by 0.058% for any additional employee 
(model 2, Table 3.4, p<0.05). Moreover, survey descriptive statistics indicate that 46% of 
survey respondents provide and ESG formation to their employees (Table 3.2). This 
formation argues both in favor of the current lack of human capital to manage such issues, 
which might be problematic for ESG management, as well as a real involvement to develop 
this human capital. 
 
3.5.2. RESULTS ON STRATEGIC DRIVERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Results do not support hypothesis H4: Socially responsible investing in Private Equity are 
partly motivated by creating value in the companies owned, yet this does not appear as the 
main stated motive. Indeed, survey data highlights that 43% of respondents only agree with 
ESG issues being important to create value (54% among UN PRI signatories; Table 3.2). We 
can note that only 12% ever measured ESG impact on their portfolio performance. Hence 
most investors believing that responsible investing creates value do it on qualitative grounds.  
Conversely, hypothesis H5 is partly confirmed by survey answers: socially responsible 
investing is strongly motivated by risk-management. 64% of the respondents (77% of UN PRI 
signatories) believe ESG issues matter for risk management (Table 3.2). Whereas risk-
management appears to be more important a responsible investing driver than value creation, 
it should be noted that data does not allow to clearly state whether risk management is more 
or less important than differentiation. 
Strong support is also brought to hypothesis H6: Venture capitalists are more likely than other 
Private Equity investors to develop specialized green funds in order to open new markets. The 
probability to manage such funds statistically significantly increases when the firm is a 
venture capitalist and decreases in transmission capital (buyouts). Precisely, marginal effects 
reported in Table 3.6 indicate that the probability of managing a green or social fund is 5.55% 
higher (model 4, p<0.05) in venture capital funds and 7.36% lower in transmission capital 
(p<0.05). We can also note that Growth Capital firms are also very active on green techs.  
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Their activity is indeed more in line with venture capital than with buyouts as they invest in 
expansion cycles of companies. Consequently, Private Equity firms managing green funds 
hence show typical characteristic of venture capitalists, as significantly smaller firms in terms 
of workforce and assets. Probit results also confirm the dichotomy between specialized green 
funds and responsible investing. Indeed, being a UN PRI signatory does not increase the 
probability to manage a green fund (Table 3.6), and respectively, managing a green funds 
does not increase the probability to be a UN PRI signatory (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). 
Evidence is mixed on hypothesis H7. As a primer, the belief among General Partners that 
ESG issues matter for Limited Partners is strongly supported by survey data. 51% of the 
respondents agree so, up to 73% among UN PRI signatories. A few firms (12%) actually 
report their ESG performance to Limited Partners, most likely because they are themselves 
still implementing ESG reporting at their portfolio level. 
Hypothesis H7a is strongly confirmed: Independent funds are more likely than captive funds 
to develop responsible practices as a differentiation tool to attract investors. Indeed, we 
observe that Private Equity firms owned by their partners, meaning independent, have a 
12.7% higher probability of being UN PRI signatories (model 3, Table 3.4, p<0.10; effect of 
4.78% in model 3). However, no significant effect of specific categories of Limited Partners is 
found on the probability to be a UN PRI signatory, neither positive nor negative. In particular, 
Captive funds are not less likely to be signatories. Results also show that Private Equity firms 
owned by banks (bank captive funds) are less likely to communicate on responsible investing 
on their website than other firms. Precisely, marginal effects show that they have a 33% lower 
probability (model 1, Table 3.7, p<0.05, effect of 25% in model 3). Similarly, Private Equity 
firms owned by other Private Equity firms (Private Equity captive funds) also have a 32% 
lower probability (model 1, Table 3.7, p<0.05; effect of 28% in model 3). This finding is in 
line with Cumming et al. (2008), who find in the context of Japanese venture capitalists that 
owner-managers provide more advice to entrepreneurs than captive managers (such as bank’s 
venture capital divisions).  
 However, hypothesis H7b is infirmed: Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-
funds, as Limited Partners do not appear more likely to implement responsible practices. 
Table 3.4 displays that firms with Pension funds as Limited Partners, as well as Institutional 
and Sovereign Limited Partners, are not more likely to be UN PRI signatories.  
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However, ownership seems to matter more than Limited Partners in this regard. CSR 
Communication is also more impacted by who owns the Private Equity firm rather than who 
finances it (Table 3.7). 
 
3.5.3. RESULTS ON RESPONSIVE DRIVERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Results partly confirm hypothesis H8 on responsive driver of socially responsible investing: 
Large and thus visible Private Equity firms are more likely to engage in socially responsible 
practices that are well formalized and publicly communicated to protect their reputation and 
license-to-operate; yet leveraged buyouts specialists do not particularly stand out in this 
regard.  
We previously noted that large Private Equity firms in terms of workforce were more likely to 
be UN PRI signatories, and this effect appears stronger and more robust when size is captured 
by the amounts of assets managed. Indeed, marginal effects observed indicate that a 1 unit 
increase in the logarithm of assets managed increases the probability of being a UN PRI 
signatory by 1.98% (model 4, Table 3.5, p<0.01; effect of 1.84% in model 3). In other words, 
a 100% increase in assets managed increases the probability of being a UN PRI signatory by 
1.98%. Results also show that a 100% increase in assets managed increases the probability of 
public communication on responsible investing by 3.53% (model 3, Table 3.5, p<0.01; effect 
of 2.65% in model 4). Let us note that despite significance, the size effect magnitude appears 
small (in particular compared to the independence effect previously discussed). 
Survey data also show that ESG Chart, ESG dedicated post, ESG reporting and UN PRI 
signature come as a bundle (see correlation Table B.1 in Appendix B). Hereby formalizing 
socially responsible investing appears more likely in large Private Equity firms.  
 
However, being specialized on Transmission capital (hence leveraged buyouts) does not 
appear to have any significant effect on UN PRI signature and communication. 
In our results, geographical scope variables appear to play a significant role negatively for 
PRI signature (at the international scope), and positively for CSR communication (at the 
European scope), suggesting that various national contexts may affect SRI behaviors. In 
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particular, the positive effect of investing at the European scope on CSR communication may 
suggest a form of mainstreaming of SRI at the European level (for instance influenced by the 
CSR reporting constraints imposed in various countries); whereas the negative effect of 
investing at an international scope on PRI signature may suggest that the diversity of 
institutional contexts does not favor transversal and global SRI engagement. 
How to disentangle differentiation from reputation protection? First, let us note that 46% 
survey respondents believe ESG matter for reputation and image risk (59% UN PRI 
signatories), which is high but less than the belief in ESG importance for Limited Partners’ 
demand. Second, we observe that very few firms communicate their ESG reporting (1%) and 
ESG Chart (5%) to the public. Those elements lead us to conjecture that protecting firm’s 
image and reputation matters more for the business than for the public. 
 
3.5.4. LIMITS OF THE ANALYSIS AND FURTHER RESEARCH PATHS 
 
This exploratory paper presents exploratory evidence on socially responsible investment at the 
Private Equity firm level and shows an important role for engagement. Hypotheses test results 
are summarized in Table 3.8. 
Several other factors, which were beyond the scope of our database, are likely to also 
influence SRI behavior in Private Equity. Compensation terms for instance might influence 
socially responsible practices. Indeed, a related literature has shown the role of executive 
compensation in the implementation of CSR in listed companies (e.g. Mahoney and Thorne, 
2006; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Besides, Johan and Najar (2010) examine the role of 
law and culture in setting fund manager fees and show that they are much more significant 
than manager characteristics and/or market conditions. Interactions between legal conditions, 
culture, compensation terms and engagement would thus be highly interesting to investigate 
in further research.  
Similarly, we control for education and international experience of the fund manager, but not 
experience. Whether the fund manager is experienced or a first time fund manager might 
impact his investment practices. Though fund manager education and international experience 
do not appear to play a significant role in our approach, experience may affect responsible 
investment practices (see Cumming and Walz, 2010). 
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SRI behavior in Private Equity could also be driven by other factors, such as regulatory 
pressure. An extensive literature has highlighted that the threat of fines and other regulatory 
costs may induce higher CSR activities (for instance, see Lutz. et al., 2000) Socially 
responsible practices might thus also have been influenced by regulatory pressure. In 
particular, in France, the recently published Grenelle II Law (April 2012) now requests non-
listed firms to publish ESG reporting (starting respectively from 2012 and 2014 for firms 
employing above 5000 and 500 employees). Extending our research to other markets, such as 
the United Kingdom or the United States, would provide an effective test of the importance of 
the regulatory and institutional context on Private Equity socially responsible investing. 
Moreover, it would test for the national anchorage of our results. 
From a wider perspective, our study highlights important strategic drivers behind socially 
responsible Private Equity. Hereby ESG concerns tackled by investors are likely to be those 
identified as having the largest impact on the bottom line of the companies they owned. 
Testing this hypothesis would constitute a promising extension of our research. Such an 
analysis could be lead at the company level, for instance by exploring the impact investor 
engagement has on the company, its stakeholders and society as a whole. 
Finally, another level that could be worth investigating would be the Private Equity fund 
level. Within the same Private Equity firm, it is indeed likely that differences exist between 
funds managed. Funds can for instance vary depending on their vintage year, since it is related 
to market conditions and to business cycles and is known to impact company valuations and 
return expectations (see Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Here we used the Private Equity firm age 
as a proxy for market condition, but other controls such as the MSCI returns in the year prior 
to the establishment of the fund would be more accurate. Funds can also undergo style drift, 
meaning they can deviate from their stated objectives in terms of the focus for their 
investments. Cumming et al. (2009) have shown that style drifts are less likely among 
younger fund managers; are affected by market conditions; and are positively related to 
investment performance. Focusing on the fund level would enable to identify whether 
responsible practices are impacted by style drift, and conversely.  
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3.6. DISCUSSION 
 
We provide a summary of our hypotheses and results in Table 3.8 and discuss below our main 
observations from this empirical analysis. 
 
3.6.1. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY: RESPONSIVE OR STRATEGIC? 
 
Our empirical results support that responsible investment in French Private Equity is a 
mainstream movement which got quickly structured under the impetus of independent large 
conventional actors, both in terms of human capital and assets managed.   
This movement in fact appears characterized by a mix of both ESG screening and 
engagement, with Private Equity investors typically being much involved in the portfolio 
company’s management.  
Socially responsible investing seems essentially strategically driven, Private Equity investors 
hereby aiming at creating value (event though this motive is not the main one), improving risk 
management and differentiating to raise fund, especially independent firms. Among all the 
effects we tested, we found that firm independence was by far the largest in terms of 
magnitude. SRI as implemented by those investors therefore appears in line with 
shareholders’ value maximization and consistent with a business improvement. 
 
3.6.2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY: ENGAGEMENT OR ACTIVISM? 
 
Our approach confirms that engagement on ESG issues quite differs between Private Equity 
investors and Public investors. On public markets, engagement is usually referred to as 
shareholder activism. Sparkes (2008) defines shareholder activism as ‘the use of the voting 
rights attached to ordinary shares to influence company management’. Since they usually are 
majority or significant shareholders, Private Equity investors have considerable influence as 
active investors.  
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TABLE 3.8 - Summary of hypotheses and results 
Hypotheses  Test Result  Conclusion (if hypothesis is not confirmed) 
H1: Socially responsible PE firms integrate ESG issues in 
mainstream business (as opposed to considering it as a niche market 
segment. 
 
 Confirmed 
 
  
H2a: PE firms are more likely to favor Governance aspects within 
the ESG issues. 
 
 Confirmed 
 
  
H2b: Socially responsible PE is characterized by investor 
engagement. 
 
 Confirmed 
 
  
H3: The integration of ESG issues is more likely to be implemented 
in large PE firms in terms of workforce. 
 
 Partly 
Confirmed 
 
 The integration of ESG issues is more likely to be implemented in large PE firms 
in terms of workforce, yet the effect is small. 
H4: Creating value in companies owned is the most important 
motive of socially responsible investing in Private Equity. 
 Infirmed 
 
 Socially responsible investing in PE are motivated by creating value in the 
companies owned, yet this is not the major motive  
H5: Risk-management is the most important motive of socially 
responsible investing in Private Equity. 
 Partly 
Confirmed 
 
 Risk-management appears as an important motive, but we cannot assess whether it 
is more or less important than differentiation 
H6: Venture capitalists are more likely than other PE investors to 
develop specialized green funds in order to open new markets. 
 
 Confirmed 
 
  
H7a: Independent funds are more likely than captive funds to 
integrate ESG issues as a differentiation tool to attract investors. 
 
 Confirmed 
 
  
H7b: Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-funds, 
as Limited Partners are more likely to integrate ESG issues. 
 
 Infirmed 
 
 Funds with long-term investors, in particular pension-funds, as Limited Partners 
do not appear more likely to implement responsible practices. 
H8: Large and thus visible PE firms as well as LBO specialists are 
more likely to formalize socially responsible investing and to 
publicly communicated it to protect their reputation and license-to-
operate. 
 Partly 
confirmed  
 
 Large and thus visible PE firms are more likely to engage in socially responsible 
practices that are well formalized and publicly communicated to protect their 
reputation and license-to-operate; yet LBO specialists do not particularly stand out 
in this regard. 
This table summarizes our hypotheses, their test results and our conclusions when the hypotheses were only partly confirmed or infirmed.  
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Moreover, engagement in the specific context of Private Equity is to be distinguished from 
conventional ethical activism, such as undertook by religious institutional investors in the 
United States through the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (Williams, 2007). 
According to Smith (1996), engagement acts as an implicit threat to the company that if the 
investor's concerns are not addressed, an exclusionary strategy may be adopted. Sparkes 
(1998) hence have argued that shareholder activism differs from SRI as advocacy is 
characterized by a single-issue focus, no financial concerns, and the seeking of confrontation 
and publicity; whereas SRI is characterized by multi-issue concern, strong financial interest, 
the seeking of engagement and the avoidance of publicity. However, Private Equity investors 
are active investors who promote ESG issues on strategic grounds rather than ethical ones. 
Hereby their engagement does not fit to Sparkes’s definition as they target promoting CSR in 
order to maximize shareholders’ value. A possible explanation of this difference might lie in 
the specificity of the French context, whereby SRI mainstreaming has been taking place under 
the explicit goal of penetration of ESG criteria into conventional funds, thereby maybe 
creating a sort of ‘ESG externality’ on the socially Responsible Private Equity market.   
 
3.6.3. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE PRIVATE EQUITY: A STRONGER IMPACT THAN PUBLIC 
INVESTORS 
 
Finally, this paper’s findings on Private Equity investors suggest that those who care for ESG 
issues might have a stronger impact as active investors than Public investors. Indeed, results 
are that 23% of respondents brought ESG issues to company’s supervisory board, 53% 
directly monitored those issues and 26% visited plants. Compared to such figures, shareholder 
advocacy is still in practice limited on public markets. For instance, Lewis and Mackenzie 
(2000) found little support of hard engagement in their large survey of UK ethical public 
investors, passive signaling (screening) being most favored. In the United States, Lydenberg 
(2002) argues that the “Wall Street Rule” generally applies, that is shareholders are expected 
to regulate managers by selling shares rather than by trying to change management practices 
through engagement. Indeed, SRI funds which used both screening and advocacy accounted 
in 2003 for about a fifth of all SRI funds (Social Investment Forum 2003). In Europe, Eurosif 
(2010 European SRI Survey) estimated €1.5 trillion assets managed were impacted by SRI 
engagement, representing about 28% of all broad SRI approaches in Europe.  
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Here we find that conventional Private Equity funds which care for ESG issues appear active 
at an equivalent level on the French market. Hereby findings hint that this financial industry 
might have the potential to become a powerful tool to promote sustainable practices in 
portfolio companies. However, to realize this potentiality, Private Equity firms need to 
develop a sound expertise of ESG issues and to acquire the corresponding human capital. 
Considering the current difficulties of the industry related to the financial crisis and liquidity 
dearth, it seems unlikely that Private Equity firms will currently invest in such competencies. 
Would that turn out so, the development of an effective and reliable responsible investment 
movement beyond its current frontiers might be compromised.  
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
 
Whereas most SRI literature has focused on public markets, this paper highlights that French 
Private Equity investors recently seized ESG issues and are developing a mainstream 
responsible investing approach structurally based on engagement. As significant shareholders, 
Private Equity investors have the potential to actively promote sustainable practices in the 
firms they own. Findings support that such activism is strategically grounded, as managing 
portfolio ESG issues might enhance value creation, enlarge risk management and enable 
Private Equity firms to differentiate to raise funds. Considering the specificities of the studied 
market, a promising research path would be to explore whether this responsible investing 
movement is restricted to France or whether drivers and maturation differ between Private 
Equity markets.  
At a time of financial crisis and regulation stringency for Private Equity, responsible 
investment hence appears to have been “thought global” by large leading actors to improve 
the mainstream business and provide it with new growth tools. However, most Private Equity 
companies currently seem to lack the human capital and expertise essential for successfully 
implementing a profitable ESG issues management. With financial markets still in the crisis 
turmoil and the upcoming of tougher regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy (Basel III), 
the European Private Equity industry environment will quickly evolve in the next few months. 
The question of how the new Private Equity responsible investing movement will react to this 
shifting context, and potential consequences for firm managers’ access to capital, henceforth 
still lay wide open.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GREEN SIGNALING IN EXPERIMENTAL PRIVATE EQUITY 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Can investors rely on CSR to identify performing firms? 
 
 
Abstract 
Private Equity investors spending resources on public good by integrating environmental 
considerations is puzzling for the agency theory. Could public good provision be used as a 
money-burning signal to better select investments? This chapter presents a signaling 
investment game and its experimental test in the laboratory using two different types of 
money-burning signals: a public good provision (carbon offset) and standard money-burning 
(advertisement). Main finding is that environmental performance, and more generally public-
good provision, is not a perfect substitute for standard money-burning signals and impacts 
equilibrium selection.  
 
Résumé 
Du point de vue de la théorie de l’agence, il est curieux qu’un investisseur en capital dépense 
des ressources pour le bien public en intégrant des considérations environnementales dans ses 
pratiques. La provision de bien public pourrait-elle servir de signal pour mieux sélectionner 
les investissements ? Ce chapitre présente un jeu d’investissement avec signal et le teste 
expérimentalement en laboratoire avec deux types de signaux couteux : une provision réelle 
de bien public (compensation carbone) et un signal standard (publicité). Le principal résultat 
est que la performance environnementale, et plus généralement la provision de bien public, ne 
se substitue pas parfaitement à des signaux couteux standards et modifie la sélection 
d’équilibre. 
 
 
Chapter 4 is based on a working paper (same title). I wish to thank the CIRANO experimental 
economics laboratory (Montreal) for hosting and supporting this research 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Agency cost reduction has long been pointed out as a major strength of Private Equity 
investors (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Jensen (1986)’s free cash flows hypothesis, along 
which Private Equity financing prevents opportunistic behaviors of managers (because free 
cash flows are used for debt servicing), received large empirical support (Opler and Titman, 
1993; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002). Henceforth Private Equity investors using corporate slack 
resources to contribute to public good appears rather puzzling from an agency theory 
perspective. However, an increasing amount of Private Equity funds management firms are 
currently showing interest in the environmental and social performance of their portfolio 
companies, as witnessed by the growing number of United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investing signatories (as shown in Chapter 3). 
Another illustration of this recent interest was the striking buyout of TXU (discussed in 
Gollier and Pouget, 2012), a giant energy company based in Dallas that serves about two 
million customers. The deal was closed in 2007 by Texas Pacific Group, Kohlbert Kravis 
Roberts & Co and the Private Equity arm of Goldman Sachs for an outstanding 48 billion 
USD. Also outstanding in this deal was that it included an agreement with environmental 
activists (Environmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense Council) to significantly 
scale back TXU's coal plant building plan and to adhere to a strict set of environmental 
standards.  
Firm profit sacrifice for public good seldom arises from sheer altruism but rather appears 
strategically implemented (Elhauge, 2005; Reinhardt et al., 2008). The literature linking CSR 
to profitability is careful enough (Chapter 1; Chapter 2; Margolis et al., 2009) to reasonably 
rule out the possibility that Private Equity investors might expect direct cash flows out of 
negative externality reduction. An alternative explanation of their interest for CSR could be 
grounded in signaling theory. Indeed, recent work supports that firms with higher financial 
performance might be those who can afford to use slack resources to provide public good 
(Baron et al., 2011). Could environmental performance hence be used by firm managers to 
signal their quality to investors?  
Using signaling theory, this chapter builds on these stylized facts to theoretically and 
experimentally investigate whether environmental performance can be used as a strategic 
signal to reduce information asymmetry between informed firm managers and investors, 
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which is known to causes under-investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Signaling in the sense 
of Spence (1974) requires the existence of a discriminating activity, more costly for low 
quality types than for high quality types. These signals have already proved relevant in the 
Private Equity setting, such as the percentage of equity retained by the entrepreneur (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977), the level of debt (Ross, 1977) or the choice of underwriter (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). Public good provision has already been identified as a possible signal of 
firm quality in the experiment of Elfenbein et al. (2012) on online charity donations. 
In other types of signaling models, called “money-burning” models, differentiation can also 
be (at least partly) achieved by undertaking a non-discriminating activity, whose marginal 
cost is unrelated to quality. A classic example of money-burning is product advertising 
(Milgrom and Robert, 1986). Environmental performance is here considered akin to money-
burning signal, in the sense that its cost is assumed to be independent of firm’s type. For 
instance, upgrading a production process to reduce carbon footprint would have the same cost 
whatever the firm type.  
While these results are important, Bernheim and Redding (2001) highlight that there are many 
ways to dissipate resources observably and are the first to question why a money-burning 
signal is chosen over another. They show that money-burning activities can be imperfect 
substitutes under specific assumptions, including the assumption that each money-burning 
activity dissipates resources at a known rate that is common for all types and uncorrelated 
with the information that the sender wishes to signal. Their results are applied to corporations 
signaling financial strength to investors through the use of dividend distributions to 
shareholders.  
This chapter asks whether environmental performance, and more generally corporate public 
good provision, can perfectly substitute to other types of money-burning signals to reduce 
information asymmetry. Determining the effectiveness of a signal conditional on its public 
good contribution is difficult, if not impossible, in the field. This is because contributions to 
public goods involve preferences and beliefs, both unobservable to the researcher. This is also 
because so many factors are occurring simultaneously in real life, such as changes in investors 
and the public’s perception of CSR, as well as external financial shocks that are constantly 
occurring in the economy, which likely alter investors’ priorities. One possibility is to turn to 
the experimental laboratory, where the researcher can abstract from many of these issues, 
while focusing on the core issue of public good provision through signaling, at the expense of 
simplification of the investing environment. The experimental laboratory enables controlling 
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the financial decision environment and observing behaviors and has thus already enabled 
many developments of financial theory (Pouget, 2001). 
A first contribution of this chapter is to propose a model of negotiated equity financing with 
money-burning signal, which is adapted to the Private Equity setting. Contrary to Bernheim 
and Redding (2001), the model does not differentiate money-burning activities based on 
resource dissipation, but rather focus on the activity qualitative content. The experimental 
design indeed contextualizes money-burning signals by allowing managers to either purchase 
a “green signal”, which contributes to a real public good (actual online carbon offset) or a 
“brown signal” (advertisement). Both money-burning signals tested in the laboratory are 
consistent with real-life settings. Whether the signal actually provides the public good is 
controlled for, so the experimental design allows addressing the simple question: are signals 
that contribute to public good perfect substitutes to standard signals? Further on, does the 
existence of a signal that contributes to public good allow for the possibility for firms to 
signal their types? In other words, can investors rely on a green signal to reduce information 
asymmetry?  
Main result is that public good provision, and more specifically environmental performance, 
is not a perfect substitute for other types of money-burning signals, such as advertising. The 
existence of a money-burning green signal (which contributes to public good) enhances firm 
type separation and equity market transparency. Strikingly, types are revealed through prices 
when green signals are available, but green signals are not actually used. This phenomenon 
does not occur with standard “brown” signals (which do not contribute to the public good). 
The presence of the public good provision seems to crowd-in actors’ intrinsic motivation to 
act in line with their moral values and thus reveal their type. The paper concludes by 
discussing the positive effect socially responsible investments might have on equity markets 
and on society as a whole.  
 
4.2. MODEL 
 
Giammarino and Lewis (1988) had noted that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) seminal paper and 
most of corporate finance theory are implicitly based on a framework in which equity is sold 
by value-maximizing firm managers to a market populated by atomistic investors through a 
competitive auction. While this model provided important insights, most transactions in 
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Private Equity rather involve a process more akin to bilateral negotiation. Giammarino and 
Lewis (1988) thus proposed a non-cooperative sequential game of equity sales and introduced 
negotiation by letting firm managers set the price of the issue. This chapter extends their 
setting, which is specific to Private Equity negotiations, by allowing firm managers to 
additionally purchase a money-burning signal.  
The proposed model does not distinguish between money-burning signals: they will be later 
on contextualized in the experimental design.  
This section limits itself to main properties and results of the model. The reader can refer to 
Appendix C for proofs. 
 
4.2.1. NOTATIONS 
 
Let us consider a firm that needs E external equity financing to invest in a project (for 
instance, building a new plant). This external equity (E) can be obtained through the issuing 
and sale of new shares (capital increase). The firm management aims at maximizing the 
welfare of the current shareholders. For the purpose of simplicity, let us suppose this firm is 
all equity financed (K existing shares) and operates in a financial market where there are 
neither taxes nor transaction costs. The market is made-up of risk-neutral Private Equity 
investors willing to acquire any asset that they believe will generate at least the market’s 
expected rate of return, which is assumed to be zero.  
Investors are faced with information asymmetry as the firm can be of two types i: high value 
(h) with probability p or low value (l) with probability 1 - p. The firm’s current assets have a 
value of     . If the firm obtains E external equity, it can invest in its project. The project 
generates a state-contingent value (Net Present Value) of     . The high type firm asset 
value always exceeds the low type:              . The value of the firm given that the 
investment has been exercised is           . 
The potential investors do not know the firm type, but they are aware of the possible values of 
   and    and of the probability p that the firm is high type. The firm type is the private 
information of the firm’s management.  
The firm manager presents an offer to issue N new shares. For the purpose of simplicity, the 
first model choice variable is z which is the fraction of all outstanding claims offered by the 
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manager to the investor:   
 
(   )
. z is thus the firm shares offered to the investor in 
exchange of the equity she invests in the firm. 
The manager can also decide to invest in a money-burning signal, which is a sunk cost. Later 
on, signaling types will be introduced in the experimental setting. The signal costs     
]    [ and sends a message  ̅ to the investors. This cost is borne by the firm itself, so that if 
the investor rejects the project, the original owners end up with       ; but if the investor 
accepts the offer, the final value of the firm to be shared between investor and original owners 
is       . The investor receives the signal   if no money-burning signal is purchased 
(    ). As high type firms have more slack resources to signal than low-type firms, the 
message  ̅ can be used by managers to signal their high type.  
The investor receives a composite offer (       ) made of the share   , which consists in a 
price signal and a money-burning signal    {  ̅   }. She can either accept or reject the offer. 
In this two-signal non cooperative game, the values of E,   ,   ,    and p are exogenous.  
 
4.2.2. STRATEGIES AND BELIEFS 
 
Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) notion of sequential equilibrium is used to characterize 
equilibrium behavior: the selection of strategies depends on beliefs, which are updated 
following Baye’s rule. An equilibrium thus consists in both a set of strategies for all players at 
each information set of the game and a set of beliefs for all players at each information set of 
the game.  
The investor has prior beliefs on which firm types can send which message:  ( |(       )). For 
z fixed:   ( |   )    ( |   )    and   ( |   )    ( |   )   .  
The investor chooses actions following the strategy function  (       )  that defines the 
probability with which each possible offer made by the firm manager is accepted by the 
investor. An offer (      ) is thus rejected with the probability    (      ). Based on the 
investor information, taken the firm strategy as fixed and given an offer,  (       )  must 
maximizes the investor’s expected payoff of accepting an offer: 
      (   )     [ ( |   ) (     )      ( |   ) (     )]    
      (   )     [  ( |   )      ( |   )  ]           (1) 
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The investor’s expected payoff of rejecting an offer is zero. 
A strategy for the firm manager is the function   (       ) that specifies for each feasible offer 
(       ) the probability with which it will be presented to the investor given the investor 
strategy. Based on the manager’s information, the set of values   (       ) must maximize the 
value of the existing shares taken  (       ) as given: 
 
     (     )    (     ) (     ) (     )  (   (     )) (        ) 
     (     )    (     ) (     )    (   (     ))           (2) 
For each feasible offer (       ), the belief the investor has about the type of the firm if she 
observes (       ) is updated and satisfies Baye’s rule.  
 
4.2.3. EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION 
 
As in most signaling games, more than one Bayes-Nash equilibrium is found in the model, 
hence the theoretical prediction is ambiguous. To refine predictions, many refinements of the 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept have been developed (see for refinement comparison Banks 
et al., 1994). Following Cadsby et al. (1998), the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), 
also known as equilibrium dominance, is here chosen. This refinement has already 
successfully been used in finance (see for instance Berkovitch and Khanna, 1990; Eckbo et 
al., 1990; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Chowdhry and Jegadeesh, 1994; Cadsby et al., 
1998). It is hence assumed that players will not select an action that is dominated and beliefs 
will reflect this.  
The intuition of theoretical results is presented below. The reader can refer to Appendix C.1 
for detailed proofs and propositions of the equilibrium characterization. 
This game is consistent with four types of pure strategy sequential equilibria. Equilibria 
selected (dominant equilibria) are contingent to the set of parameters used.  
(i) The first pure strategy sequential equilibrium is a price separating and money-burning 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, high type firms succeed in signaling their type to investors by 
purchasing money-burning signals and hence avoid under-investment. Low type firms cannot 
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afford to burn money, so they reveal their type through price and get financed. A two-speed 
economy is financed in which high type firms use money-burning signals, low type firms 
don’t, and both offer different prices. 
 (ii) The second pure strategy sequential equilibrium is a price separating and non money-
burning equilibrium which exists under two different sets of conditions. In the first set of 
conditions, the money-burning signal is too costly for high type firms to purchase it and 
investors thus do not consider the money-burning signal as reliable. Both firm types offer the 
same price. High type firms do not succeed in signaling their type and suffer under-
investment. Conversely, in the second set of conditions, the money-burning signal is not 
costly enough to be informative of the firm value level, as both firm types can buy it. Once 
again, high type firms suffer under-investment, as both firm types offer the same price. 
(iii) The third pure strategy sequential equilibrium is a price pooling and non money-burning 
equilibrium. Here, money-burning is too costly to be profitable, it is not done and both firm 
types offer the same price to investors. In this setting, high type firms are underpriced and 
low-type firms are over-priced.  
(iv) The last pure strategy sequential equilibrium is a price pooling and money-burning 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the money-burning cost is kept low enough by the stated 
conditions so that it is more profitable for both firm types to pay for it rather than suffer 
poorer treatment based on investor beliefs about non money-burning deviators. High type 
firms are still underpriced and low-type firms are still over-priced. 
 
4.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
4.3.1. MODEL PARAMETERS 
 
The previous model will now be experimentally tested. Parameters are chosen so as to 
conduct a tough test of the ability of subjects to separate in equilibrium (which is further 
discussed in section 4.3.3). They are precisely chosen to set up three different situations of 
Private Equity negotiations that will be experimentally tested and compared: (i) “expensive” 
money-burning signals affordable by high type firms only; (ii) “cheap” money-burning 
signals affordable by both firm types; (iii) as a control treatment, model predictions are also 
tested in the absence of money-burning based on Giammarino and Lewis’s (1988) model 
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predictions (presented in Appendix C.2). Figure 4.1 displays the game tree to be played in the 
experiment.   
Parameters for the expensive setting, cheap setting and control setting without signal are 
presented in Table 4.1. Note that only the availability and price of signaling (         ) 
change between the three settings.  
 
4.3.2. EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
 
No Money-Burning Treatment 
 
In this treatment, money-burning signal is not available. The “no money-burning” setting 
uses parameters consistent with an equilibrium in which all firms should offer the same price 
to investors. Precisely, Giammarino and Lewis’s (1988) precise that high type firms have no 
other possible strategy and that low type firms should select with a probability of zero a 
strategy in which they reveal their low type. 
Equilibrium Prediction 1: Firms should all offer a share of 27% (up to 32%) in the absence 
of money-burning opportunities. Investors should accept those offers. 
Details of Giammarino and Lewis’s (1988) model predictions can be found in Appendix C.2 
and detailed predicted strategies with their probabilities and payoffs in Appendix C.3.  
 
Expensive Money-Burning (Affordable by High Type Firms Only) Treatment 
 
Expensive money-burning is now available. The “expensive money-burning” setting uses 
parameters consistent with two equilibria, one of them being dominant (following the intuitive 
criteria): (i) a dominated equilibrium in which different firm types offer different prices and 
only high type firms purchase money-burning signals; (ii) and a dominant equilibrium in 
which all firms offer the same price and none purchase money-burning signals.  
Equilibrium Prediction 2: Firms should all offer a share of 27% (up to 32%) and not buy 
expensive money-burning signal. Investors should accept those offers.  
Note that Prediction 2 is similar to the control treatment Prediction 1. Detailed predicted 
strategies with their probabilities and payoffs can be found in Appendix C.3.   
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FIGURE 4.1 – Game tree 
Nature decides whether firms are high type (H) or low type (L). Depending on treatments, firms can purchase an 
expensive money-burning signal (E), a cheap money-burning signal (C) or no money-burning signal (N). Also 
depending on treatments, the nature of the signal will be either a green signal or a standard advertisement. Then 
firms choose the price signal z, that is the share (0% to 100%) to be offered to the investor against equity 
provided. Investors receive offers (money-burning signal and price signal) and either accept (A) or reject (R) the 
offer. Payoffs are then received: (firm payoff; investor payoff). If the offer is rejected, the firm that bought the 
money-burning signal bears its cost alone (-E or –C). If the offer is accepted, the value created is shared between 
firms and investors.   
  and   
  (respectively   
  and   
 ) are the firm and investor payoffs if the firm is high type 
(resp. low type) and bought no signal.   
  and   
  (resp.   
  and   
 ) are the firm and investor payoffs if the firm 
is high-type (low type) and bought a signal.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.2 - Experimental design. 
Each treatment was run four times and counted 10 to 11 participants. 
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TABLE 4.1 - Parameters for experimental design 
 Expensive signaling setting  Cheap signaling setting  Control - No signal 
Parameter High type 
firm 
Low type 
firm 
 High type 
firm 
Low type 
firm 
 High type 
firm 
Low type 
firm 
Equity needed: E 6 6  6 6  6 6 
Value of assets in place:    20 6  20 6  20 6 
NPV of investment:    9 2  9 2  9 2 
Total non-signaling firm value given investment:   36 15  36 15  36 15 
Cost of money-burning signal    8 8  3 3  0 0 
Total money-burning firm value given investment:       28 7  33 12  - - 
Probability of i 0.40 0.60  0.40 0.60  0.40 0.60 
Max share offered by non- money-burning firm:     
    (%) 44 60  44 60  44 60 
Max share offered by money-burning firm:      
    (%) 29 14  39 50  - - 
Share min for investor if non- money-burning firm type is known: 
    
   (%) 
19 47  19 47  19 47 
Share min for investor if money-burning firm type is known:     
    25 100  21 58  - - 
Share of average non- money-burning firm:   . (%) 27 27  27 27  27 27 
Share of average money-burning firm:    (%) 45 45  34 34  - - 
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Cheap Money-Burning (Affordable by Both Firm Types) Treatment 
 
Cheap money-burning is now available. The “cheap money-burning” setting uses parameters 
consistent with three equilibria, one of them being dominant (following the intuitive criteria): 
(i) a dominated equilibrium in which all firms are at the same price and all purchase money-
burning signals; (ii) a dominated equilibrium in which different firm types offer differ prices 
and none purchase money-burning signals; (iii) a dominant equilibrium in which all firms are 
at the same price and none purchase money-burning signals. 
Prediction 3 is identical to prediction 2. Detailed predicted strategies with their probabilities 
and payoffs can be found in Appendix C.3. 
 
4.3.3. BEHAVIORAL CONJECTURE: GREEN VERSUS BROWN SIGNALS 
 
A pure signaling game theory model with its predictions was presented. In this setting, the 
signal in itself has no content. The underlying assumption is that all money-burning signals 
are perfect substitutes. To provide context, the experimental design introduces two types of 
money-burning signal labels: “green signal” and “brown signal”. 
The green signal indicates the firm performs well on the environmental level. In a real-life 
setting, the green signal could be energy efficient, cleaner production processes (as in the 
TXU example) or carbon emission offset. In the experiment, the green money-burning signal 
precisely is carbon emission offset, which is here analyzed as a costly private provision of 
public good. The green signal goes beyond sole wording: the provision of public good is 
actually real. Part of the signal cost is indeed transferred online, in front of participants, to a 
certified carbon-offset non-profit organization (Planetair).  
The brown signal consists in standard advertisement (as in the seminal paper of Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1986). In a real-life setting, advertising is also paid for by firms to improve their 
reputation, independently of product quality. A recent example of (very) costly advertisement 
campaign decorrelated from product quality is Red Bull financing of Felix Baumgartner free-
fall from the stratosphere. In brown signal treatments, a participant is randomly assigned to 
become a publicist (“group C” in the instructions). When firm managers (“Group A” in the 
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instructions) decide to purchase an advertisement, part of the signal cost is transferred to the 
publicist. The existence of the publicist ensures in the design that money goes “somewhere 
real”. 
Green and brow signals differ by framing and economic consequences but are similar in terms 
of monetary payoffs for participants. Equilibrium selection is conjectured to differ depending 
on the money-burning signal content. Indeed, parameters have been chosen for type 
separation (by purchasing money-burning signals) to always be a dominated equilibrium. As a 
provision of public good, the green signal might increase both firm managers and investors’ 
utility beyond profits. In the context of portfolio selection, Holm and Rikhardsson (2008) and 
Consolandi et al. (2009) show for instance how environmental, social and governance 
information impacts investment-decision. If green signaling impacts firm managers and 
investors’ preferences, it will then be used differently from a standard signal. Typically, green 
signal is conjectured to enhance the selection of separating strategies by purchasing green 
money burning signals. Conversely, brown signal should not enhance utility and the pooling 
strategy is expected.  
The following conjecture is hence proposed. 
Behavioral Conjecture: Green signal should increase the selection of the price separating 
and money-burning equilibrium. Conversely, a pooling equilibrium should be reached in 
presence of the brown signal. As such green signal it is not a perfect substitute to brown 
signal. 
 
4.4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
 
The experimental design is based on the three previously described settings: the control 
treatment (no signal - Game 0); the expensive money-burning setting and the cheap money-
burning setting. For each money-burning setting, the experience compares brown signaling 
(Game 1) to green signaling (Game 2) and also provides participants with a choice of money-
burning signals (green or brown; Game 3). Henceforth, the design consists in a control 
treatment (no money-burning signal available) plus six money-burning signal treatments (see 
Figure 4.2).  
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In Game 1 (brown signaling), a participant is randomly assigned to become a publicist 
(“group C” in the instructions). When firm managers (“Group A” in the instructions) decide to 
purchase an advertisement, part of the signal cost is transferred to the publicist. In Game 2 
(green signaling), firm managers can decide to purchase voluntary carbon offset. Part of the 
signal cost if then transferred online (in front of participants) to a certified carbon-offset non-
profit organization. Signal descriptions to participants were kept as neutral as possible (see 
instructions in Appendix C.5; the working used is further indicated). Theoretical predictions 
are identical between Games 1 and 2. Finally, in Game 3 (signal choice), participants can 
choose between standard advertisement and carbon offset.  
Each of the seven treatments was run four times. Each session counted 24 rounds and was 
played by 10 or 11 (when “publicists” were needed) participants who kept the same role and 
type for the whole session. 296 participants, recruited in Montreal universities and newspaper 
job ads, took part in the experiment. Participants had no specific knowledge requirement on 
Private Equity, corporate finance or environmental issues. Survey answers showed that 
subjects were rather homogenous in terms of demographics and investment knowledge (see 
Appendix C.4 for descriptive statistics on participants).  
The experiment was run on networked computers, programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arriving for the session, participants received 
acceptance and instruction sheets detailing for all players rules and potential payoffs, which 
were read aloud. Examples were also provided. Participants were randomly assigned to be 
firm managers (“Group A” in the instructions) of high (“type 1”) or low (“type 2”) type, 
investors (“Group B”) or publicists (“Group C”) for the entire session. Rounds were 
independent and between rounds participants gained experience. The number of rounds to be 
played (24) was not announced. Throughout the session, communication between subjects 
was not allowed. 
The sequence of play in a round was as follows. At the start of each round, firm managers 
were randomly and anonymously paired with investors. After observing her type and her 
opportunities, the firm manager chose the fraction of equity to offer and whether or not to 
purchase a signal. The paired investor then observed the offer made and either accepted or 
rejected the offer. Both partner players then learned each other payoffs.  
At the end of the session, subjects got show up fee (10$CAN) plus their payoffs. Special care 
was brought to the payoff structure. Indeed, Cadsby et al. (1998) results appeared driven by 
the potential short-term gains that could be obtained by defecting high type firms. Those 
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results are rather similar to those of Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993), where it was the payoff 
structure on actions taken prior to convergence that seemed to determine equilibrium 
selection. Participants’ payoffs were thus calculated as follows. Participants were first 
endowed 6$CAN, knowing that this money was at stake. At the end of the session, two 
rounds were randomly selected. Payoffs were calculated as the endowment added to the 
results for the two selected rounds. Investors got zero if they rejected an offer. If their offer 
was rejected, firm managers got either zero if they had bought no signal or minus the signal 
cost if they had bought a signal. If their offer was accepted, firm managers received their 
share of the value created by the investment, as the investors did. Participants were indeed 
paid on created value. As an example, let us consider an investor who accepted to invest 
6$CAN against a 20% share in a firm. If the firm was worth 35$CAN, the investor received 
20% * 35$CAN = 7$CAN. Her net payoff was thus 7 $CAN – 6$CAN = 1 $CAN. Publicists 
received 1$CAN for each advertisement bought, and 1$CAN was given to Planetair if 
participants had purchased carbon offset. The average participant payoff was about 20$CAN 
for 1H30. 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
 
This section presents results for each prediction. For the purpose of clarity when presenting 
results, firm offers are classified into four categories, namely “non-credible”, “separating”, 
“pooling” and “no-risk” offers. 
 “Non credible” offers are such that whatever the firm type, the investor’s payoff is known by 
all to always be negative (no signal z < 18%; cheap signal z < 19%; expensive signal z < 
23%). “Separating” offers are such that the investor’s mathematical expected payoff is 
negative (no signal 17% < z < 27 %; cheap signal 18% < z < 31%; expensive signal 22% < z 
< 42%) and include high type firm separating offers. “Pooling” offers are such that the 
investor’s expected payoff is positive (no signal 26% < z < 43%; cheap signal 30% < z < 
55%; expensive signal z > 42%) and include pooling offers. “No-risk” offers are such that 
whatever the firm type, the investor’s payoff is known by all to be positive (no signal 42% < 
z; cheap signal 55% < z; does not exist with expensive signal) and include low type separating 
offers. 
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FIGURE 4.3– Firm offers 
Money-burning and non money-burning offers made by high type and low type firms over the last five rounds of 
play in the expensive advertisement treatment (top left); the expensive carbon offset treatment (top right); the 
cheap advertisement treatment (middle left); the cheap carbon offset treatment (middle right); and the control 
treatment (bottom left). 
 
  
Control treatment – no signal available 
Cheap brown signal treatment (advertising) Cheap green signal treatment (carbon offset) 
Expensive brown signal treatment (advertising) Expensive green signal treatment (carbon offset) 
Legend 
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FIGURE 4.3 - Investors’ answers 
Investors’ acceptance rate of money-burning and non money-buring offers over the last five rounds of play in the 
expensive advertisement treatment (top left); the expensive carbon offset treatment (top right); the cheap 
advertisement treatment (middle left); the cheap carbon offset treatment (middle right); and the control treatment 
(bottom left). 
 
  
Control treatment – no signal available 
Cheap brown signal treatment (advertising) Cheap green signal treatment (carbon offset) 
Expensive brown signal treatment (advertising) Expensive green signal treatment (carbon offset) 
Legend 
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FIGURE 4.4 - Quadratic predictions of offers made 
Quadratic predictions of shares offered (ordinates) by high type firms (grey lines) and low type firms (black lines) over periods of play (abscissa) in the control treatment (top 
left); the expensive advertisement treatment (top right); and the expensive carbon offset treatment (bottom left). Dotted lines highlight the average decision trajectory of low-
type firms that constantly revealed their types in the last five rounds of play 
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TABLE 4.2 - Predictions versus aggregate results and earnings per player types and treatments 
 
Treatment  Firm managers  Investors 
  High type  Low type     
  Mean 
share 
offered 
Std 
Dev 
Signal 
% 
Actual 
earnings 
Predicted 
earnings 
 Mean 
share 
offered 
Std 
Dev 
Signal 
% 
Actual 
earnings 
Predicted 
earnings 
 Acceptance 
(%) 
Actual 
earnings 
Predicted 
earnings 
Control – no 
signal 
 28.5 3.7 no 2.8 4.15  36.9 10.4 no 1.5 3.7  64.4 0.94 1.2 
1A - Expensive 
advertisement 
 26.1 9.3 0.11 1.5 3.8  29.0 11.9 0.12 1.0 3.5  53.9 0.35 1.2 
1B - Expensive 
carbon offset 
 27.0 5.4 0.10 1.9 3.8  36.0 16.4 0.12 0.7 3.5  60.8 0.64 1.2 
1C – Choice   24.8 8.3 0.16 1.6 3.8  33.5 17.7 0.21 0.0 3.5  57.2 0.37 1.2 
2A – Cheap 
advertisement 
 26.5 6.3 0.11 2.0 3.8  33.7 11.4 0.15 1.3 3.5  55.8 0.38 1.2 
2B - Cheap 
carbon offset 
 20.6 12.7 0.11 2.4 3.8  30.1 14.5 0.08 1.5 3.5  51.9 0.23 1.2 
2C – Choice  27.5 5.0 0.14 2.5 3.8  28.6 16.5 0.24 0.7 3.5  54.4 0.74 1.2 
Predictions are that all firms should select the pooling non signaling equilibrium with    [       ] without signaling.  
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4.5.1. RESULTS FOR PREDICTION 1: POOLING EQUILIBRIUM IN THE ABSENCE OF MONEY 
BURNING OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Results confirm Prediction 1: a pooling equilibrium is reached when money-burning is not 
available. However, some deviations are observed from low-type firms. Typically, about a 
third of participants does not strategically select a pooling strategy but rather reveal (through 
prices) their low type (separating strategy). Control results constitute a benchmark for the 
other treatments and similar deviations as those observed will hence be expected in further 
treatments.  
Table 4.2 presents predicted and actual offers, acceptance rates and earnings across treatments 
by player types. Figure 4.3 illustrates offer distribution by firm type over the previously 
defined categories in the five first and last rounds of play, as well as investors’ answers. T-
tests (with Satterthwaite’s approximation formula when needed) are used to analyze 
differences between offers. Let us consider successively high type firms, low types firms and 
investors.  
High type firms clearly converged to the predicted dominant pooling equilibrium (   
[       ] in Table 4.2; “pooling” offers in Figure 4.3). Differences between the first five 
and last five rounds of play highlight the existence of a learning effect (Figure 4.3). 
Low-type firm offers were more scattered than high type’s (e.g. standard variation of 
respectively 10.4% versus 3.7%, Table 4.2), which calls for a detailed analysis of the 
heterogeneity of strategies played. Indeed, whereas some low type firms converged to the 
predicted dominant pooling equilibrium (“pooling” offers; 2.79$/round, Figure 4.3), others 
converged to the dominated separating equilibrium (“no-risk offers”; 1.35$/round) in which 
they reveal their type. Figure 4.5 illustrates that most players kept to their separating or 
pooling strategy from the first rounds of play on (see also the proportions of participants that 
changed of offer category over the last 5 rounds in Table C.4.2, Appendix C.4). Hereby the 
different equilibrium selections correspond to different types of participants selecting 
different strategies.  
Let us now turn to investors’ answers. Investors also earned less than predicted (0.94$/round 
instead of 1.2$/round, Table 4.2). Figure 4.3 shows that investors acknowledged low type 
disclosure and accepted all “no-risk offers” (0.67$/round). However they only accepted 2/3 
“pooling offers” (1.21$/round). Hence Investors’ acceptance of non signaling offers increased 
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linearly with the share offered, not playing strategically but rather overweighting potential 
losses over potential gains.   
 
4.5.2. RESULTS FOR PREDICTION 2: POOLING EQUILIBRIUM IN PRESENCE OF EXPENSIVE 
MONEY BURNING OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Results only partially support Prediction 2: a pooling equilibrium is not always reached when 
expensive money burning is available. In line with the behavioral prediction, the equilibrium 
selected is not the same depending on the money-burning signal available. Prediction 2 is 
confirmed in presence of brown signaling but deviations are observed in presence of green 
signaling. 
Figure 4.4 summarizes results over the last 5 rounds of play in expensive signal treatments. 
The reader can find in Appendix C.4 results in the 5 first rounds of play. Random effect probit 
models, cluster corrected by participants, are used to analyze money-burning behavior (Table 
4.4). Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions can be found in Table C.4.3 in 
Appendix C.4.  
Results differ depending on signal types. Indeed, in light of the control treatment results, the 
availability of expensive brown signal increased the selection of the dominant price pooling 
equilibrium whereas the availability of expensive green signal increased the selection of the 
dominated separating equilibrium in which firms reveal their type (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). The 
expensive choice signal treatment has similar results than the expensive green signal 
treatment (Figure 4.5).  
Strikingly, purchases of money-burning signals nevertheless little occur whatever its type 
(green or brown) and was abandoned over the last rounds of play (Table 4.2, Figure 4.3, 
Figure 4.5). Probit results (Table 4.4) confirm that money-burning offers decline over time. 
Type separation in the green signaling setting occurs through prices and not through money-
burning. When the green signal is available, some participants select a strategy that was 
theoretically always dominated (the price separating and non money-burning strategy).  
Signal type effect on separation does not result from green signal salience as conjectured in 
the behavioral prediction. Indeed, when the choice between green or brown signal is given to 
participants, participants do not choose green over brown, or the reverse way (Table 4.2; 
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figure 4.3). The green signal effect on separation might thus be a consequence of the public 
good provision, which will be discussed later on. 
Let us now consider successively high type firms, low types firms and investors. 
High type firm managers converged to the predicted dominant pooling non signaling 
equilibrium (   [       ], no signal; Table 4.2). They buy brown signal (22.5%) and 
even more green signal (32.5%) in the first 5 rounds but quit signaling as the game goes on. 
Despite reaching the predicted equilibrium, high type firm managers earned only about half of 
what was predicted. 
Low type firm offers differ significantly from high type offers (Table 4.2). Unexpectedly, low 
type firms deviate and buy expensive signals at a certain loss with significant frequency (23% 
to 30% in the first 5 rounds), although the design ensured they cannot afford to do so (payoffs 
always negative). Finally, low type firms also earned less than predicted and did poorer than 
high type firms.  
Based on those first elements of analysis, money-burning signals appear jammed by low type 
firms. Why does signal jamming occurs, and more specifically, why do low type firms 
purchase money-burning signals they can’t afford? Based on the actual probability of investor 
acceptance conditional on the type of offer made, the actual firm expected profit per offer 
type is established. Results over the last five rounds of play are presented in Table 4.3. Signal 
jamming can result from either (i) signal salience for participants; (ii) a strategy anchored on 
social preferences; or (iii) a strategy anchored in prospect theory.  
(i) Money-burning signal salience would mean that low type firms purchase money-burning 
signals because they have a strong preference for the signal itself and a high willingness to 
pay for it. Thus they would purchase signals in order to maximize their utility function. 
However, there is no significant difference in the use of brown (sacrificing profit for a 
participant) versus green (sacrificing profit for a more abstract public good) signals. It can be 
considered unlikely that both signals have the same salience for all participants. Moreover 
most participants only signal in the first rounds and stop. Henceforth, signal salience appears 
an unlikely hypothesis for signal jamming. 
(ii) Strategic signal jamming anchored in social preferences would mean that low type firms 
purchase signals because they find unfair that high type firms earn more than them and they 
also believe the existence of a credible signal protects this inequality. Thus they would 
purchase signals in order to change investors’ belief update in the signal credence. However, 
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high type firms succeeding in signaling their types do not earn more than low type firms 
revealing their type (Table 4.3). Therefore the social preference hypothesis is unlikely. 
(iii) Strategic signal jamming anchored in prospect theory would mean that low type firms 
purchase money-burning signals because they understand there is more money to make by 
pooling than by revealing their type and because they believe the existence of a credible 
signal prevents them from succeeding in pooling. This belief would imply participants believe 
investors have a strong preference for signaling firms. If high type firms succeed in signaling, 
low types firms are indeed likely to have their pooling offers rejected by investors. Therefore 
prospect theory appears as a relevant explanation for signal jamming. 
 
Let us now turn to investors’ aggregated results. Investors also earned less than predicted in 
all treatments (Table 4.2). An econometric analysis takes into account the dynamics of the 
experimental results and grasps individual investor acceptance determinants (Table 4.5). 
Random effect probit models, cluster corrected by participants, are used (variable descriptive 
statistics are available in Table C.4.3, Appendix C.4). Acceptance increases at first with 
expensive signaling, hence when the signal is expensive enough to be credible (Table 4.5). 
However, a learning effect is observed, with investors learning over time to be more skeptical 
of offers made. Estimations of the interactions between shares offered and signals show that, 
at equivalent price, signaling offers are more rejected than non signaling ones. Henceforth 
investors are willing to accept expensive signaling offers in a rational way (one that would 
optimize their profits) but are not willing to sacrifice profits for signals in themselves, be them 
green or brown.  
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TABLE 4.3 -  Actual firm expected profit (by category of offer made) over the last five rounds knowing the actual investors’ acceptance probability 
Signal type Offer category Control treatment 
 Expensive signal treatments  Cheap signal treatments 
 Brown Green Choice  Brown Green Choice 
  High Low  High Low High Low High Low  High Low High Low High Low 
No signal 
 purchased 
Non credible no no  0.00 0.00 no no 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 1.63 1.44 0.00 0.00 
Separating 0.00 0.00  1.25 0.86 2.09 1.43 1.46 1.00  2.29 1.58 3.61 2.49 2.29 1.58 
Pooling 3.22 2.45  3.33 2.53 3.72 2.83 3.39 2.57  3.55 2.70 2.50 1.90 4.27 3.25 
No-risk -0.05 1.88  -0.05 1.98 -0.05 1.82 -0.05 1.84  -0.05 1.86 -0.04 1.47 -0.05 1.82 
Advertisement 
purchased 
                 
Non credible    -8.00 -8.00   -8.00 -8.00  -2.40 -2.40   -3.00 -3.00 
Separating    -3.61 -4.69   -3.61 -4.69  -0.06 -1.05   -3.00 -3.00 
Pooling    -5.46 -3.94   -4.61 -2.58  -0.97 -1.16   no no 
No-risk    no no   no no  no no   no no 
Carbon offset 
 purchased 
                 
Non credible      no no -11.00 -6.65    -3.00 -3.00 no no 
Separating      no no -8.00 -8.00    5.92 2.91 -3.00 -3.00 
Pooling      -5.97 -4.75 -7.32 -6.92    -1.32 -1.49 -1.32 -1.49 
No-risk      no no no no    -5.60 -1.05 no no 
In table 4.3, « no »indicates that no such offer was made in the last five rounds of the treatment. Bold characters highlight selected strategies. 
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TABLE 4.4 -  Random effect Probit model estimates of determinants of firm money-burning 
 
  Advertisement (brown signal)  Carbon offset (green signal) 
Variable  High Type  Low Type  High Type  Low Type 
Offered shares (z)  0.02 * (0.01)  0.01  (0.01)  0.05 *** (0.01)  0.01 ** (0.05) 
Result at previous round  -0.03  (0.03)  -0.03  (0.03)  -0.04  (0.03)  0.01  (0.03) 
Result at previous round * signal purchased  -0.09 * (0.05)  -0.16 *** (0.04)  0.04  (0.04)  -0.18 *** (0.05) 
Non credible offer  0.70 ** (0.35)  0.82 *** (0.26)  1.34 *** (0.33)  0.70 ** (0.29) 
1st period dummy  0.30  (0.33)  0.55 ** (0.25)  -0.21  (0.35)  -0.14  (0.29) 
Last 10 period dummy  0.66 * (0.34)  0.26  (0.24)  0.17  (0.34)  0.15  (0.28) 
Period  -0.10 *** (0.03)  -0.05 ** (0.02)  -0.07 *** (0.03)  -0.05 ** (0.02) 
Gender  0.48  (0.46)  0.02  (0.23)  0.05  (0.33)  0.08  (0.32) 
Age  0.06 ** (0.03)  0.02  (0.02)  0.01  (0.02)  0.02  (0.02) 
Experienced player  -0.49  (0.52)  -0.15  (0.29)  -0.29  (0.38)  0.22  (0.47) 
experienced investor  -0.12  (0.26)  -0.18  (0.11)  -0.26 * (0.15)  -0.11  (0.16) 
                 
ρ  0.41 ***   0.24 ***   0.11 ***   0.41 ***  
Log Likelihood:  -178.5    -317.1    -166.6    -265.2   
Number of observations  786    1179    786    1179   
Number of firms  34    51    34    51   
Figures in brackets are standard deviations. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; Statistically significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 4.5 -  Random effect Probit model estimates of determinants of investors’ decision 
  
Variable  Expensive signal treatments  Cheap signal treatments 
Offered shares (z)  0.09 *** (0.01)  0.08 *** (0.01) 
Carbon offset purchased  0.73 ** (0.34)  -0.29  (0.57) 
z * Carbon offset purchased  -0.06 *** (0.01)  -0.01  (0.02) 
Advertisement purchased  1.21 *** (0.32)  0.41  (0.34) 
z * Advertisement purchased  -0.07 *** (0.01)  -0.04 *** (0.01) 
Result at previous round  0.03  (0.02)  0.04 * (0.02) 
Result at previous round * Carbon offset 
purchased 
 -0.13  (0.08)  -0.10  (0.11) 
Result at previous round * Advertisement 
purchased 
 0.03  (0.06)  -0.11  (0.08) 
Non credible offer  -0.47 * (0.27)  -0.60 ** (0.28) 
1st period dummy  0.72 *** (0.22)  0.66 *** (0.23) 
Last 10 period dummy  0.12  (0.16)  0.31 * (0.16) 
Period  -0.02 ** (0.01)  -0.03 *** (0.01) 
Gender  -0.09  (0.15)  0.22  (0.19) 
Age  -0.01  (0.01)  0.00  (0.01) 
Experience at Cirano experiment  0.28  (0.19)  -0.39  (0.24) 
Knowledge at investing  -0.12  (0.08)  -0.05  (0.09) 
         
ρ  0.16 *** (0.04)  0.26 *** (0.05) 
Log Likelihood:  -715.6    -725.8   
Number of observations  1440    1440   
Number of groups (investors)  60    60   
Figures in brackets are standard deviations. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; 
Statistically significant at 1%. 
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4.5.3. RESULTS FOR PREDICTION 3: EQUILIBRIUM IN PRESENCE OF CHEAP MONEY BURNING 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Results only partially support Prediction 3: a pooling equilibrium is not always reached when 
cheap money-burning is available. In line with the behavioral prediction, the equilibrium 
selected is not the same depending on the money-burning signal available. Prediction 3 is 
confirmed in presence of brown signaling but deviations are observed in presence of green 
signaling. 
Results of the cheap brown money-burning treatment and the cheap money-burning choice 
treatment are similar to the control treatment. Results of the cheap green signal treatment (2B) 
differ. The availability of the green signal once again increased type revelation and signaling 
declined over time (Table 4.4). Figure 4.3 summarizes results over the last 5 rounds of play in 
cheap signal treatments. The reader can find in Appendix C.4 results in the 5 first rounds of 
play. 
As found with expensive money-burning, cheap money-burning effect on separation does not 
only result from green signal salience as participants do not choose green over brown in the 
choice treatment (Table 4.2; figure 4.3). The green signal effect on separation will be 
discussed in Section 4.6. 
Let us consider successively high type firms, low types firms and investors. 
High type firm managers converged to the predicted dominant pooling non signaling 
equilibrium in presence of the cheap brown money-burning signal (   [       ] and no 
signal; Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5). However, in the presence of the cheap green signal 
treatment (2B), offers were significantly lower (Table 4.2). About half high type firms indeed 
converged to a dominated separating equilibrium in which they reveal their type (“separating 
offers” in Figure 4.5; see also Figure 4.3; earn 3.49 $CAN/round). The presence of the green 
signal increased their separation. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, low type firms little mimicked this strategy and instead 
spread between the predicted dominant pooling non signaling equilibrium (“good offers”, 
2.17$CAN/round) and the predicted dominated (non signaling) separating equilibrium in 
which they reveal their type (“no-risk offers, 0.96$CAN/round) as shown in Figure 4.3.  
Let us now turn to investors’ results. Table 4.5 shows that when signaling is cheap and thus 
not credible, acceptance rate is rationally not significantly impacted by signal purchase, 
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whatever its type. In details, in cheap brown signaling treatments, investors’ acceptance of 
non signaling offers increased linearly with the share offered rather than strategically (Figure 
4.4; Table 4.5). However, in cheap green signal treatments, investors answered rationally to 
firm managers’ strategies (Figure 4.4): acknowledging the type separation that was 
unpredictably occurring, they accepted more (56%) “separating offers” than “pooling offers” 
(50%). Investors also earned less than predicted in all treatments. Moreover, probit 
estimations show that, for the same price, cheap advertising offers are more rejected than non 
advertising off; but that green offers are not more rejected than non-green offers (see the 
interactions between signal and offered shares). Consequently, investors have a willingness to 
pay for the cheap green signal than they do not have for standard signal.  
 
4.6. DISCUSSION 
 
4.6.1. THE MONEY BURNING SIGNAL CONTENT IMPACTS EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 
 
This chapter first contributes to the wide literature that tests refinements and equilibrium 
selection (e.g. Brandts and Holt, 1992, 1993; Banks et al., 1994). The experimental test of 
Giammarino and Lewis (1988)’ model of equity sales highlights deviations from the predicted 
equilibrium selection (Equilibrium Prediction 1, see Appendix C.2). High type firms 
converged to the pooling equilibrium predicted by Giammarino and Lewis (1988) to be a 
certain realization (probability equal to 1). However low type firms deviated by spreading 
between the pooling equilibrium predicted to occur with a probability of   ( 
 ) (equal to 1 
with parameters used) and a dominated separating equilibrium predicted to occur with a 
probability     ( 
 ) (equal to 0 with parameters used). Henceforth the prediction is realized 
when participants are faced with unique equilibrium but fails when players are confronted to 
mixed strategies. 
The experimental results are hence in line with Cadsby et al. (1990)’s results. These authors 
test a sequential game theoretic model of corporate finance also based on Myers and Majluf 
(1984). Contrary to this paper’s model and design, Cadsby et al. (1990) use an auction design. 
They find that where theoretical equilibrium was unique, theory predicted well; when theory 
permitted pooling, separation and semi separation equilibrium, the more efficient pooling 
equilibrium was observed. In this paper, pooling and separating strategies co-exist.  
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When money-burning is introduced, similar yet more complex deviations are observed. 
Extending Cadsby et al. (1990), Cadsby et al. (1998), introduce signaling (advertisement) in 
their model and experimental setting. They observe that equilibrium dominance often fails 
and that equilibrium selection appears related to the payoff structure. Morgan et al. (2006) 
note that in a large experimental literature studying matrix games with mixed strategy 
equilibria systematic departures from equilibrium predictions are commonly observed.  
This paper’s contribution is to show that the money-burning content matters in equilibrium 
selection. Specifically, it shows that the existence of a public good provision signal creates 
deviations from predicted strategies, namely type revelation. Environmental performance is 
thus not a perfect substitute for other types of money-burning signal. 
 
4.6.2. GREEN SIGNALS INCREASE TYPE REVELATION WITHOUT BEING USED 
 
Surprisingly, type revelation does not occur through actual green signaling, but rather through 
prices when green signaling is available. Indeed, both green and brown signals were used and 
then abandoned over the first rounds of play. Data hence contradicts the proposed behavioral 
conjecture, but is shown to be consistent with a signal jamming strategy anchored in prospect 
theory. Results are also in line with Shleifer (2004)’s findings on competition and ethical 
conduct. The author shows that competition reduces entrepreneurs’ willingness to pay for 
ethical conduct. When unethical behavior by competitors reduces their costs, it also reduces 
prices in the market, and as a result drives down prices. Participants in the experiment 
jammed the strategic potential of money-burning, as previously discussed, and therefore 
stopped providing public good as it was driving down their profits.  
Hereby money-burning signals are discarded but type revelation still occurs through non-
strategic price separation. This equilibrium was predicted to always be dominated, as low type 
firms could only make significantly less profits by selecting such strategy. However, this sub-
optimal behavior is only observed in treatments with green signaling available. The 
behavioral conjecture is hence partially supported: green signals are not perfect substitutes for 
brown signals. This costly type revelation is analyzed as a consequence of the availability of 
the public good provision. Such behavior might be related to the “identity” or “self-image” 
concept (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Brekke et al., 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). 
Following Brekke et al. (2003)’ model, participants are likely to want to think of themselves 
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as socially responsible (‘What kind of a person am I?’). However, their individuals’ perceived 
social responsibility varies with external conditions and potential profit (‘What kind of 
situation is this?’), which lead them to make trade-offs between the wish to be socially 
responsible and the desire for remuneration (‘What should a person such as I ideally do in a 
situation such as this?’). Hence participants ﬁrst determine their morally ideal effort, and then 
maximize utility by trading the beneﬁts of maintaining a self-image as a socially responsible 
person against the costs. This trade-off between pay-off and identity appears as a likely 
explanation for the type revelation observed. Indeed, firm managers in the experiment are 
likely to have quit green signaling to cut costs. However, revealing their type appears as an 
“honest” strategy in which one does not try to lie about her type, hence protecting one’s self-
image.  
Conversely, when advertising is available and public good participation is not mentioned, 
participants play strategically under the impetus of pure extrinsic motivation, without taking 
into consideration damage to their self-image. Knowing that they could contribute to a public 
good led firm managers to reveal their true type, hence reducing market information 
asymmetry.  
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 4 aimed at exploring whether environmental performance, and more generally 
corporate public good provision, could perfectly substitute to other types of money-burning 
signals to reduce information asymmetry in Private Equity negotiations. It investigated 
whether the existence of a money-burring signal that contributed to a public good allowed for 
the possibility for firms to signal their type to investors. To do so, a signaling game of Private 
Equity negotiations was built and tested in the laboratory. The experimental design enabled to 
provide content to the money-burning signal, making it an actual contribution to a real public 
good.  
In the laboratory, environmental performance was not achieved, as money burning signals 
were not purchased. Environmental performance did not appear particularly more salient than 
advertisement as a money-burning signal, and none were used to signal quality. However, in 
the green signal setting (that is when firms could potentially pay to become environmentally 
performant) firm type separation occurs in a sub-optimal way, firms revealing their type 
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through prices. This type revelation is costly, but appears preferred to a pooling strategy that 
would require (on top of not being environmentally performant) to hide one’s true type. 
Equilibrium selection thus differs depending on the money-burning signal content. 
Environmental performance cannot thus perfectly substitute to other types of money-burning 
signals to reduce information asymmetry. 
Private provision of public good seemed to increase transparency trough prices on the 
experimental Private Equity market. Such a result triggers the suggestion that involving 
environmental and social performance in deals might crowd-in actors’ intrinsic motivation to 
act in line with their moral values. Improving performance on environmental, social and 
governance issues might thus create virtuous circles on transparency and standard business 
and investment activities.  
Finally, public good contribution quickly fades away in the setting used in this chapter, 
whatever its cost. Whereas the growing interest of investors for environmental and social 
performance of their portfolio might be a promising improvement of standard practices, 
results in the laboratory simplified environment call attention to the actual public good 
provision and impact on society as a whole. A natural extension of this work, that would also 
enable to test for result robustness to other settings, would be to use other types of money-
burning signals, including other types of public-good provisions. In particular, the question of 
the most relevant type of public good provision signaling in equity market might provide 
interesting insights of corporate finance and socially responsible investment literatures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can Private Equity Funds Foster CSR? 
142 
 
 
  
  
143 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE PRICE OF UNSUSTAINABILITY: AN EXPERIMENT WITH 
PROFESSIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS 
 
Do sustainable and unsustainable practices impact the access to equity 
financing? 
 
 
Abstract 
This last chapter sheds light on the impact sustainable and unsustainable corporate practices 
have on equity financing. We present a unique framed field experiment in which professional 
Private Equity investors compete in closed auctions to acquire fictive firms. We hence 
observe that corporate non-financial performance impacts firm valuation and investment 
decision and we quantify to which extent. Main result is an asymmetric effect, entrepreneurs 
having more to lose from unsustainable practices than to gain from sustainable ones. Our 
findings are discussed in terms of practical implications for both investors and firm managers. 
Résumé 
Ce dernier chapitre met en lumière l’impact que les pratiques durables et non durables des 
entreprises peuvent avoir sur leur financement en capitaux-propres. Nous présentons une 
expérience de terrain unique où des investisseurs en capital sont mis en compétition pour 
acquérir des entreprises fictives dans un contexte d’enchères fermées. Nous observons ainsi 
que la performance extra-financière des entreprises impacte les valorisations et décisions des 
investisseurs et nous quantifions dans quelle mesure. Le principal résultat est un effet 
asymétrique de la durabilité, les entrepreneurs ayant plus à perdre des pratiques non durables 
qu’à gagner des durables. Nos résultats sont discutés en termes d’implications pratiques pour 
les investisseurs et les manageurs d’entreprises. 
 
 
Chapter 5 is based on a working paper (same title) co-written with Patricia Crifo and Sabrina 
Teyssier submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. We thank the French Private Equity Association and 
Eurazeo PME for their help in the experimental design, and the French Asset Management 
Association.   
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The academic community has acknowledged that the past half-century wide gains in global 
economic development and human wealth creation has been achieved at the cost of 
environmental degradation, jeopardizing the sustainability of our economic systems (the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Dean and McMullen, 2007). In search for green 
growth foundations, an expanding body of literature investigates the role sustainable 
entrepreneurship can play (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and McMullen, 2007; Zahra et al., 
2009). Hall et al. (2010) review this academic field and underline research paths left open, 
such as the conditions under which entrepreneurs can pursue sustainable ventures, or the 
limits to entrepreneurs’ potential for creating sustainable economies. This chapter contributes 
to this literature by shedding light on the impact both sustainable and unsustainable corporate 
practices have on Private Equity financing. We indeed ask whether investors support 
sustainable entrepreneurs by preferentially providing them with the equity needed to ensure 
their growth.  
Most research focused on developing the ‘business cases’ for sustainable development 
(Parrish, 2010), that is motivating and legitimating firms’ sustainable orientations by potential 
profit making. Indeed, the impact of corporate social performance on economic performance 
has been largely studied in the business and economic literature (e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 
2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Crifo and Ponssard, 2010). In the most extensive literature meta-
analysis up-to-date, Margolis et al. (2009) conclude on the existence of a small, positive and 
significant relationship between firm financial and social performance. However, drivers and 
causality of this relationship are ambiguous and not well understood (Horváthová, 2010; 
Surroca et al., 2010). This chapter argues that the equity market reaction to corporate 
sustainable orientations is likely to be profit-oriented. Therefore, understanding how corporate 
social performance is perceived by investors in terms of value creation is not trivial for 
academics and remains core for entrepreneurs, including for sustainability entrepreneurs as 
defined by Parrish (2010)17. 
                                                             
17
 Parrish (2010) opposes conventional entrepreneurs to sustainability entrepreneurs. The former « view 
enterprises as a means of profiting from the exploitation of resources, with the underlying logic of using 
resources for one's own advantage to generate maximum financial returns in the shortest time possible ».The 
latter « view enterprises as a means of perpetuating resources, with the underlying logic of using human and 
natural resources in a way that enhances and maintains the quality of their functioning for the longest time 
possible ». 
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Hereby we take the standpoint of focusing specifically on how sustainable (or socially 
responsible) and unsustainable (or socially irresponsible) practices can respectively create and 
destroy firm value, that is create or destroy profits for the firm shareholders. More 
specifically, we aim at providing entrepreneurs with a quantified measure of whether their 
efforts to manage the “triple bottom line, that is balancing economic health, social equity and 
environmental resilience” (Kuckertz and Wagner, 2009) is rewarded by investors in terms of 
firm value and investment attractiveness. The literature highlights that entrepreneur’s 
engagement in sustainable practices may be profit-motivated, morally motivated or ethically 
grounded (Bryant, 2009; Harris et al., 2009). Here, whatever their original motivations, we 
explore how entrepreneurs may have a strong rationale for wanting to know whether engaging 
their firm on a sustainable path will create or destroy its market value and whether it will ease 
or not their access to equity. 
Firm value aggregates a large quantity of information on the company’s past, current and 
future cash flows and assets, both tangible and intangible. Many factors, often not directly 
available to researchers18, interweave in real life to build firm value, making it difficult to 
isolate the sole contribution of extra-financial performance in standard empirical analysis. A 
first research path consists in analyzing listed firms, whose values publicly result from stock 
market consensus. In this line, the socially responsible investment literature (see Renneboog 
et al., 2008 for a review) provides interesting insights using event studies (such as Takeda and 
Tomozawa, 2008) and empirical comparisons of socially responsible to conventional portfolio 
performance (Van de Velde et al., 2005; Galema et al., 2008).  
However, the backbone of our economies consists in non-listed firms19, for which no public 
price is available. The novelty of our approach is to provide an original analysis based on 
experimental economics, allowing us to quantify the contribution of sustainable practices to 
the value of non-listed firms. The experimental setting we rely on enables us to simplify the 
investing environment and control the information that grounds firm-value to focus on 
sustainability impact. The robustness of our methodology is grounded in the firm valuation 
expertise of the participants in our experiment.  
                                                             
18
 Examples of such factors include expected cash flows, management quality and intangible assets. 
19
 Unlisted firms have been shown to differ from public corporations, for instance in terms of capital structure 
(Romano et al., 2001) and shareholders protection (Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). They also undergo different 
legislation on extra-financial performance disclosure than public corporations. They encompass the large body of 
small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs), which are the largest GDP contributor and employer in Europe 
(Ecorys, 2011), and differ in their CSR from public corporations (Jenkins, 2004; Lepoutre and Heene; 2006). 
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Indeed, our experiment involves professional Private Equity investors (including both venture 
capital and buyouts specialists). Our motivation to recruit these specific investors was 
threefold. First, their business is to value and invest in unlisted firms, in particular small and 
medium size enterprises. On a theoretical level, they have been identified as highly efficient at 
maximizing shareholders’ value by reducing information asymmetry (Jensen, 1986, 1989), 
monitoring the companies they select (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and evaluating them 
better than a standard financial institution would (Ueda, 2004). Second, several authors 
pointed out that they already include in their valuation and investment decision non-financial 
criteria identified as core for business in the long run, such as the quality of management 
(Muzyka et al., 1996) or governance (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Wright et al., 2009), in 
particular for family firms (Dawson, 2009). Third, many entrepreneurs turn to Private Equity 
investors to get access to capital. Analyzing whether sustainable and unsustainable practices 
matter for those key investors in terms of firm valuation and investment decision is therefore a 
core issue in itself for entrepreneurs. 
Hence we present a framed field experiment with Private Equity investors and infer from their 
expertise explicit measures of over and underperformance in terms of sustainable practices. 
We formalize sustainable practices as CSR and decompose it into its three main pillars: 
Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) factors. Along each factor, we consider that the 
firm can implement either sustainable or unsustainable practices (sign, either positive or 
negative for society). Finally, we distinguish policies that are core for the business and 
mobilize resources (hard) from policies which are peripheral (soft), following a dichotomy 
suggested by Hannan and Freeman (1984) and Nicholls-Nixon et al. (2000). Our experimental 
design thus enables a focus on these three dimensions of corporate practices: factor (ESG), 
sign (positive, i.e. sustainable, or negative, i.e. unsustainable) and quality (soft or hard). 
Thirty three investors were involved in first-price sealed-bid auctions with embarrassment 
cost, a mechanism we formalize to demonstrate that it enables price revelation. Investors 
competed to acquire fictive firms based on case studies carefully built to ensure realism and 
credential context. Investors were provided with accounting and financial information, 
together with non-financial information as the experiment progressed. We intentionally 
manipulated the non-financial details in order to obtain investors’ valuation revision for each 
factor, sign and quality independently.  
Our results on 330 observations highlight that non-financial performance matters for Private 
Equity financing. We control for investor heterogeneity and observe that firm valuations and 
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investment decisions are both impacted by the factor (ESG), sign (sustainable or 
unsustainable) and quality (hard or soft) of corporate practices, and we quantify to which 
extent. Main finding is the existence of an asymmetrical effect of non-financial performance, 
entrepreneurs having more to lose from unsustainable practices than to gain from sustainable 
ones.  
When investors’ heterogeneity is controlled for, our results unveil that unsustainable policies 
(cumulating soft and hard practices) decrease firm valuation by respectively 11%, 10% and 
15% for environmental, social, and governance issues. Sustainable environmental and social 
policies only increase firm valuation by 5%, governance having no significant impact. 
Whether the corporate practice is core (hard) or peripheral (soft) for the business essentially 
matters in the case of unsustainable practices. We also observe that unsustainable practices 
decrease investment likelihood by about 30%. The decrease only occurs for hard 
environmental and social issues, whereas all governance issues (both soft and hard) matter for 
investors, highlighting the specificity of this CSR dimension. We conclude that unsustainable 
corporate policies might both prevent equity financing and increase its cost, sustainability thus 
consisting in a defensive strategy to protect firm value and equity access.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 details the experimental 
design, procedures used and the incentive mechanism of the first-price auction with 
embarrassment cost. Results are presented in Section 5.3 and their practical implications for 
investors and entrepreneurs are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes by suggesting 
potential research extensions.  
 
5.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
We first present our experiment design in subsection 5.2.1 before detailing procedures in 
subsection 5.2.2. The experiment was built and conducted in partnership with professional 
associations20
 
 in order to ensure realism, credent context and participants’ involvement. It is 
designed to quantitatively measure investors’ pricing of corporate sustainability based on 
                                                             
20
 The Sustainable Club of the French Private Equity Association provided financial, technical and logistic 
support to build the case studies, recruit participants and run the experimental sessions. We affirm that our 
research was conducted in full independence and that our professional partners neither interfered in our study nor 
in our results. 
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first-price sealed-bid auctions with embarrassment cost. We discuss the choice of this auction 
mechanism and prove that it is incentive compatible in subsection 5.2.3.  
 
5.2.1. DESIGN 
 
The design encompasses four treatments based on three fictive case studies carefully built 
with professional Private Equity investors. Each treatment uses two case studies and evaluates 
a different set of extra-financial performance in terms of factor, sign, and quality.  
Factor deals with the focus of the policy, which can target any of the multiple actions 
encompassed in CSR, from waste reduction to proactive human resources management. 
Following business and academic practices in use
21
, we categorize corporate policies within 
the three pillars of CSR: Environment (E), Social (S) and Governance (G). Sign can be 
positive (+) or negative (-), meaning that the firm respectively over-performs (sustainable 
practices) or underperforms (unsustainable practices) its industry non-financial performance 
standards on a given factor. Finally, the corporate practice can either be core for the firm 
business (“hard practice”) or peripheral (“soft practice”), defined by the bearing on firm 
resource mobilization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000). We qualify 
this property as the corporate practice quality and refer to it as “hard” (++ or --) or “soft” (+ or 
-).  
Each of the three case studies corresponds to a fictive firm that needs Private Equity 
financing. Various industries, firm sizes and financial performances (investment 
attractiveness) are used across cases. Table 5.1 summarizes the characteristics of the case 
studies, which are detailed in Appendix D.1. Each case study uses two different factors with 
different signs. For each factor and sign (for instance: sustainable environmental policy), we 
always evaluate the effects on investors’ decisions of successively a soft practice (e.g. energy 
saving at the holding building level) and a hard practice (e.g. change in the production process 
to reduce toxic waste). We thus measure the effects of a soft practice, a hard practice, and the 
total cumulative impact of both, which we assimilate to the effect of a global policy.  
                                                             
21
 For business and market practices in use, the reader can refer to the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investing (http://www.unpri.org/), US SIF (http://ussif.org/)  and EUROSIF (http://www.eurosif.org/); for 
academic literature reviews on CSR and SRI to Crifo and Ponssard (2010), Reinhardt et al. (2008), Renneboog et 
al. (2008). 
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Treatments combine case studies in order to independently test investor decisions when 
confronted to various extra-financial performance levels. Treatments 1, 2 and 3 test all 
combinations of factors and signs. Treatment 4 ensures that the sequence of information 
(learning first about the firm’s sustainable practices and then about its unsustainable ones; or 
the reverse way) does not impact investors’ decisions. Figure 5.1 displays the experiment 
design and details the information evaluated by participants in each treatment.  
 
5.2.2. PROCEDURES 
 
Participants were recruited by professional association emailing and directly registered online. 
We run one session per treatment (hence four sessions) with 6 to 11 participants. Treatments 1 
to 3 were conducted in the French Private Equity Association office; treatment 4 was 
conducted via an internet website for participants who could not attend the previous sessions. 
The 33 participants were all professional Private Equity investors (their profile is detailed in 
section 5.3.1). 
In each session, the sequence of events was as follows. First, participants signed an agreement 
form that ensured anonymity and confidentiality. They were explained the rules of the 
experiment (available in Appendix D.3). They were given the first case study, similar in its 
format and content to a real business deal offer. Data provided encompassed business 
description, history, key market indicators, accounting data, business-plan with expected 
future cash-flows, comparable transactions and multiples, and a firm price benchmark based 
on different weighted average cost of capital. After analyzing this information, investors 
wrote down their firm valuation and whether they wanted to invest or not in it.  
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FIGURE 5.1 - Experiment design 
Four treatments were tested. Two case studies were done by treatment, using information on Environmental (E), 
Social (S) or Governance (G). Information is either positive (+) or negative (-), and either soft (+ and -) or hard 
(++ and --). Each participant underwent the 10 steps of information of a single treatment. 
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TABLE 5.1 - Characteristics of the three case studies used in  the experiment 
 
Case 
Study 
 Sector  Number of 
Employees 
 Factor  Sign Quality Policy 
Firm A  Catering  1600  Social  + soft Employee training & career 
development 
      hard Working conditions & 
remuneration 
   Environment  - soft Environmental footprint 
monitoring 
      hard Environmental performance 
of supply chain 
           
Firm B  Packaging  227  Environment  + soft Environmental footprint 
monitoring 
      hard Eco-design 
   Governance  - soft Organization of authority 
delegation 
      hard Organization of board of 
directors 
           
Firm C  Electronic 
Components 
 2608  Governance  + soft Organization of authority 
delegation 
      hard Organization of board of 
directors 
   Social  - soft Employee training & 
remuneration 
       hard Working conditions & 
remuneration 
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Once all investors in the session had done so, new extra-financial information was 
progressively given to them, as would occur in an auditing process. They sequentially 
received four new pieces of extra-financial information of different sign, quality and factors 
(see Figure 5.1, steps 1 to 5). For each new piece of information, participants could either 
revise their firm valuation and investment decision or not. Altogether, each investor thus 
valued five times the first case study. Our interest lays in the change of decisions between the 
first valuation (our baseline) and the four decisions that follow. Investors could also write 
comments on their decisions, providing us with qualitative data. 
Once the first case study was completed, the second case study was given to investors and the 
same rules applied (Figure 5.1, steps 6 to 10). We thus gathered 330 observations (330 firm 
valuations and 330 investment decisions) as well as detailed qualitative data. Once the second 
case study was completed, participants fulfilled a short questionnaire eliciting their socio-
economic characteristics, understanding, strategy, ESG training, beliefs on ESG factors as 
well as intrinsic preferences such as risk aversion (full questionnaire is available in Appendix 
D.4). On average, sessions lasted about 90 minutes. 
 
5.2.3. INCENTIVES MECHANISM 
 
The experimental design is based on first-price sealed-bid auctions with embarrassment cost. 
We here discuss the efficiency of this mechanism at revealing investors’ true firm valuation. 
In a first-price sealed-bid auction, each investor independently submits a single bid without 
seeing others’ bids. The firm is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid (the winner), 
who pays her bid. First-price sealed-bid auctions with a limited amount of bidders 
(“controlled sales”) are a widespread bidding process among Private Equity investors (Boone 
et al., 2009, Fidrmuc et al., 2012). Deal values usually stay private information and research 
on the topic thus often resorts to survey data (Hsu, 2004). First-price sealed-bid auctions have 
been well documented both theoretically (Klemperer, 2004, p.12) and experimentally (for a 
survey see Kagel, 1995). Two downsides of our experimental auction need offsetting: 
obviously, there is no actual firm to acquire in our experiment; and conversely, participants 
would not be asked to spend large amounts of cash. The auction game is therefore built to 
psychologically trigger participants’ price revelation.  
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First, to ensure saliency, we use two incentives: a monetary incentive, as the winner can earn 
a prize equivalent to 120€ (which consisted in three bottles of Champagne of a French luxury 
brand); and a reputational incentive, as the auction winner is announced publicly. Second, to 
offset the absence of monetary cost for the auction winner, we rely on the embarrassment of 
winning with too high a bid that was identified by Klemperer (2002). Beyond cash flow waste 
(which does not occur in our setting), winning with too high a bid causes embarrassment cost 
as it suggests incompetence. We spur further this embarrassment cost in a threefold way: (i) 
our case studies provide investors with a common price range for the firm valuation 
(depending on their choice of Weighted Average Cost of Capital; see Appendix D.1), which 
they can use as a benchmark; (ii) the winner’s firm valuation is made public, so that all 
participants know if the winning bid is too high; and (iii), we introduce a penalty in the first-
price sealed bid auction. Indeed, if the winner’s bid is too high, we openly state that she made 
a “bad deal” and she loses her prize. A winning bid is defined as “too high” if it exceeds 10 
percent of the market consensus, calculated as the median of all valuations
22
.  
Drawing on Klemperer (2004, p. 68), we formalize the first-price sealed-bid auction with 
embarrassment cost and demonstrate that this mechanism enables the revelation of investors’ 
true firm valuation. We consider n risk-neutral investors
23
 whose firm valuations vi are 
independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1], with distribution function 
denoted by F(v) and density function denoted by f(v). With a uniform distribution on [      ] 
we have )/(1)(),/()()( vvvfvvvvvF  .  
Investor i's utility    from winning the auction with bid bi equals: 
               (     (  ))    (1) 
where vi denotes her true firm valuation, m(bj) the median of all j bids, and the term 
proportional to parameter k reflects the embarrassment of winning with too high a bid, that is 
                                                             
22
 The choice of the median is based on perceptions within the sector as well as the 10 percent interval that 
corresponds to the estimated bargaining on the real market. 
23
 Klemperer (2004, p.19) notes that in first-price auction, risk-aversion make bidders bid more aggressively. 
Risk aversion in first-price auction has received major attention by the experimental community: for instance, 
see Neugebauer and Perote (2008) for a recent contribution showing the limits of over-bidding. In our 
experiment, participants appear fairly risk-neutral (see section 3.1 and Appendix D.2). 
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disutility for a winner to lose the monetary prize and to be known to make a bad deal. A non-
winner's utility is zero
24
. 
We are going to determine the players’ expected payments and the equilibrium bidding 
strategies. Let denote by )~(vb  the bidding strategy that player i is supposed to follow in the 
equilibrium of the game induced by the incentives mechanism ( v~ denotes the corresponding 
type of player i). We denote by     bidder i's expected utility from behaving as type v
~  given 
her opponents. The expected payment of a bidder of type v~  is defined as the probability of 
winning the auction in the equilibrium (pi( v
~ )), times the expectation of ui conditional on the 
remaining (n-1) values being below v~ :  ijvvuEvpEU jiii  ,~)~( . 
In any mechanism which always gives the object to the highest-value bidder in equilibrium, 
the probability of winning the auction is simply pi( v
~ )=(F( v~ ))n-1, with F(.) the distribution 
function, since a bidder’s probability of winning is the probability that all the other (n-1) 
bidders have lower values than she does. With a uniform distribution on [0,1], we have F( v~
)= v~ , therefore pi( v
~ )= v~ n-1.     then writes:  
   ijvvbmEvbkvbvvEU jjini   ,~)()~()~(~ 1     (2) 
Bidder i's optimal bidding choice of  ̃ satisfies        ̃    that is: 
   
    0,~)(~/)~(')~('~
,~)()~()~(~)1(
1
2




ijvvbmEvvbkvbv
ijvvbmEvbkvbvvn
jj
n
jji
n
    (3) 
To simplify our computations and obtain analytical results, we assume following Klemperer 
(2004, p.215) that there is a linear equilibrium so that: b(v)= ×v. We are searching for the 
equilibrium bidding strategy b(v), which in a linear equilibrium amounts to determining the 
equilibrium value of . Equilibrium bidding strategies are symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
which a bidder with value v chooses the bid b(v). Consider that player i with value v deviates 
and chooses the bid b
~
, and let v~  be the type of bidder she would just tie with, that is: 
bvb
~
)~(  . Mimicking v~  would beat all the other (n-1) bidders with probability 
1))~(( nvF  and 
yield expected surplus to player i 
1))~(()~,(  nvFvvEU . Choosing the best bid to make is thus 
                                                             
24
 In the basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue equivalence and marginal revenues apply (see Klemperer, 
2004).  In a framework in which the object always goes to the buyer with the highest value and bidders with 
lowest values expect zero surplus, any mechanism that allocates a unit among the bidders yields the same 
expected revenue. 
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equivalent to choosing the best v~  to mimic which is computed as the first-order condition 
       ̃   . In turn, for the bidding function b(v) to be an equilibrium, i’s best response to 
all other biddings according to this function must be to do likewise, that is, her optimal choice 
of b
~
 is b(v) and of v~  is v. We thus have  ̃        in our (symmetric Nash) equilibrium. 
Conditional on vi being the highest value, the other n-1 values are uniformly distributed on [0, 
vi] so, using the property of the uniform distribution, the expected value of the median of 
these (which is what i would expect to pay conditional on winning) is vi/2: 
 [ (  ) |              ]           (4) 
Using b(v) = ×v and   ̃        and substituting for equation (4) into equation (3), we get: 
0
2
1
2
)1( 12 

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
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i    (5) 
That is we obtain the following equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi)= ×vi with: 
  (
   
 
 
 
 
)  (   )     (6) 
And bidder i's unconditional expected utility is given by: 
       
   [         [        ]]     
       (7)  
 
The result of this simple first-price auction with embarrassment cost shows that     is 
independent of k. Since the highest type wins, the lowest type makes zero surplus. For all k, 
the other conditions for revenue equivalence are satisfied and the bidders are equally well off.  
What matters for the experiment is that when the embarrassment cost ( ) increases, the 
equilibrium bidding strategy (b(vi)) converges toward the median valuation (vi/2). In other 
words, the risk of winning the auction with too high a bid depresses investors’ firm valuations 
towards the market consensus. Assuming the reputational and monetary incentives we 
implemented are salient, the embarrassment cost is very high in the experimental auction. 
Therefore our first-price sealed-bid auction design enables the revelation of investors’ real 
firm valuation.  
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5.3. RESULTS 
 
We first present participants’ main characteristics in section 5.3.1, then results on the impact 
of corporate extra-financial performance on investors’ firm valuation in section 5.3.2, before 
analyzing the impact on investment decisions in section 5.3.3. Table 5.2 summarizes 
descriptive statistics on experimental results. Full descriptive statistics, detailed by treatment 
and firm, can be found in Appendix D.5 (Table D.5.1). 
 
5.3.1. PARTICIPANTS’ PROFILE 
 
Following our questionnaire’s answers, participants in our experiment are professional and 
experienced Private Equity investors (39 years old in average). They work in different 
segments of Private Equity (venture and seed capital 33%, growth capital 24% and leveraged 
buyouts 52%
25
) and at different posts (chairman 21%, partner 21%, investment director 12%, 
investment manager 40% and specialists of socially responsible investments 6%). 73% are 
men and 48% have received some kind of training on the management of ESG issues. Results 
of a simple lottery (see question 10 in Appendix D.4) allows us to estimate participants’ risk 
aversion. Compared to usual experimental participants (Holt and Laury, 2002), they appear 
fairly risk-neutral and less risk-averse than usual experimental participants (see figure D.2.3. 
in Appendix D.2). Detailed participant descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix D.2. In 
the following analysis, we control for investor heterogeneity using these variables.  
 
5.3.2. RESULTS ON FIRM VALUATION 
 
A first element worth noting is the consistency of firm valuation between sessions, which 
supports the expertise of our participants, the efficiency of the auction mechanism and the 
robustness of our results. Between sessions, Firm A base mean valuation was 151.8 M€ with a 
35.2M€ standard error (that is 23%); 37.8M€ with a 6.9 M€ standard error (18%) for firm B; 
and 514.8M€ with a 114.3M€ standard error for firm C (23%) (see Table 5.2). 70% of the 
winners received their prize for firm A and 50% for firm B and C, meaning most winning 
                                                             
25
 Some participants worked in two segments, explaining why total exceeds 100% 
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valuations were within 10% of the median valuation. Also supporting results consistency, we 
can note that most valuations (respectively 67%, 100% and 63% valuations for firms A, B and 
C) were within the firm valuation range we had provided in the case studies (see Appendix 
D.1). 
For the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the relative change in investors’ firm valuation 
between information steps (in %) rather than the absolute firm valuation (in M€). The 
heterogeneity of investors’ valuations in Step 1, that is based on sole financial data, is 
therefore controlled for in the analysis. Table 5.3 presents the mean of the relative change in 
investors’ firm valuation depending on factor, sign and quality. Statistical significance of the 
observed changes is assessed by the p-values yielded by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, which compares the mean of the relative valuation change to zero. Figure 5.2 
summarizes these data.  
Descriptive statistics (Table 5.2) and the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the 
mean changes in firm valuation (Table 5.3) indicate that sustainable and unsustainable 
practices all impact firm valuation whatever their factor, sign and quality.
26 
 Unsustainable 
environmental, social and governance policies (cumulating soft and hard practices) appear to 
significantly decrease investors’ firm valuation by respectively 11.6%, 10.5% and 15.3% (all 
p-values <0.01); whereas sustainable ones only increase it by 5.0%, 5.5% and 2.0% (all p-
values < 0.05) (Table 3). Most of the unsustainable policy effect appears driven by hard (that 
is core for the business) practices.  
 
 
  
                                                             
26
 Only the impact of positive hard governance practice is not significant at the level of 10%. 
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TABLE 5.2 - Descriptive statistics on experimental results 
a 
 
Firm  Corporate practice  Valuation (M€)  Investment decision 
(%) 
  factor Sign & 
quality 
Obs.  Mean 
b
 
 
Median. Min. Max.  Mean 
b
 
 
A  Base  24  151.8 (35.2) 160.0 81 242  0.75 (0.44) 
  Social + 24  151.1 (35.2) 160.0 81 220  0.75 (0.44) 
   ++ 24  152.2 (35.6) 162.5 81 220  0.71 (0.46) 
  Env. - 24  150.0 (34.7) 160.0 81 220  0.75 (0.44) 
   - - 24  137.5 (27.4) 137.5 81 180  0.46 (0.51) 
              
B  Base  26  37.8 (6.8) 38.2 20 50  0.65 (0.49) 
  Env. + 26  36.6 (8.3) 37.9 15 50  0.69 (0.47) 
   ++ 26  37.9 (9.4) 39.3 15 58  0.81 (0.40) 
  Gov. - 26  37.3 (8.0) 37.5 20 56  0.61 (0.50) 
   - - 26  33.8 (8.9) 33.0 15 50  0.46 (0.51) 
              
C  Base  16  514.8 (114.3) 500.0 280 747  0.94 (0.25) 
  Gov. + 16  522.8 (119.3) 505.0 280 747  0.94 (0.25 
   ++ 16  526.7 (124.7) 506.5 280 750  1.00 (0.00) 
  Social - 16  508.2 (114.7) 497.5 280 740  0.88 (0.34) 
   - - 16  467.5 (117.3) 450.0 275 700  0.50 (0.52) 
a 
Provided by firm case study (A, B or C) and by corporate practice factor (Environment, Social or Governance), 
sign and quality (“+” sustainable soft practice; “++” sustainable hard practice; “-“ unsustainable soft practice; “--
“ unsustainable hard practice). Base (italic figures) is the first investment round, in which investors’ decisions 
are taken based on sole financial data.  
b
 Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
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FIGURE 5.2 - Impact on firm valuation 
Mean impact (%) of corporate sustainable (Positive hard “++”) and unsustainable (Negative hard “- -“) practices 
on investors’ firm valuation depending on the policy factor: Social (left), Governance (middle) and Environment 
(right) 
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TABLE 5.3 - Experimental effects of corporate policies on the mean changes in firm 
valuation and investment decision a 
Factor Sign
b
 Quality # obs. Mean change in 
firm valuation (%) 
c
 
Mean change in investment 
decision (%) 
c
 
Environment Negative  24 -11.57 ***  -29.17 *** 
  Soft - 24 -3.36 * 0.00  
  Hard -- 24 -8.08 *** -29.17 *** 
        
 Positive  26 4.95 *** 11.54 * 
  Soft + 26 1.69 ** 0.00  
  Hard ++  26 3.20 *** 11.54 * 
        
Social Negative  16 -10.47 ** -50.00 *** 
  Soft - 16 -2.98 ** -12.50  
  Hard -- 16 -7.95 ** -37.50 ** 
        
 Positive  24 5.49 *** -4.17  
  Soft + 24 3.95 ** -4.17  
  Hard ++ 24 1.48 ** 0.00  
        
Governance Negative  26 -15.26 *** -30.77 ** 
  Soft - 26 -5.80 *** -15.39      
  Hard -- 26 -10.07 *** -15.39  
        
 Positive  16 2.03 ** 6.03  
  Soft + 16 1.43 ** 0.00      
  Hard ++ 16 0.60  6.03      
a 
Mean relative change in respectively firm valuation and investment decision when investors learn about 
corporate extra-financial performance, depending on the corporate practice factor (Environment, Social or 
Governance), sign (Negative, i.e. unsustainable; or Positive, i.e. sustainable) and quality (hard or soft practice). 
b
 The mean change in firm valuation and investment decision calculated by Sign (italic) represents the 
cumulative effect of both the soft and hard practices, that is the effect of a global sustainable or unsustainable 
policy.  
c
 Statistical significance is given by Wilcoxon signed-rank test (H0: Mean of change = 0): *** p<0.001; ** 
p<0.005 * p<0.010  
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However, heterogeneity in investors’ socio-economic characteristics, experience and 
preferences may affect their decisions and bias those results. To control for this heterogeneity 
and for the repetition of valuations for each investor, we use panel regression models and 
econometrically analyze the effects of sustainable corporate policy (Table 5.4) and 
unsustainable corporate policy (Table 5.5) on firm valuation change depending on factor and 
quality.  
In both tables, models 1 and 2 are GLS models with random effects in which investors’ age, 
gender, specialty (venture capital; buyouts; expansion capital; socially responsible 
investments), and training on ESG issues management are controlled for. We also control for 
the order in which the case studies were given as well as whether the session was run on the 
internet or not. Models 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects, hence directly 
controlling for investors’ heterogeneity, and are used as robustness check. Models 1 and 1’ 
explain the firm valuation change between rounds 1 – 3, 3 – 5, 6 – 8 and 8 – 10 and test the 
effects of corporate policy factor (ESG). They thus provide estimates of the cumulative effect 
of hard and soft practices on a given factor. Models 2 and 2’ explain the firm valuation 
change between each round and estimate the crossed effects of factor and quality. They thus 
distinguish the effects of soft and hard practices for any given factor. As a robustness check, 
table D.5.2. in Appendix D.5 provides other estimations using crossed effects of sign, factor 
and quality. 
Let us first focus on the effects of sustainable practices on firm valuation change (Table 5.4). 
Sustainable environmental and social policies (cumulating soft and hard practices) led to a 
significant increase in firm value of respectively 4.7% and 5.4% in Model 1; 4.6% and 5.9% 
in Model 1’ (all p-values<0.01). Positive Governance has no significant impact in our data. 
We now distinguish core from peripheral practices (Models 2 and 2’, Table 5.4). Once 
sustainable policies are separated into soft and hard practices, the effects that remain 
significant are the effect of hard environmental practice (3.2% and 3.1% in Model 2 and 2’, p-
value<0.01) and the effect of soft positive social practice (3.8% in Model 2 and 4.1% in 
Model 2’, p-value<0.01). In all random-effect models, investors’ intrinsic characteristics do 
not have significant effect on firm valuation change. 
Let us now focus on the effects of unsustainable practices on firm valuation change (Table 
5.5). Unsustainable environment, social and governance policies (cumulating soft and hard 
practices) respectively decrease firm value by -11.2%, -10.6% and -15.1% in Model 1; and -
11.7%, -10.7% and -14.6% in Model 1’ (Table 5.5; all p-values<0.01). When we separate the 
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effects of soft and hard practices (Models 2 and 2’), we find that both significantly reduce 
firm value, but hard practices have a significant larger impact (tests of equality between 
coefficients for each factor: p-value<0.05). Soft unsustainable practices decrease firm value 
by -3.5% (p-value<0.05), -3.1% (p-value<0.10), and -5.7% (p-value<0.01) for respectively 
environment, social and governance issues in Model 2 (-3.8%, -3.1% and -5.3% in Model 2’), 
whereas hard unsustainable practices respectively lead to a -8.2%, -8.0% and -9.9% decrease 
in Model 2 (all p-values<0.01; decrease of -8.5%, -8.1% and -9.6% in Model 2’).  
Three investors’ intrinsic characteristics appear to impact their change in firm valuation when 
they learn about unsustainable practices: gender, Private Equity segment and specialization in 
socially responsible investments. Change in firm valuation is less important for women than 
for men (+3.6%, model 1, p-value<0.05). A close look at data reveals that they do not 
increase their firm valuation when they learn about unsustainable practices, but rather have a 
smaller reaction than men. Growth expansion investors penalize more strongly firm value 
than investors specialized in venture capital or buyouts (-3.5%, model 1, p-value<0.10). 
Finally, the two socially responsible investments specialists of our sample also have a 
stronger reaction (-11.4%, model 1 p-value<0.01).  
To summarize, results show that unsustainable corporate policies significantly decrease firm 
value whereas sustainable ones significantly increase it (except for governance), yet with a 
lesser magnitude. 
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TABLE 5.4 - Effects of corporate sustainable policies on the change in firm valuation
a
 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1’ d Model 2 c Model 2' d 
Env. 4.74 *** (1.21) 4.59 *** (1.26)       
Soc. 5.38 *** (1.25) 5.85 *** (1.31)       
Gov. 2.48  (1.48) 2.01  (1.57)       
Env x soft       1.66 * (0.98) 1.57  (1.01) 
Env x hard       3.18 *** (0.98) 3.08 *** (1.01) 
Soc x soft       3.73 *** (1.02) 4.05 *** (1.05) 
Soc x hard       1.30  (1.01) 1.61  (1.05) 
Gov x soft       1.79  (1.19) 1.47  (1.24) 
Gov x hard       0.97  (1.19) 0.65  (1.24) 
Case study order 0.53  (0.92) 0.56  (0.95) -0.45  (0.62) 0.20  (0.63) 
Internet session 0.42  (1.35)    0.35  (0.90)    
Investor age 0.02  (0.05)    0.01  (0.03) 
   
Investor gender -0.76  (1.09)    -0.47  (0.72) 
   
Venture capital 0.31  (1.78)    0.20  (1.18) 
   
Buyout 0.54  (1.53)    0.35  (1.01) 
   
Expansion 
capital 
-0.24  (1.47)    -0.17  (0.98) 
   
SRI 5.40  (2.67)    3.69  (1.77) 
   
ESG training -0.47  (0.95)    -0.30  (0.63) 
   
Obs. 132   132   198   198 
  
Nb. investors 33   33   33   33   
Wald chi2 39.11 ***     31.99 ***     
F-test    6.88 ***     3.00 ***  
R² (within) 0.22   0.22   0.12   0.12 
  
a
 We only test here the effects of policies of Positive Sign. Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) 
between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. Sustainable corporate policy effects are decomposed 
into factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and quality (soft or hard). Figures in brackets are standard errors. * p-value< 
10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1%. 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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TABLE 5.5 - Effects of corporate unsustainable policies on the change in firm valuation
a
 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1’ d Model 2 c Model 2' d 
Env. -11.20 *** (1.80) -11.65 *** (1.83)       
Soc. -10.56 *** (2.11) -10.66 *** (2.17)       
Gov. -15.09 *** (1.72) -14.61 *** (1.75)       
Env x soft       -3.47 ** (1.48) -3.79 ** (1.49) 
Env x hard       -8.19 *** (1.48) -8.51 *** (1.49) 
Soc x soft       -3.06 * (1.73) -3.11 * (1.77) 
Soc x hard       -8.04 *** (1.73) -8.08 *** (1.77) 
Gov x soft       -5.64 *** (1.43) -5.32 *** (1.44) 
Gov x hard       -9.91 *** (1.43) -9.59 *** (1.44) 
Case study order 0.13  (1.32) 0.00  (1.31) 0.09  (0.90) -0.03  (0.90) 
Internet session -2.17  (1.94)    -1.47  (1.39)    
Investor age 0.13 * (0.07)    0.09 * (0.05) 
   
Investor gender 3.56 ** (1.56)    2.47 ** (1.12) 
   
Venture capital -2.95  (2.56)    -2.26  (1.83) 
   
Buyout -2.25  (2.19)    -1.73  (1.57) 
   
Expansion capital -3.49 * (2.12)    -2.56 * (1.51) 
   
SRI -11.36 *** (3.83)    -8.74 *** (2.74) 
   
ESG training 0.26  (1.36)    0.26  (0.97) 
   
Obs. 132   132   198   198 
  
Nb. investors 33   33   33   33   
Wald chi2 128.81 ***     101.25 ***     
F-test    24,95 ***     10.21 ***  
R² (within) 0.51   0.51   0.31   0.31 
  
a
 We only test here the effects of policies of Negative Sign. Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) 
between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. Unsustainable corporate policy effects are 
decomposed into factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and quality (soft or hard). Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
* p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1%. 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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5.3.3. RESULTS ON INVESTORS’ INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
 
Let us now focus on the impact of corporate policies on investment decisions. Table 5.2 
presents the mean change in investment decision depending on corporate practice factor, sign 
and quality, that is the share of investors (in %) who revise their previous decision and either 
stop or start investing in the firm when they learn about its sustainability performance. As for 
mean change in firm valuation, statistical significance of the observed changes is assessed by 
the p-values yielded by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
In our experiment, unsustainable policies (cumulating both soft and hard practices) reduce the 
investment likelihood by respectively -29.2%, -50.0% and -30.8% for environment, social and 
governance issues (p-values<0.01, Table 5.2). Most of the effects seem driven by hard 
practices, governance put apart. For all factors, soft practices do not stand out as sufficient to 
influence the decision to invest. Sustainable policies do not appear to significantly increase 
the investment decision, except for environment (+10.4%, p-value<0.10; Table 5.2).  
As for firm valuation, the decision to invest or not in a firm depends on investors’ 
heterogeneity in terms of preferences and style. To explain investment decision while 
controlling for this heterogeneity, we use random-effect logistic model (Model 3) in Table 5.6 
(a fixed-effect model 3’ is tested as a robustness test and presented in table D.5.3. in 
Appendix D.5). Controls in Model 3 are similar to those used to explain the relative change in 
firm valuation in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. As estimates cannot be directly interpreted, predictive 
margins are calculated. They provide the predicted probabilities of deciding to invest knowing 
the factor and quality of the corporate practice, assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. for an 
average investor). 
Results confirm that only unsustainable practices significantly change the investment 
decision. They also confirm that only hard unsustainable practices matter in this regard for 
environmental and social issues (both p-values <0.01). Governance stands out, both soft (p-
value<0.10) and hard (p-value<0.01) unsustainable practices reducing the investment decision 
(p-value<0.01). Predictive margins also highlight that, among the ESG factors, governance 
has the largest impact on the investment decision in terms of magnitude.  
 
 
.   
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TABLE 5.6 - Effects of corporate sustainability policies on investment decision  
a
 
 Sustainable practices  Unsustainable practices 
 
Model 1
 b  
 Predictive 
Margins 
 Model 1
 b  
 Predictive 
Margins 
 
Env x soft -0.76 
 
(0.87) 0.74 *** 
 
0.37 
 
(0.75) 0.86 *** 
 
Env x hard 0.86 
 
(0.95) 0.87 *** 
 
-1.84 *** (0.66) 0.50 *** 
 
Soc x soft -0.27 
 
(0.83) 0.79 *** 
 
0.77 
 
(1.02) 0.90 *** 
 
Soc x hard -0.26 
 
(0.83) 0.79 *** 
 
-2.26 *** (0.81) 0.41 *** 
 
Gov x soft 2.06 
 
(1.35) 0.94 *** 
 
-1.25 * (1.67) 0.61 *** 
 
Gov x hard
 d
 21.85 
 
(15270) 1.00 *** 
 
-2.27 *** (0.69) 0.41 *** 
 
          
  
 
Case study order -0.12 
 
(0.59) 
   
0.44 * (0.43)   
 
Internet session -4.49 ** (1.28) 
   
-1.52 
 
(1.17)   
 
Investor age -0.11 
 
(0.09) 
   
0.00 
 
(0.04)   
 
Investor gender 0.66 
 
(1.74) 
   
-1.07 
 
(0.94)   
 
Venture capital -2.70 
 
(2.48) 
   
-1.16 
 
(1.48)   
 
Buyout -4.92 ** (2.37) 
   
-2.37 * (1.30)   
 
Expansion capital -2.46 
 
(1.94) 
   
-1.14 
 
(1.25)   
 
SRI -5.27 
 
(3.42) 
   
-2.53 
 
(2.21)   
 
ESG training 2.55 
 
(1.54) 
   
0.30 
 
(0.80)   
 
Obs. 198 
     
198 
  
  
 
Nb. investors 33 
     
33 
  
  
 
Wald chi2 11.77 
     
23.17 * 
 
  
 
log_likelihood -61.53           -96.89         
a
 Effects of sustainable (Sign = positive) and unsustainable (Sign = negative) corporate policies on the 
investment decision (0 = don’t’ invest; 1 = invest) depending on their factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and quality 
(soft or hard). * p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1%. 
b  
Model 3 is a random effects logistic regression.  
c 
 Predictive margins are the predicted probability of deciding to invest knowing the sign, factor, and quality, 
assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. that it is an average investor). 
d
 All observations  = 1 when Factor =  Governance, Sign = Positive and Quality = Hard. 
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5.4. DISCUSSION 
 
Experimental findings show that corporate sustainability impacts Private Equity investors’ 
firm valuation and investment decision. However, sustainable and unsustainable policies 
asymmetrically affect Private Equity financing, entrepreneurs having more to lose from the 
latter than to gain from the former. We also observe that investors care for the content of the 
corporate sustainability policy: environmental, social and governance issues do not equally 
matter, Governance appearing specific. The quality of the corporate practice (whether it is 
core (hard) or peripheral (soft) for the firm) also matters.  
Our results are consistent with earlier studies (on listed firms) showing that companies with 
better ESG performance tend to face significant lower capital constraints. El Ghoul et al. 
(2011) show for instance that investment in responsible employee relations and environmental 
policies contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity, whereas participation in 
“sin” industries (tobacco and nuclear power) increases firms’ cost of equity.  
We discuss in this section the consequences of our results for investors and entrepreneurs, 
taking into account qualitative data. Indeed, many participants (20 out of 33) wrote down the 
justifications of their valuations and investment decisions, shedding light on their 
understanding and use of the ESG criteria in Private Equity. 
 
5.4.1. SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS 
 
As could be expected from such participants, most investors integrated the extra-financial 
information in standard financial tools. For instance, they estimated the cost of upgrading 
poor environmental management systems and impacted that cost in the firm business plan and 
future cash flows. Cost estimations were often approximated, investors indicating they would 
require additional auditing to confirm their valuation. Poor extra-financial performance thus 
enabled them to lower the firm price during the acquisition stage. However, numerous 
comments indicated that they expected to be able to generate profits by improving this poor 
extra-financial performance. Conversely, sustainable practices already implemented were not 
expected to create additional value. As put by a participant, they were “considered intrinsic to 
quality management and expected by the board”. 
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Investors’ qualitative comments also pointed out that our estimation of unsustainability 
impact on investment decisions (about -30%) is likely biased upward by our experimental 
design. Indeed, most investors would not actually have rejected the investment (as they did in 
the experiment, as they had no alternative), but would have rather asked for complementary 
audits and dues diligences in a real investment. Whereas the high rejection rates we observed 
might be overestimated, unsustainable practices appear likely to increase Private Equity 
investors’ demands in terms of dues diligences and eventually shareholders’ pact. 
Our results also highlight that the content of the corporate sustainability policy matters for 
investors, both in terms of quality and factor. The importance of the environment and social 
practice quality (soft or hard) appears in line with the pointed-out financial and quantitative 
approach of extra-financial performance by Private Equity investors. Indeed, hard practices in 
our experiment were designed to be core to the firm business, bearing on resource 
mobilization, hence having stronger accounting impact. Among the ESG factors, governance 
stands out as having strong effects on firm valuation and investment decision when negative 
(for both soft and hard practice), and none when positive. Governance is indeed a specific 
issue in the Private Equity industry. As significant shareholders, Private Equity investors are 
usually deeply involved in the firm governance, when they do not have complete control of 
the board. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) also identify governance engineering as a major 
strength of the industry. Whereas good governance might not be paid for during the 
acquisition stage because it is expected, a firm poorly governed might be a risk well 
understood and to which investors strongly react.  
For the Private Equity industry, the ability to properly evaluate the extra-financial 
performance of a target firm could thus constitute a negotiation tool in acquisition stages to 
lower its cost, thus increasing the investment profitability. Also, it could enable Private Equity 
investors to create value in the companies they already hold in portfolio. However, succeeding 
in doing so requires a specific human capital on corporate social responsibility management, 
which the industry might likely still be in lack of. 
 
5.4.2. SUSTAINABILITY AND ENTREPRENEURS 
 
Let us now consider consequences for entrepreneurs. Our results imply that unsustainable 
practices are likely to prevent access to Private Equity financing, particularly when they 
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represent sufficient a risk to threaten the core business. For instance, food-safety issues due to 
poor environmental management in our catering case-study (firm A) decreased investment 
decisions by about 30%. As previously discussed, in real investments, this rejection rate is 
likely to be overestimated. However, poor management of environmental and social issues 
would likely increase investors’ demands in terms of audits and dues diligences, which are 
costly.  
Core business issues put apart, unsustainable firms are likely to get financed as much as 
sustainable ones. However, low extra-financial performance appears to be used to lower the 
firm valuation, meaning it increases the cost of equity capital for entrepreneurs and destroys 
their shareholders’ value. Improving environmental, social and governance practices could 
thus allow entrepreneurs to protect their firm price and access to Private Equity capital. 
Environmental and social performance might even be paid for by investors when it 
strengthens the firm attractiveness. 
Let us finally note that the quantification approach used by investors implies the need for 
entrepreneurs to implement indicators to assess and monitor environmental, social and 
governance performance. Indeed, considering Private Equity investors’ growing concern for 
extra-financial performance (Crifo and Forget, 2012), it appears likely that such quantified 
information will be increasingly required. To be paid for, sustainability will hence likely need 
to be accurately and quantitatively demonstrated.  
 
5.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper tackled the core question of the impact of corporate sustainable and unsustainable 
practices on Private Equity financing. We find that entrepreneurs who engage their company 
on a sustainable path might not be more attractive for Private Equity investors than the others. 
However, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs who do not manage environmental, social 
and governance issues are likely to suffer limited access to Private Equity, with a higher cost 
of capital, hence penalizing their shareholders by destroying firm value. Indeed, when 
investors’ heterogeneity is controlled for, our results unveil that unsustainable policies 
decrease firm price by respectively 11%, 10% and 15% for environmental, social, and 
governance issues.  
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Several research paths are opened by our results and we here shed light on three of them. A 
first path arises from our experiment focus on deal pricing, discarding issues about control 
rights. As several experiment participants highlighted, unsustainable practices might lead to 
reinforced dues diligences rather than price change. The issue of the impact of corporate 
sustainability on control rights in Private Equity financing negotiations is left open to 
investigate and is likely to be of broad interest for entrepreneurs.  
Another research avenue is triggered by the asymmetry we highlighted in the pricing of 
sustainable and unsustainable policies. Indeed, it remains unclear whether investors 
strategically overweighed unsustainability to lower firm price in acquisition stages, or 
whether they actually overvalued extra-financial risks (potential losses) over opportunities 
(potential gains). Whereas the former could be explained by negotiation strategy and 
empirically tested by observing exist stages, the latter would rather relate to behavioral 
finance concepts, such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Finally, a research path is drawn by our focus on the Greening Goliaths rather than the 
Emerging Davids identified by Hockerts and Wustenhagen (2010), that is firms engaging in 
incremental environmental or social process innovation (such as through corporate social 
responsibility initiatives) rather than new sustainable entrepreneurships. Investigating how 
Emerging Davids would be evaluated by venture and seed capitalist compared to Greening 
Goliaths appears as a promising research extension to the sustainable entrepreneurship 
literature.  
From a wider perspective, equity financing remains a core limit of entrepreneurs who wish to 
pursue sustainable ventures. Venture capital likely has a key role to play in such 
entrepreneurships, yet its extent is a question left open. Research is still needed to analyze 
how to raise the equity needed and what are the best organizational structures to finance green 
growth and support Emerging Davids.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
MAIN FINDINGS  
 
The five chapters of this dissertation used different methodologies to tackle from various 
angles the question of the compatibility of CSR in the Private Equity industry. Doing so, 
contributions were made to different fields of the literature. This section summarizes them in 
a transversal approach and discusses in which extent Private Equity funds can indeed foster 
sustainable development through CSR. 
Contributions to the CSR literature were made in Chapters 1, 2 and 5. Chapter 1 anchored this 
concept in economics and provided a unified framework of its drivers based on market 
imperfections. It thus highlighted, among other research paths to explore, the need to account 
for the multidimensional nature of CSR as different policies have diverging effects on firm 
performance. Chapter 2 introduced in the CSR literature model averaging that enabled to 
estimate simultaneously the effects of five types of corporate policies as well as their relative 
importance for firm performance. The chosen variant of this methodology has the potential to 
be practically used in many empirical fields hampered by multidimensional issues lacking 
theoretical consensus. Results have implications for academics and practitioners, as they 
reconcile competing theories on the effects of CSR and show that CSR dimensions are not 
equivalent to do well and do good. Chapter 5 completed these findings by pointing out that 
over and under performance on CSR levels do not have symmetrical effects on firm value, the 
latter being stronger. 
Using the CSR and Private Equity framework, Chapter 4 contributed to signaling theory by 
showing that a money-burning signal that provides public good is not a perfect substitute to 
standard money-burning signals. Indeed, it generates deviations from predicted equilibrium in 
the laboratory. Whereas a wide literature on equilibrium selection and refinements exists in 
signaling games, the novelty of this work is to observe deviations from equilibrium due to the 
social consequences of the signal and related to intrinsic motivations. The experimental 
design also contributed to this literature by proposing an original way of giving content to 
signals in the laboratory as the signals used actually provided real public good (online 
donations to carbon offset).  
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The socially responsible investment field is enriched by Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Indeed, its spread 
in the Private Equity investment class is shown and characterized in Chapter 3. Its specificity 
lies in investor engagement, which is stronger than usual on public financial markets, Private 
Equity investors being significant shareholders in the companies they finance and often 
involved in their governance. Socially responsible investments in this asset class are also 
pointed out as strategic rather than philanthropic, which supports the on-going mainstreaming 
process of these investment practices. 
This dissertation finally contributes to corporate finance in several ways. Theoretically, it 
provides in Chapter 4 a model of bilateral Private Equity negotiations with signaling which 
highlights how information asymmetry can be reduced. It also demonstrates in Chapters 3 and 
5 that firm valuation and equity financing models ought not only to be based on financial 
information, but also on extra-financial information, as investors already consider it. 
Empirically, it thus unveiled that omitting CSR performance might bias estimations results of 
econometrics research on Private Equity funds strategy and performance.  
To sum up and put conclusions together to answer this dissertation research question, CSR 
appears compatible with the Private Equity industry to some extent. Indeed, Private Equity 
investors are involved in their portfolio companies in such a way that they can actively foster 
CSR if they decide to, and if they have the needed expertise. They can improve their bottom 
line by strategically fostering some CSR dimensions – yet not all. Consequently, regulators 
can rely on them to promote some forms of public goods, on specific circumstances. 
Implications for Private Equity investors and public policies are detailed in the following 
sections. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS 
 
The findings of this dissertation have several implications for the Private Equity industry. 
First and foremost, CSR already is a strategy undertaken by many conventional funds to 
improve business and operational management (Chapters 1 and 3). Indeed, depending on 
whether CSR issues are well managed or conversely ignored, value can be created or lost 
(Chapter 5). In other words, the extra-financial performance impacts the cost of capital. Yet a 
good management of CSR issues is far from trivial to implement (Chapter 2). Findings lead to 
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a few suggestions for Private Equity funds managers who wish to engage in CSR and limits of 
this engagement
27
.  
Once the management of a given Private Equity firm has decided to engage in CSR, several 
steps need to be undertaken for it to be successful, meaning to create shared value between 
funds investors, the Private Equity firm, its portfolio companies and society. Implementing a 
CSR policy requires processes akin to those developed to implement any transversal business 
strategy. Indeed, CSR precisely is a business strategy that can interfere with the firm usual 
activities and should therefore be thought and built with the other corporate functions on a 
mid to long term horizon. The choice of CSR policy level hence depends on resource 
allocation and action perimeter (for instance the Private Equity firm, or its portfolio, or only 
new companies in the portfolio). Two levels are to be identified: CSR at the Private Equity 
firm level and CSR at the portfolio level.  
At both levels, the first step to develop a CSR strategy could consist in mapping corporate 
extra-financial impacts along the firm value creation chain. This inventory would lead to a list 
of all CSR issues and opportunities that can be analyzed, hierarchized and dealt with. Among 
the wide range of potential CSR policies (Chapter 1), those that best fit the business model 
and have the greater potential to yield both extra-financial and financial outcomes could be 
selected (Chapter 2). At the Private Equity firm level, developing a CSR policy might be an 
efficient and practical way of learning by doing what would be (or will be) required from 
portfolio companies. At the portfolio company level, CSR can be fostered by investor 
engagement, for instance by visiting portfolio companies’ productive sites, bringing CSR 
issues to their boards, evaluating CSR performance, or requiring CSR reporting (Chapter 3). 
Table C.1 suggests what could be a proactive CSR policy in a Private Equity firm.  
  
                                                             
27
 The section is adapted from the chapter “L’intégration des Enjeux ESG dans le Capital Investissement”, V.D. 
Forget and F. Massut, forthcoming in the collective book Tout Savoir sur le Capital Investissement, G. 
Mougenot (Ed.), City & Work, Paris, 2013. 
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TABLE C.1 – Examples of ESG practices for Private Equity funds managers 
 Environment Social Governance 
Daily 
management at 
the Private 
Equity firm level 
 ESG Chart (engagement level, perimeter, UN PRI signature, dedicated means, etc.) 
 Implementation of identification processes of ESG risks and opportunities at the 
management firm level and at the portfolio level 
 Dedicated organization to ESG strategy implementation 
 ESG strategy communication to internal and external stakeholders (employees, 
institutional investors, portfolio companies, Private Equity professional associations, 
UN PRI, etc.)  
 Staff training on ESG issues management (and/or external expertise) 
 Quarterly or yearly evaluations of ESG strategy implementation (dedicated means, 
progresses, results) communicated to institutional investors 
 Third-party audits of sustainable development reports 
 Evaluation of direct 
(headquarters, 
transports) and indirect 
(portfolio companies, 
suppliers) 
environmental impacts 
 Impact reduction, Eco 
gestures 
 Carbon footprint 
assessment 
 Recycling 
 Fight against 
discrimination 
 Employee participation 
 Compensation 
transparency 
 Yearly employee 
performance appraisals 
 ESG factor integration 
in appraisals and 
manager variable 
premiums  
 Transparency towards 
institutional investors : 
reports, investment 
memos, consultative 
committees, strategic 
committees  
  Annual General Meeting 
 
Acquisition 
Stages 
 Exclusion of specific geographical areas and sectors 
 ESG issue integration in due diligences to evaluate related risks and opportunities 
 ESG part in investment memos 
 ESG issue integration in shareholders’ agreements 
 Exclusion of 
operations using 
protected species 
(CITES), etc. 
 Evaluation of 
environmental 
operational risks 
 Exclusion of operations 
that don’t respect 
international 
conventions (Humans 
Rights, ILO, etc.) 
 Evaluation of social 
operational risks 
 ESG expertise of target 
company management 
 
Holding Stages  
 Shareholder engagement to help portfolio companies to improve ESG performance 
(reduce risks / exploit opportunities) 
 Dialogs with portfolio company management on ESG issues 
 Surveillance and respect of sectorial ESG guidelines 
 Implementation of quantitative and qualitative ESG indicators to develop scoreboards, 
ESG reporting and performance evaluations 
 Visits to portfolio company plants 
 Sharing good practices between portfolio companies and help to acquire internal 
expertise  
 Evaluation of direct 
and indirect 
environmental impacts 
 Dialog with 
stakeholders 
 Working conditions 
improvement 
 Specialized Committees 
 Stakeholders involvement 
Exit Stages 
 Quantitative valuation of value created by ESG performance (vendor due diligences) 
 Sharing capital gains from sales with employees 
 ESG results communication. 
Translated from “L’intégration des Enjeux ESG dans le Capital Investissement”, co-written with François 
Massut and forthcoming in the collective book Tout Savoir sur le Capital Investissement, G. Mougenot (Ed.), 
City & Work, Paris, 2013. 
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However, the integration of CSR issues in the Private Equity industry encounters several 
limits. First, the implementation of CSR strategy goes as far as managers’ conviction goes and 
thus depends on their willingness to involve extra-financial issues in their activities (Chapter 
1). CSR also goes as far as the conviction of middle managers and teams, whose awareness 
can be promoted by dialogue, training or compensation. Yet managers and employees willing 
to go beyond wording and actively integrate CSR issues face its complexity and technicality 
(Chapter 2). For CSR not to be felt as an additional and pointless constraint, employee 
participation, training and human capital development are needed. Expertise on CSR, which 
likely still lacks in Private Equity funds (Chapter 3) can either be developed internally or 
externalized (consulting), but can hardly be bypassed for CSR not to drift to greenwashing 
(Chapter 1). 
Expertise also requires resource allocation. The diffusion of CSR practices will thus likely 
depends upon Limited Partners (Chapter 3) who expect profitability from Private Equity 
firms. Their future requests and sustainability commitments might play a core role in the 
responsible investment movement in Private Equity. For instance, part of the management 
fees could be dedicated to CSR expertise gains both at the Private Equity firm and portfolio 
levels. Similarly, part of the variable compensation of Private Equity funds managers could 
take into account extra-financial objectives on both qualitative and quantitative indicators.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
This dissertation demonstrated that Private Equity funds have both interest and means to be 
socially responsible investors and have the potential to actively promote sustainable practices 
in the firm they own. This section discusses public good contribution and its limits, CSR 
regulation, Private Equity regulation, and implications for public administrations. 
The research presented shows that Private Equity funds have the potentiality to foster some 
aspects of sustainability through CSR, but only as far as CSR makes business sense. All 
Chapters contribute to the idea that CSR will not be implemented at the expense of 
profitability or competitiveness to provide public good for the sake of it. Hereby we can 
expect that some dimensions of CSR will be more fostered than others, as they will be more 
profitable on the short run. For instance, good business behaviors with customers and 
Can Private Equity Funds Foster CSR? 
176 
 
suppliers might be more easily improved than implication in local communities or high 
environmental levels (Chapter 2). The optimal CSR level might also differ between business 
and society: Chapter 5 illustrated that whereas unsustainable practices penalized equity 
financing, sustainable ones were not proportionally priced. The extra-financial performance 
mostly impacts the cost of capital by lowering it when unsustainable practices are discovered. 
A core issue for public policies targeting CSR might thus be to evaluate its social 
consequences and actual public good contributions (Chapters 1 and 4) in order to well balance 
voluntary programs and binding environmental and social regulations.   
Whereas CSR will only cover part of the ground to sustainable development, it stands out as 
an efficient tool to be promoted by regulations. At a time of state budgetary restraints and 
economic crisis, it seems consistent to advocate private contributions to public good and self-
regulations that business is willing to achieve while protecting its competitiveness. Since 
different CSR policies have various effects on profitability (Chapters 2 and 5), this 
dissertation’s findings suggest that soft law relying on corporate strategy might be the most 
efficient framework for CSR regulation, as is currently the case. However, regulations might 
be relevant to ensure CSR does not drift to greenwashing by strengthening transparency and 
promoting third-party certified norms and labels (such as EMAS regulation). Proofs of means 
and result reporting requirements could be required to ensure that CSR claims are not empty 
or mislead consumers, along deceptive advertising regulations. 
Transparency has also been the focus of Private Equity regulation. National, European and 
International negotiations started in 2009 to strengthen regulation and supervision of 
alternative funds managers, among which Private Equity funds managers. These negotiations 
yielded the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) in 
the United States and its Volcker Rule, which prohibits banks from acquiring or retaining any 
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund or Private Equity fund and 
also from sponsoring them. The European Parliament voted in 2011 the Directive on 
Alternative Investment Funds Managers (AIFM), which should be applied by Member States 
by 2013 and consists in a comprehensive framework for the supervision and prudential 
oversight of different asset classes, including Private Equity. In Europe, the stated objectives 
are to introduce safeguards to increase the transparency of this type of investments and to 
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address potential risks to portfolio companies, acknowledging their crucial role in 
restructuring and financing companies28
.
  
Transparency on their environmental and social impacts is also increasingly required from 
Private Equity managers. In the United Kingdom, the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme holds 
since 2008 Private Equity companies liable for the carbon emissions of the companies over 
which they have management and financial control. In France, the Grenelle II 224 decree (n° 
2012-132, 30 January 2012) and 225 decree (n° 2012-557, 24 April 2012) requires that assets 
managers disclose how they integrate environmental, social and governance issues in their 
investment policies and assess the extra-financial impacts of their portfolio companies over 
500 employees (starting from 2013). These regulations will have important local impacts but 
their scope will be limited by their national anchorage, notwithstanding potential market 
distortions. Extensions of extra-financial transparency laws at the European level appear 
essential to foster CSR and socially responsible investments. 
Important regulations have thus been decided between the beginning and the end of my 
research with crucial impacts on CSR spread and growth financing. Findings of this 
dissertation mostly go along them. These regulations are just being implemented, or will be 
implemented in the on-going year, and need not to be complemented before their 
effectiveness can be assessed. They will clearly have important impacts on the Private Equity 
industry, its move towards socially responsible investment and the equity financing of 
enterprises. Evaluations of these regulations and of their impacts in the upcoming years will 
tell us whether an adequate balance between competitiveness, social inclusion and 
environmental protection has been found considering the current market turmoil.  
Finally, implications for public administrations can also be drawn. This research essentially 
focused on the social responsibility of enterprises and their financers. Yet CSR and socially 
responsible investments also have a role to play in public administrations – so to say, charity 
begins at home. Public administrations are indeed important employers (it is the first 
employer in France) and their direct activities, such as public procurement, have large impacts 
on business and society. Sustainable development would clearly benefit from the engagement 
of public administration to foster responsible practices among its human resource and supply 
chain. Moreover, States are also major investors through their sovereign wealth funds, where 
                                                             
28
 See theEuropean website : 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/572&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en 
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socially responsible investments would fully be relevant. In this regard, the French Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations plays a crucial role on the French market as the first institutional 
investor. This financial institution currently promotes socially responsible practices in its 
direct investments and funds of funds activities, with a strong impact on the French market. 
The continuation of such efforts and its spread at the European and international level are still 
left as open question marks and should be promoted. 
 
 
LIMITS AND FURTHER RESEARCH PATHS 
 
Each chapter of this dissertation detailed its limits and potential extensions. This final section 
takes a step back to summarize what could not be tackled in this research and what was left 
open to explore for academics to understand interactions between sustainable development, 
CSR and Private Equity.  
A first limit of this dissertation has been raised as early as Chapter 1. To understand if Private 
Equity investors can foster sustainable development, a missing milestone in this research is 
the actual social and environmental impacts of CSR. In other words, what are the 
consequences for society as a whole of Private Equity investor engagement? In a broader 
perspective, research is currently needed on the social side of CSR. To do so, the current CSR 
research toolbox needs to be expanded, driving for instance on methodological lessons from 
development economics, public policy evaluation or ecology as suggested in Chapter 1. In a 
different perspective, evaluating and comparing the social and environmental externalities of 
conventional versus responsible investments and of different types of responsible investments 
would be a challenging path for further research.  
A similar research could be developed at the firm level. Indeed, the question of the actual 
impact of Private Equity investor engagement on firm social and financial performance is 
new, both for practitioners and academics. Much could be learned by following the financial 
and extra-financial performance of enterprises as investor engage in them to promote 
competitiveness and sustainability. In this regards, Private Equity responsible investments is 
particularly difficult to tackle as they essentially focus on SMEs, for which little 
environmental and social data is available. A project was set up in the first year of this Ph.D. 
(in partnership with a French extra-financial rating agency and an asset management firm) to 
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evaluate and match the CSR and economic performances of European SMEs. Lacking 
funding, this project was finally abandoned. A different way to answer questions left open 
would be to work with assets managers engaging in CSR and evaluate results at the portfolio 
company results.  
On a more theoretical level, issues of moral hazard might arise once Private Equity investors 
acquired a firm based on its CSR strategy. While this exploratory research sheds light on 
responsible investing in Private Equity, it did not provide it with a proper framework that 
would enable dealing with these issues. More generally, a theory of CSR in Private Equity 
could for instance arise from principal-agent theory (commonly used in Private Equity models 
in corporate finance) and could trigger questions related to multitasking (firm managers trying 
to do well and do good).  
Consequences of CSR engagement for Private Equity funds themselves will also be 
interesting to follow up in the future. The use of CSR by Private Equity firms as a mean of 
differentiation (Chapter 3) and value protection (Chapter 5) was supported. Empirical tests 
could be developed, particularly regarding advertising and media. Do Private Equity firms 
actually suffer financial penalty when they poorly manage the extra-financial performance of 
their portfolio? Do media campaigns targeting environmental or social performance affect 
Private Equity deals, exits and performance?  
Another limit of this Ph.D. dissertation arises from its national anchorage in the French 
Private Equity market. However, socially responsible investment behaviors are likely to 
depend on factors such as legal conditions, culture and regulatory pressure, which differ 
between institutional contexts. A promising research path would thus be to extend this 
research to other markets, such as the United States or the United Kingdom markets, and test 
whether drivers, maturation, prioritization and implementation differ beyond French borders. 
On a more international level, CSR in Private Equity backed-up companies raises issues that 
go beyond borders. For instance, SMEs are increasingly embedded within global supply 
chains. Is CSR a good or a bad news for such companies? Are Private Equity investors better 
suited than other investors to grasp such investment opportunities? Lastly, what will 
globalization of Private Equity (through deal syndications for instance) imply for their interest 
for CSR?  
Finally, as noted in Chapter 5, the role of innovation in sustainable development has not been 
discussed in this dissertation. However, innovation financing is the focus of seed capital and 
venture capital, two segments of the Private Equity industry. The research presented mostly 
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tackled the integration of CSR issues in existing firms on conventional markets. However, the 
largest share of sustainable development solutions are likely still to be invented, developed 
and spread through markets – and to do so, entrepreneurs need equity financing. The potential 
of venture capital as a tool for green growth could thus constitute a last extension of this 
dissertation. 
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility Data 
 
Vigeo ratings on five CSR dimensions are used in this paper: environmental policy rating 
(Environment), corporate governance (Governance), human resources management (human 
resources), involvement in local communities (Community involvement) and business 
behaviors towards customers and suppliers (Customers & suppliers). 
Vigeo identifies CSR issues by sector and, for each CSR dimensions, specific criteria are 
selected and weighted according to: CSR type and impact on sector stakeholders; 
stakeholders’ impact exposure; and finally sector risks if the impact is not correctly managed.  
Vigeo then rates firm performance on CSR dimensions in terms of leadership, implementation 
and results. A final score is calculated by firm for each dimension on a 0 (minimum) to 100 
(maximum) scale.  
For firms to be comparable across sectors, firm scores are benchmarked against their sector 
average score. The resulting rating is provided on a five-level scale: ‘worst-in-class’ (5%), 
‘below sector average’ (25%), ‘in the sector average’ (40%), ‘proactive’ (25%) and ‘best-in-
class’ (5%). For the purpose of this paper, whose methodology requires sufficient 
observations per category, those ratings are quantified into a three-level scale: worst (bellow 
sector average; 30%); average (40%); best (above sector average).  
As Vigeo systematically rates the DJ Stoxx 600 firms (largest listed European firms), there is 
no bias selection in data. Academic work based on Vigeo’s data is still scarce (Cavaco and 
Crifo 2010) and promising, notably because it allows researchers to study the European 
market whereas most previous studies focused on the United States market. 
 
Financial Data 
 
Financial performance and control variables data come from the Bureau Von Dijk’s Orbis 
global database, which is sourced from many different providers. All financial measures are 
given in 2005 United States dollars and observations with unconsolidated accounting data and 
more than one subsidiary were not kept. Control for outliers is done by winsorizing at the 2% 
and 98 % levels ROA and ROCE. 
In full sample (not restricted to R&D intensity data availability), firms belong to 17 different 
countries and 14 industrial sectors (see Table A1).  
Pearson correlation coefficients can be found in Table A2. 
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TABLE A.1.-  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PER COUNTRY GROUP AND INDUSTRY (FULL SAMPLE) 
Variable  ROA  ROCE  Global CSR rating 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 12 8.21 2.97  12 14.16 3.82  12 2.49 0.56 
Belgium 42 8.82 6.26  44 18.01 13.49  44 2.66 0.55 
Denmark 25 10.14 7.62  25 15.68 9.59  25 2.82 0.91 
Finland 42 10.67 7.44  42 19.09 12.95  42 3.29 0.66 
France 430 6.64 6.52  416 12.87 9.51  416 3.11 0.62 
            
Germany 189 6.80 6.77  191 13.25 10.13  191 3.14 0.61 
Greece 9 10.01 7.16  9 14.05 9.14  9 2.11 0.62 
Ireland  27 6.90 5.84  27 12.25 7.33  27 2.48 0.76 
Italy 68 8.38 6.51  65 16.46 12.55  65 2.66 0.62 
Luxembourg 11 5.64 8.35  11 9.71 11.67  11 3.13 0.75 
            
Netherlands 126 6.16 5.85  126 11.91 10.95  126 3.14 0.57 
Norway 17 12.65 9.93  18 20.43 14.27  18 3.06 0.45 
Portugal 20 6.21 2.26  20 12.50 4.22  20 2.63 0.46 
Spain 96 7.17 6.40  94 13.97 15.74  94 2.72 0.62 
Sweden 52 8.61 7.41  55 16.86 12.58  55 2.92 0.61 
            
Switzerland 70 9.91 6.07  71 16.08 8.84  71 2.80 0.72 
UK 341 9.46 7.16  340 17.07 12.58  340 3.24 0.63 
Car Industry 82 4.64 4.04  83 10.86 8.45  83 3.09 0.64 
Trade 129 8.34 7.16  129 17.48 13.07  129 3.06 0.61 
Consumer goods 287 10.94 6.91  285 18.99 10.96  285 3.04 0.68 
            
Building 67 6.26 4.62  65 14.65 8.10  65 2.97 0.72 
Energy 163 7.95 6.11  161 14.23 10.10  161 3.08 0.63 
Equipment 84 7.62 5.99  83 15.86 13.52  83 3.04 0.67 
Finance 58 7.53 6.00  58 12.47 7.92  58 3.09 0.66 
Hotel industry 54 4.75 4.59  54 10.22 6.46  54 3.05 0.61 
            
Agri-food  91 9.01 4.53  91 16.92 7.58  91 3.03 0.66 
Intermediate 196 7.76 6.01  196 13.03 8.29  196 3.05 0.68 
ITC 148 7.35 10.24  143 13.74 16.31  143 2.99 0.67 
Media 43 7.79 7.26  39 14.47 10.08  39 2.91 0.66 
Telecom 76 5.09 7.57  80 9.31 17.39  80 3.02 0.64 
Transport 99 5.98 4.33  99 12.21 6.86  99 3.07 0.72 
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TABLE A.2.-  PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 CSR 
Human 
Resources 
Governance 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Community 
Involvement 
Environment ROA ROCE Risk. 
Financial 
leverage 
R&D 
intensity 
Size  
Global CSR 1.00            
Human Resources 0.76 1.00           
Governance 0.56 0.24 1.00          
Customers & 
Suppliers 0.76 0.49 0.32 1.00         
Community 
Involvement 0.73 0.45 0.24 0.44 1.00        
Environment 0.76 0.52 0.25 0.50 0.48 1.00       
ROA 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 1.00      
ROCE 
-
0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.45 1.00     
Risk. 
-
0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.37 -0.01 1.00    
Financial leverage 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.11 -0.55 1.00   
R&D intensity 
-
0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.31 -0.09 1.00  
Size 0.34 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.28 -0.09 -0.02 -0.33 0.03 -0.22 1.00 
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
Survey wording 
« ESG Practices of Private Equity Investors – Survey 2011 » (Novethic) 
 
ESG Policy at the Management Firm Level 
1) Have you formalized a policy or a chart stating how you take into account Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) criteria in your portfolio and/or your investments?  
Yes; Please detail since when / No, but we plan to do so this year (directly go to question 5) / No 
(directly go to question 5) 
2) If you answered yes to question 1, to whom do you communicate it? 
Our co-workers / Our investors / Our portfolio companies / Publicly communicated 
3) Are you a signatory of the French Private Equity Association Chart? 
Yes / No; why?  
4) Are you a signatory of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI)? 
Yes; Please detail since when / No, but we plan to do so this year / No.  
5) Are your co-workers trained in ESG issues management in their daily business?  
Yes; Please detail how / No. 
6) Your ESG policy is run by : 
A co-worker dedicated to this policy / A co-worker non dedicated to this policy / Investment directors 
/ An external third-party / Other, please detail.  
7) Within your management firm, which policies have you launched in terms of sustainable 
development?  
ESG evaluation at the management firm level 
Environment: Management firm carbon footprint evaluation / Videoconferences / Energy savings 
thanks to eco-gestures  
Social: employee training / annual job appraisal / employee profit-sharing 
Governance: Ethics Chart or Deontology Code 
Other: please detail 
Implementation in portfolio companies 
8) Do you exclude from your investments:  
Specific industries: Weapons / Alcohol / Tobacco / Pornography / Hazard games / GMOs / Nuclear 
Energy / Other, please detail 
Specific policies considered reprehensible: Child labor / Forced labor / Other, please specify 
9) Which means do you use to evaluate ESG practices in companies (before investment; over the 
investment phase; while the company is hold in your portfolio)? 
Dialogue between the management firm and the portfolio company / ESG survey sent to the company 
/ Management firm internal ESG audit grid / Acquisition dues diligences / Specific acquisition dues 
diligences / Audit by an external third-party / Other, please detail. 
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10) In this context, are environmental issues (water and energy consumptions, carbon assessment, 
waste management, etc.) evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan 
to do so this 
year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
1) In this context, are social issues (training, skill management, diversity, non discrimination, 
etc.) evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan 
to do so this 
year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
1) In this context, are governance issues (allocation and delegation of authority, board formation, 
board independence, fight against corruption, etc.) evaluated:  
 Always Sometimes * Never 
No, but we plan 
to do so this 
year* 
When you acquire a company         
When you hold a company in portfolio         
When you sell a company         
*Please detail how many companies were evaluated in 2010.  
 
2) How do you support your portfolio companies to implement their sustainable development 
policy?  
Regular dialogue between the management firm and a dedicated contact in the portfolio company / 
Link establishment with a specialized consultant / Support of the ESG reporting / Follow-up, but the 
portfolio company has full autonomy to implement the policy / Other, please detail.  
3) How do you ensure ESG criteria are taken into account in the companies in which you invest? 
Chart compliance request / ESG reporting request / ESG issues on the agenda of the company’s 
supervisory board / Visit of plants / ESG clause in the shareholders pact / Other; please detail.  
4) Have you ever measured the impact of the ESG issue management on your portfolio? 
Yes; please detail / No.  
5) The ESG evaluation of a company already led you to :  
Decrease a target company valuation / Reject an investment / The company ESG evaluation had no 
impact on our management / Other; please detail.  
 
Relationships with investors 
6) Have you implemented a regular ESG reporting of your portfolio? 
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Yes, it is public / Yes, it is communicated to our investors / No / No, but we plan to do so this year.  
7) Do your Limited Partners ask you how you manage ESG issues?  
Yes, often / Yes, sometimes / No, never.  
8) If you answered yes to question 7, how have your Limited Partners formalized their request 
(survey, side letters, shareholders pact, etc.)?  
 
Motivations 
9) For which reasons do you take into account ESG issues in your investments? 
To improve risk management (social litigations, environmental liability, etc.) / To answer our 
investors’ demand / To ease fund raising / To improve deal flow / To reduce the management firm 
reputational risk / to improve the value of portfolio companies / other, please detail.  
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APPENDIX - TABLE B.1. - Correlation Matrix (1/3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
1-Firm Age 1,00                          
2-Workforce 0,15 1,00                         
3-Funds 0,02 0,45 1,00                        
4-Companies 0,16 0,39 0,70 1,00                       
5-Assets managed 0,14 0,39 0,26 0,32 1,00                      
6-Listed 0,21 0,04 -0,08 -0,06 0,08 1,00                     
7-PE firm 0,00 0,03 -0,01 -0,08 -0,03 -0,03 1,00                    
8-Partners -0,14 -0,13 -0,01 -0,23 0,08 -0,10 -0,38 1,00                   
9-Bank 0,06 0,10 0,12 0,30 -0,08 -0,08 -0,23 -0,43 1,00                  
10-Insurance 0,04 0,12 0,10 0,27 0,18 -0,03 -0,09 -0,18 -0,06 1,00                 
11-Industry 0,01 -0,06 -0,07 -0,04 -0,06 -0,06 -0,12 -0,22 -0,08 -0,04 1,00                
12-French state -0,01 0,01 -0,07 0,06 -0,09 -0,04 -0,15 -0,37 -0,03 -0,02 -0,03 1,00               
13-Other 0,07 -0,04 -0,10 -0,07 -0,02 0,06 -0,09 -0,16 -0,08 -0,01 -0,04 -0,00 1,00              
14-LP Industry -0,05 -0,08 -0,09 -0,04 -0,13 -0,08 -0,05 -0,12 -0,10 -0,07 0,51 0,16 -0,08 1,00             
15-LP Captive 0,00 0,03 0,10 0,17 -0,00 0,06 0,13 -0,32 0,48 0,14 -0,14 -0,22 -0,04 -0,19 1,00            
16-LP Sovereign -0,07 0,02 -0,02 0,11 -0,12 -0,06 -0,08 -0,19 -0,01 0,02 -0,08 0,55 -0,02 0,29 -0,17 1,00           
17-LP Individuals  -0,04 0,20 0,50 0,26 0,13 0,05 -0,01 0,11 0,01 -0,05 -0,05 -0,19 0,06 -0,11 -0,01 -0,04 1,00          
18-LP Institutional -0,03 0,02 0,01 -0,09 0,03 -0,02 -0,03 0,30 -0,24 -0,07 -0,13 -0,01 -0,04 -0,01 -0,27 0,11 0,01 1,00         
19-LP Pension funds 0,08 0,22 0,03 0,02 0,30 0,08 0,10 0,20 -0,19 0,04 -0,13 -0,14 -0,04 -0,05 -0,20 -0,04 -0,03 0,17 1,00        
20-LP Family offices 0,03 -0,02 -0,07 -0,10 -0,10 0,05 -0,10 0,19 -0,18 -0,02 -0,07 0,00 0,07 0,13 -0,25 0,20 -0,04 0,13 0,10 1,00       
21-VC -0,02 0,05 0,26 0,16 -0,09 -0,05 0,01 -0,14 -0,01 -0,10 0,06 0,28 0,04 0,20 -0,09 0,35 0,23 -0,06 -0,14 -0,02 1,00      
22-Transmission 0,17 0,13 -0,01 0,07 0,15 0,08 -0,05 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,01 -0,06 0,03 -0,04 -0,08 -0,12 0,00 0,11 0,19 0,01 -0,24 1,00     
23-Growth 0,04 0,08 0,13 0,17 -0,11 -0,05 -0,01 -0,09 0,19 -0,03 -0,02 -0,03 -0,01 0,05 0,05 0,11 0,16 -0,06 -0,11 -0,08 -0,01 0,28 1,00    
24-Mezzanine 0,02 0,22 0,02 0,10 0,12 0,04 0,06 -0,08 -0,05 0,14 0,09 -0,05 0,00 -0,02 0,12 -0,08 -0,08 -0,02 -0,06 0,03 -0,16 -0,01 -0,03 1,00   
25-Distressed Capital -0,04 0,15 -0,08 -0,12 0,02 -0,02 0,07 0,10 -0,09 -0.05 -0,08 -0,06 -0,03 -0,09 -0,06 -0,04 -0,07 0,06 0,08 -0,04 -0,12 0,11 -0,01 -0,04 1,00  
26-Funds of funds -0,10 0,25 0,27 0,16 0,01 -0,05 0,14 -0,08 0,04 0,15 -0,09 -0,06 -0,08 -0,13 0,11 -0,14 0,01 -0,09 0,08 -0,08 -0,09 -0,15 -0,14 0,07 0,01 1,00 
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APPENDIX – TABLE B.1. (continues) - Correlation Matrix (2/3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
27-Minority 0,05 0,05 0,16 0,24 -0,26 -0,06 0,05 -0,25 0,21 0,12 -0,03 0,15 -0,07 0,09 0,10 0,33 0,15 -0,14 -0,14 -0,01 0,36 -0,28 0,33 0,07 -0,26 0,12 
28-Regional 0,06 -0,08 -0,10 0,09 -0,13 -0,07 -0,09 -0,35 0,24 0,01 0,03 0,44 -0,02 0,18 -0,01 0,35 -0,02 -0,01 -0,25 -0,04 0,18 0,10 0,18 -0,09 -0,08 -0,13 
29-European -0,03 0,15 0,17 -0,01 0,22 0,11 0,04 0,23 -0,18 0,03 -0,03 -0,23 -0,03 -0,11 -0,06 -0,23 -0,05 0,04 0,31 0,02 -0,10 -0,11 -0,16 0,08 0,02 0,23 
30-International 0,01 0,23 0,16 0,12 0,22 0,21 0,03 0,03 -0,04 0,08 -0,01 -0,12 -0,07 -0,03 0,03 -0,09 0,01 0,09 0,18 -0,05 0,09 -0,06 0,05 0,08 0,05 0,21 
31-Sector -0,08 -0,08 0,03 -0,14 -0,04 -0,07 0,06 0,07 -0,13 -0,07 0,11 0,01 -0,06 0,12 -0,07 0,03 -0,03 0,10 0,04 -0,03 0,24 -0,29 -0,08 -0,07 -0,06 -0,03 
32-Gender -0,08 0,00 0,02 0,09 0,11 0,09 -0,10 -0,08 -0,04 0.09 0,14 0,12 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,12 -0,03 -0,05 -0,04 -0,05 0,04 -0,02 -0,05 0,06 -0,07 0,04 
33-Founder -0,20 -0,02 -0,06 -0,13 -0,10 -0,10 -0,12 0,52 -0,33 -0,03 -0,08 -0,27 -0,02 -0,05 -0,22 -0,08 0,12 0,20 0,07 0,08 -0,04 -0,06 -0,03 0,01 0,10 -0,07 
34-Engineer 0,03 -0,02 0,03 0.09 0,11 -0,03 -0,04 -0,01 0,02 0,05 -0,08 0,14 0,00 -0,08 0,04 0,12 0,00 -0,04 0,07 -0,03 -0,00 -0,08 -0,02 0,01 -0,04 -0,03 
35-Business school -0,06 -0,10 0,03 -0,02 -0,13 0,09 -0,01 0,01 0,02 -0,03 0,18 -0,17 -0,08 0,12 0,13 -0,02 0,15 -0,11 -0.08 0,15 -0,02 -0,07 0,05 0,05 -0,11 0,03 
36-mgt International -0,09 0,12 -0,01 -0,10 0,04 0,04 0,09 0,07 -0,10 -0,09 0,03 -0,13 -0,05 -0,08 -0,09 -0,13 -0,12 0,13 0,11 -0,13 -0,09 0,10 -0,05 0,02 0,15 -0,02 
37- mgt Other 0,03 -0,06 -0,03 0,01 -0,01 -0,07 -0,04 -0,02 0,08 -0,04 -0,06 0,07 0,06 0,07 -0,10 0,03 0,02 0,08 -0,08 0,04 0,11 -0,10 -0,04 -0,12 -0,07 -0,04 
38-UNPRI 0,06 0,15 0,19 0,14 0,20 -0,01 0,04 0,07 -0,08 0,01 -0,03 -0,05 -0,07 -0,04 0,06 -0,06 0,07 0,06 0,17 -0,08 -0,06 0,03 -0,04 -0,00 -0,10 0,08 
39-AFIC Chart -0,04 -0,06 0,13 0,05 0,02 0,05 -0,00 0,24 -0,06 0,04 -0,03 -0,36 -0,02 -0,10 0,18 -0,22 0,16 -0,01 0,04 -0,04 -0,12 -0,01 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,02 
40-Green or Social fund -0,07 -0,03 0,05 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,04 -0,05 -0,05 0,01 0,12 0,05 0,13 0,07 0,05 0,07 0.05 -0,07 -0,11 -0,11 0,17 -0,18 0,13 -0,10 -0,00 -0,02 
41-Communication  0,01 0,20 0,16 0,07 0,27 0,06 -0,06 0,07 -0,12 0,09 -0,01 -0,06 0,14 0.00 0,05 -0,06 0,12 0,00 0,13 -0,15 0,02 -0,01 0,02 -0,06 -0,11 0,03 
42-Interest 0,04 0,11 0,18 0,12 0,11 -0,02 -0,01 -0,02 -0,07 0,02 0,06 0,04 0,09 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,07 0,07 0,01 -0,01 0,10 0,01 0,04 -0,01 -0,02 
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APPENDIX - TABLE B.1. (continues) - Correlation Matrix (3/3) 
 (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
27-Minority 1,00                
28-Regional 0,26 1,00               
29-European -0,20 -0,47 1,00              
30-International 0,07 -0,23 0,37 1,00             
31-Sector -0,03 -0,18 0,18 0,07 1,00            
32-Gender 0,06 -0,02 0,03 0,01 -0,09 1,00           
33-Founder -0,05 -0,24 0,08 -0,01 0,13 0,01 1,00          
34-Engineer -0,03 -0,14 0,06 -0,00 0,15 -0,10 -0,12 1,00         
35-Business school 0,05 -0,07 0,04 -0,05 -0,00 0,09 -0,07 -0,24 1,00        
36-mgt International -0,18 -0,10 0,12 0,15 -0,00 0,06 0,10 -0,13 -0,21 1,00       
37- mgt Other 0,12 0,15 -0,10 0,07 0,05 -0,02 -0,04 -0,13 -0,28 -0,31 1,00      
38-UNPRI -0,02 -0,11 0,14 -0,02 0,03 0,04 0,01 0,04 -0,10 -0,00 0,02 1,00     
39-AFIC Chart -0,15 -0,30 0,22 0,15 -0,01 -0,08 0,13 0,01 0,13 -0,00 -0,07 0,15 1,00    
40-Green or Social fund 0,07 0,02 -0,02 0,09 0,34 0,02 -0,01 0,05 -0,01 0,01 0,17 0,03 0,04 1,00   
41-Communication  -0,11 -0,14 0,17 0,16 0,13 0,02 0,07 0,13 -0,13 0,03 0,07 0,37 0,13 0,42 1,00  
42-Interest -0,10 -0,03 0,04 -0,06 0,02 -0,02 -0,04 0,02 0,04 -0,17 0,05 0,40 0,11 0,15 0,30 1,00 
 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between variables of the public data database. Correlations significant at the 5% level or 
lower are underlined.  
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TABLE B.2. - Appendix 
Survey sample representativeness 
 
    Survey  
Respondents 
Survey  
Non Respondents 
 Comparison 
of tests 
Variable name  Definition  Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median   
Main characteristics           
Firm Age  Years elapsed since firm foundation  74 13.9 11.0  227 12.9 11.0  1.0 
Workforce  Number of employees  68 18.6 10.5  218 11.5 6.0  7.1** 
Funds   Number of funds managed by the firm  74 7.7 2.5  228 4.1 2.0  3.7*** 
Companies   Number of companies hold in portfolio  68 55.7 17.5  220 34.8 16.0  20.9** 
Assets managed  Millions of Euros of assets managed  72 1422 318  223 700 100  722** 
Ownership: Percentage of firms shares...           
Listed  ... listed on a Stock market (in %)./  73 1.1 0.0  227 1.6 0.0  -0.0 
PE firm  ...  owned by another Private Equity firm (in %).  70 15.5 0.0  204 16.1 0.0  -0.0 
Partners  ...  owned by the firm Partners (in %).  70 40.7 22.5  201 42.3 0.0  -0.0 
Bank  ... owned by a Bank (in %).  70 13.9 0.0  201 18.8 0.0  -0.1 
Insurance 
company 
 ... owned by an insurance company (in %)  70 3.8 0.0  201 3.2 0.0  0.0 
Industry  ... owned by an industrial corporation (in %).  70 7.3 0.0  201 4.7 0.0  0.0 
French state  ... owned directly or indirectly by the French State (in %).  71 13.4 0.0  203 10.8 0.0  0.0 
Other  ... owned by other shareholders (in %).  70 5.5 0.0  201 2.7 0.0  0.0 
Limited Partners: Dummy variable equal to 1 if....., 0 otherwise           
LP Industry  ....the firm manages funds provided by an industrial corporation  69 0.23 0.00  199 0.18 0.00  0.06 
LP Captive 
 
... the firm is captive and essentially manages funds provided by a single 
bank or insurance 
 
69 0.35 0.00  199 0.31 0.00  0.04 
LP Sovereign  ...the firm manages funds provided by a Sovereign Wealth Funds  71 0.41 0.00  200 0.38 0.00  0.03 
LP Individuals   ... the firm manages funds provided by individuals  71 0.23 0.00  199 0.21 0.00  0.01 
LP Institutional  ... the firm manages institutional funds (except pension funds)  70 0.87 1.00  194 0.76 1.00  0.11** 
LP Pension funds  ... the firm manages funds provided by pension funds  70 0.31 0.00  194 0.25 0.00  0.07 
LP Family offices  ... the firm manages funds provided by family offices  69 0.38 0.00  194 0.37 0.00  0.01 
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TABLE B.2. – Appendix continued 
    Survey 
Respondents 
 Survey 
Non Respondents 
 Comparison 
 of tests 
Variable name   Definition  Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median   
Activity : Dummy variable equal to 1 if...., 0 otherwise           
Venture Capital  … funds are invested in venture capital  74 0.42 0.00  226 0.42 0.00  -0.01 
Transmission  …funds are invested in transmission capital  74 0.69 1.00  226 0.57 1.00  0.12** 
Growth  …funds are invested in growth capital  74 0.61 1.00  226 0.59 1.00  0.02 
Mezzanine  …funds are invested in mezzanine  74 0.09 0.00  226 0.07 0.00  0.03 
Distressed
 
Capital  …funds are invested in distressed capital  74 0.08 0.00  226 0.09 0.00  -0.00 
Funds of funds  …funds are invested in funds of funds  74 0.09 0.00  226 0.11 0.00  -0.02 
Investment scope: Dummy variable equal to 1 if...., 0 otherwise           
Minority  .... the firm invests as a minority shareholder  65 0.71 1.00  174 0.80 1.00  -0.10* 
French district scope  ... the firm invests only in a specific French district  74 0.15 0.00  234 0.18 0.00  -0.03 
European scope  ... the firm invests in other European countries than France  74 0.61 1.00  234 0.57 1.00  0.04 
International 
 
scope  ... the firm invests in other countries than European countries  74 0.16 0.00  234 0.22 0.00  -0.06 
Sector  ...  the firm manages at least one fund specialized in a sector  72 0.38 0.00  227 0.36 0.00  0.02 
Management: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Chairman ..., 0 otherwise           
Gender  ... is a woman  74 0.04 0.00  225 0.05 0.00  -0.00 
Founder  ... founded the firm  73 0.40 0.00  217 0.44 0.00  -0.04 
Engineer  ... has a French “Grandes Ecoles” Engineer background   71 0.30 0.00  185 0.28 0.00  0.02 
Business school  ...has a French Business School background  71 0.51 1.00  183 0.46 0.00  0.05 
International  ... has an international background  71 0.11 0.00  183 0.27 0.00  -0.16*** 
Other  ... has a different French background  71 0.49 0.00  183 0.44 0.00  0.05 
Public Responsible Investment Practices: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm.... , 0 otherwise           
UNPRI  ... is a UNPRI signatory  74 0.30 0.00  234 0.03 0.00  0.27*** 
AFIC Chart  ... is signatory of the French Private Equity Association Ethics Chart  74 0.77 1.00  234 0.65 1.00  0.12** 
Green or Social fund  ... manages at least one fund with a social or environmental target  72 0.21 0.00  227 0.09 0.00  0.12*** 
Communication   ...has a website referring to responsible investing practices  74 0.38 0.00  223 0.11 0.00  0.27*** 
This table compares the main characteristics of survey respondents and survey non respondents based on the public data we gathered (see Table 1). We test for survey sample 
representativeness of the French Private Equity industry by using t-tests for normally distributed variables and tests of proportion for dummy variables: respondents 
significantly differ from non respondents at the *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
APPENDIX C.1.: PROOFS OF EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION PROPOSITIONS 
 
We here use the setting described in the main text.  
To characterize equilibria, six critical values of z are useful to define. For the purpose of simplicity, we 
will use the notation      instead of (     ) and      instead of (     ).  
    
           is the value at which the purchase of securities is a zero NPV transaction for the 
investor if her beliefs are  ( |    )   . In other words, it is the smallest z that the investor will accept 
of a firm that does not signal under these beliefs. 
    
      (     )   is the value at which the purchase of securities is a zero NPV transaction for the 
investor if her beliefs are  ( |    )   . In other words, it is the smallest z that the investor will accept 
of a firm that signals under these beliefs. 
    
    (    )      is the value of z that leaves the value of existing equity unchanged if the 
manager does not signal. In other words, it is the largest fraction that the manager who does not signal 
is willing to give up in order to secure financing.  
    
    (         ) (     )  is the value of z that leaves the value of existing equity unchanged 
if the manager signals. In other words, it is the largest fraction that the manager who invests in a signal 
is willing to give up in order to secure financing.  
     (     (   )  )  is the value of z at which the transaction has a zero NPV for the 
investor, based on the prior belief that the firm that does not signal is type h with probability p and is 
type l with probability 1 – p. Note that these beliefs prevail if the action taken by the firm are 
uninformative, so that the investor’s revised and prior beliefs are identical. 
     (  (      )  (   )(     ))  is the value of z at which the transaction has a zero NPV 
for the investor, based on the prior belief that the signaling firm is type h with probability p and is type 
l with probability 1 – p. Note that these beliefs prevail if the actions taken by the firm are 
uninformative, so that the investor’s revised and prior beliefs are identical. 
Noe that we always have     
         
   , whereas for   the inequality depends of the relative values of 
    and    . We also always have      
         
     and      
         
   . This means that since the signal is 
costly and thus decreases in our model the final firm value, would investors perfectly know the firm 
type, they would ask for a larger share of the firm to compensate for the value destroyed by the 
money-burning signal. Without information asymmetry, or if signaling can’t impact investors beliefs, 
firm managers who signal reduce their gain. From the previous inequalities we also infer     
        
     
          
   . The relative positions of the other critical values depend on parameter values.  
 
The notion of sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson (1982) is here used to solve the signaling 
game. Equilibria selected are contingent to the set of parameters used. Without loss of generality we 
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can make the following assumption, which allows us to restrict attention to a subset of the possible 
values of z when characterizing the equilibria: 
Assumption 1: Only offers    [     
           
    ] are presented in equilibrium. 
Indeed, we always have:     
         
          
   . Offers of          
    should be accepted by the 
investor since they provide her with an NPV of at least zero, regardless of the firm’s type. However, 
such offers will reduce the value of the original shares without changing the probability of acceptance 
and therefore should not be made. On the other hand, offers       
    represent a negative NPV 
transaction for the investor regardless of the type of firm making the offer and hence should not be 
accepted. Given that these offers should not be accepted under any beliefs, managers should prefer 
offers of     
   . 
As in most signaling games, more than one Bayes-Nash equilibrium is found in our model, hence the 
theoretical prediction is ambiguous. To refine predictions, following Cadsby et al. (1998), we here 
choose the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). It requires that out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
reflect some though about which types are likely to make a particular out-of-equilibrium response. 
More precisely, it requires that the investor, after observing an unexpected deviation from equilibrium 
play, should assign probability zero to all those firm manager types that, by deviating so, cannot 
improve their respective payoff, provided the investor makes some utility-maximizing choice of 
response. 
Assumption 2: Players will not select an action that is dominated (following the intuitive criterion) 
and beliefs will reflect this.  
This game is consistent with four types of pure strategy sequential equilibria: (i) a price separating and 
signaling equilibrium; (ii) a price separating and non signaling equilibrium which exists under two 
different sets of conditions; (iii) a price pooling and non signaling equilibrium; (iv) a price pooling and 
signaling equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, different firms present different offers. Here 
equilibria (i) and (ii) are separating equilibria; equilibria (iii) and (iv) are pooling equilibria. Equilibra 
characterization is given by the following propositions. 
 
 price separating and signaling equilibrium 
Proposition 1: A price separating and signaling equilibrium in which  
1. a type l firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
3. the investor accepts     
     and     
    with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
exists if and only if (i)     
         
    and (ii)     
         
    and (iii)      . 
However,(iv)      
 (   )(     ) is also needed for this equilibrium to be dominant.  
 
In a separating equilibrium, different firms present different offers. In this equilibrium, investors 
believe that a firm that does not signal is type l with probability 1.  
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Condition (i) guarantees that a l – type firm cannot benefit from defecting by signaling. Indeed, offers 
       
    will be rejected in equilibrium by the investor as she will always get a negative expected 
payoff. Presenting such an offer has thus an expected payoff of zero for the l-type firm. Yet offers 
       
    will be accepted by the investor as they necessarily provide a positive or null NPV whatever 
the firm type. As     
         
   , presenting     
    reduces the expected payoff of the firm l without 
increasing the probability of acceptance by the investor. On the other hand, the firm l cannot profit 
from mimicking a h-type behavior as     
         
   , implying that presenting the offer     
    would 
lead to a negative payoff for the firm. Moreover, offers     
    would be rejected by the investor as she 
believes that a firm without signal is type l. Hence offers     
    or     
    are not presented. Since 
    
          
   , presenting the offer     
    is thus optimal in that it generates a positive and maximized 
expected payoff for the firm l.  
Condition (ii) ensures that a type h firm will have no incentive to select type l’s equilibrium strategy. 
Indeed, offering more than     
    generates a negative payoff if accepted and a payoff of zero is 
rejected. Hence, such an action is dominated by any offer that is less than or equal to     
     since this 
will generate a payoff of at least zero. As     
         
   , a h-type firm can thus not play a l-type firm 
strategy by offering     
   . Taken together, the first two conditions thus imply that neither type can 
benefit from selecting the other’s strategy. Moreover, offers     
    will be rejected by the investor as 
they put probability 1 of being l-type on non-signaling firms.  
Condition (iii) guarantees a positive payoff of signaling for h-type firms as     
         
   . However, 
condition (iv) is needed for this equilibrium to be dominant. Indeed, condition (iv) guarantees that a 
type h firm cannot benefit by defecting through abstention from signaling. Hence offers     
    are 
optimal for h-type firms. If condition (iv) is not satisfied, then this equilibrium is dominated by the 
price pooling and non signaling equilibrium.  
Finally, consider the investor’s response to the offer made. Acceptance of     
    dominates reject since 
it yields an expected payoff of at least zero if the firm is l and positive if the firm is h, whereas 
rejection provides a payoff of zero regardless of the type.     
    and     
    offers are rejected as off-
equilibrium path offers. Acceptance of     
    dominates rejection as it yields a positive expected payoff 
if accepted and zero if rejected.  
In this equilibrium, high type firms signal their type to investors and hence succeed in avoiding under-
investment. Low type firms cannot afford to purchase a money-burning signal, so they reveal their 
type and get financed. A two-speed economy is financed in which high type firms signal and low type 
firms don’t. 
 
 price separating and signaling equilibrium 
This equilibrium exists under two sets of conditions (Propositions 2a and 2b). 
Proposition 2a: A price separating and non signaling equilibrium in which  
1. a type l firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
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3. the investor accepts the offer     
    with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
exists if     
         
    and     
         
    and      . 
 
In this equilibrium, investors believe that a firm without signal is type l with probability 1- p and type 
h with probability p. The first condition ensures that a type h firm will have no incentive to select type 
l’s equilibrium strategy. The second condition guarantees that a l – type firm cannot benefit from 
defecting by mimicking h price and signaling. Taken together, those conditions thus imply that neither 
type can benefit from selecting the other’s strategy. The third condition necessarily implies     
    
    
    , meaning that a type h firm will have no incentive to defect by signaling as it will get a negative 
payoff if the offer is accepted and a payoff of zero if the offer is rejected. The investor will accept the 
offer     
    with probability 1 as she will get a positive payoff if the firm is h-type and payoff of zero if 
the firm is l-type. Offers     
    will be always rejected as the investor will get a negative payoff if the 
firm is l-type and a null if the firm is h-type. The signal is too costly for firms to invest in it. In this 
equilibrium, under-investment occurs as h-type firm cannot successfully signal their type.  
In this equilibrium, the signal is too costly for high type firms to profitably invest in it and investors 
thus do not consider it as a reliable quality signal. High type firms do not succeed in signaling their 
type and suffer under-investment.  
 
Proposition 2b: A price separating and brown signaling equilibrium in which  
1. a type l firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers     
    with probability 1; 
3. the investor accepts the offer     
    with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
exists if and only if      
         
    and     
         
    
Conversely, in this equilibrium, the signal is not costly enough to be informative of the firm value 
level.  
Investors here believe that a signaling firm is type h with probability p and type l with probability 1 – 
p. The first condition ensures that a type h firm will have no incentive to select type l’s equilibrium 
strategy by offering     
   , and will not profit either from offering     
   . The second condition implies 
that offers     
    and     
    can be proposed by both firm types and will be rejected by investor as she 
gets a negative expected payoff. Offers     
    will be rejected as an out-of-equilibrium offer. In this 
equilibrium, the signal is not costly enough to be informative of the firm value level, and h-type firm 
suffers under-investment.  
We can note that the stated conditions imply that the price separating non signaling equilibrium cannot 
co-exist with the price separating signaling equilibrium. 
 
 price pooling and non signaling equilibrium 
Proposition 3: A price pooling and non signaling equilibrium in which  
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1. a type l firm offers   
  with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers   
  with probability 1; 
3. the investor accepts the offer   
  with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
Exists if and only if     
        
However,      
 (   )(     ) is also needed for this equilibrium to be dominant.  
In this equilibrium, investors believe that a firm without signal may be type h with probability p and 
type l with probability 1 – p. Consider a value of   
  satisfying      
     {    
        
   }. A l-type 
firm always benefits from offering   
  as   
      
   . The investor will accept the offer   
  as she gets a 
null expected payoff. A h-type firm can benefit from offering   
  as   
        
   , but offers     
    will 
be rejected by the investor under any beliefs as she gets zero if the firm is h-type but a negative payoff 
if the firm is l-type. Both firm types will thus propose   
 , which will tend to equal    at the 
equilibrium. No restriction on the cost of signaling is needed to ensure the existence of this 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, if      
 (   )(     )  then this equilibrium is dominated by the 
price separating and signaling equilibrium.  
In this equilibrium, money-burning signal is too costly to be profitable and both firm types offer the 
same price to investors. In this setting, high type firms are under-priced, low-type firms are over-
priced.  
 
 price pooling and signaling equilibrium 
Proposition 4: A price pooling and signaling equilibrium in which  
1. a type l firm offers   
  with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers   
  with probability 1; 
3. the investor accepts the offer   
  with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
Exists if and only if              and     
        and     
        
In this equilibrium, investors believe that a signaling firm may be type h with probability p and type l 
with probability 1 – p, whereas a firm that does not signal is believed to be type l. The first condition 
ensures that l-type firms have no incentive to offer a signaling separating offer rather than a pooling 
signaling offer since it implies   
      
   . Consider then a value of   
  satisfying       
   
   {    
        
   }. The second condition guarantees that l-type firm has no incentive to deviate by not 
signaling. The third condition has the same consequence for h-type firms. Since both firms can 
purchase money-burning signals, offers     
    will be rejected by the investor as they have a negative 
expected payoff if accepted, and are worth zero if rejected. The offer   
  is thus optimal for both firm 
types. In this equilibrium, the cost of the money-burning signal is kept low enough by the stated 
conditions so that it is more profitable for both firm types to signal and pay that cost rather than to 
suffer poorer treatment based on investor beliefs about non-signaling deviators.  
High type firms are still under-priced and low-type firms are still over-priced. 
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APPENDIX C.2.: GIAMMARINO AND LEWIS (1988)’S ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
Giammarino and Lewis (1988) formulate the following assumption and propositions that we test in 
this paper: 
Assumption 1: Only offers    [   
         
    ] are presented in equilibrium. 
Proposition 1: A separating and signaling equilibrium in which  
1. a type l firm offers   
    with probability 1; 
2. a type h firm offers   
    with probability 1; 
3. the investor accepts   
    with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
exists if and only if   
      
    
Proposition 2: A pooling equilibrium in which  
1. both firm types offer     with probability 1 ; 
2. the investor accepts the offer     with probability 1 and rejects all other offers; 
Exists if and only if   
        
 
Proposition 3: A semipooling equilibrium of the following type exists if and only if   
      
    
1. Type l offers    with probability   ( 
 )   . Type h offers    with probability   ( 
 )  
(   ) 
(   ) 
 and offers  ̂ with probability     ( 
 ), where   
        
  (     )
 
2.  (  )  ((    ̂ )     ) ((   
 )     ) 
      ( ̂)     (  
   ) 
      ( )              ̂   
    
3.   ̅        ̂    
    
 
Proposition 4: A semipooling equilibrium of the following type exists if and only if   
      
    
1. Type h firm offers    with probability   ( 
 )   . Type l offers    with probability 
   ( 
 )  
(   ) 
(   ) 
 and offers   
     with probability     ( 
 ), where   
        
  (     )
 
2.  (   )=((1-  
   )     ) ((    
   )     ) 
      (  
   )    
      ( )               
    
3.   
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APPENDIX C.3.: DETAILS AND PROOFS OF EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS 
 
Strategies predicted in the “no signal” setting, “expensive signaling” setting, and the “cheap signaling” 
setting are respectively presented in Table A1, Table A2 and Table A3. Predictions for the “no signal” 
setting based on Giammarino and Lewis’s (1988) model lead to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis A: In the absence of signaling opportunity, only pooling offers should be made and 
accepted, with    [       ]. (Predictions of Giammarino and Lewis, 1988)  
 
TABLE C.3.1. 
Predicted strategies in the No signaling setting 
 
Offer type:  Separating offers Pooling offers  
    
      
        
Share offered (%) (with no risk premium)  43 18  27 
Share offered (%) (with 1$ risk premium)  50 20  32 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer accepted  -2.5 8.0  3.8 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer rejected  0.0 0.0  0.0 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer accepted  1.0 5.2  3.5 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer rejected  0.0 0.0  0.0 
      
Probability of offer by high-type firm: fh(.)  0.0 1.0  1.0 
Probability of offer by low-type firm: fl(.)  1.0 1.0  1.0 
      
Expected payoff of investor:  1.0 -1.5  1.2 
Probability of acceptance by investor: α(.)   1.0 0.0  1.0 
Notes: Predicted offers (following Giammarino and Lewis (1988)’s model) are given with and without a 1$CAN 
risk premium experimentally given to investors for the purpose of the incitation design. Payoffs are here 
displayed as they were to participants, which were paid according to the net value created by the investment. 
 
In the “expensive signaling setting”, let us consider the high-type firm strategy. Offers     
        
would yield the highest payoff (8$CAN), but are easily mimicked by low-type firms, so that the 
expected payoff of the investor is negative (-1.5$CAN). Anticipating the reject, firms will not offer 
    
   . High-type type firms have no incentive to deviate by offering     
         or     
        as 
they get negative payoffs. So is it with   
     . Offering      
        would be accepted and 
would yield 0.3$CAN. However, this strategy is dominated for high-type firms by   
      which 
yields 3.8$CAN. Investors still accept this offer as in average they break even. Let us now consider the 
low-type firm strategy. We similarly show that the low type firm should also propose the price pooling 
and brown signaling offer   
      (  
      without the 1$CAN risk premium). 
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TABLE C.3.2. 
Predicted strategies in the Expensive signaling setting 
 
Strategy - Offer type:  Separating offers  Pooling offers 
  Signal  No signal  Signal  No signal 
      
        
         
        
       
     
  
Share offered without 1$ risk premium  100 23  43 18  42  27 
Share offered with 1$ risk premium  100 25  50 20  49  32 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer accepted  -20.0 0.3  -2.5 8.0  -6.2  3.8 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer rejected  -8.0 -8.0  0.0 0.0  -8.0  0.0 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer accepted  0.0 -1.5  1.0 5.2  -2.9  3.5 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer rejected  -8.0 -8.0  0.0 0.0  -8.0  0.0 
           
Probability of offer by high-type firm: fh(.)  0.0 1.0  0.0 1.0  0.0  1.0 
Probability of offer by low-type firm: fl(.)  0.0 0.0  1.0 1.0  0.0  1.0 
           
Expected payoff of investor:  0.0 0.8  1.0 -1.5  0.0  1.2 
Probability of acceptance by investor: α(.)   0.0 1.0  1.0 0.0  0.0  1.0 
Notes: Predicted offers are given with and without a 1$CAN risk premium experimentally given to 
investors for the purpose of the incitation design. Payoffs are here displayed as they were to participants, 
which were paid according to the net value created by the investment. 
 
In the “cheap signaling” setting, we show with a similar analysis that both firm types are also 
predicted to select the price pooling and brown signaling offer   
      (  
      without the 
1$CAN risk premium). 
TABLE C.3.3. 
Predicted strategies in the Cheap signaling setting 
 
Strategy - Offer type:  Separating offers  Pooling offers 
  Signal  No signal  Signal  No signal 
      
        
         
        
       
     
  
Share offered without 1$ risk premium  55 19  43 18  31  27 
Share offered with 1$ risk premium  64 22  50 20  37  32 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer accepted  -8.5 5.0  -2.5 8  0.2  3.8 
Payoff of high-type firm if offer rejected  -3.0 -3.0  0.0 0.0  -3.0  0.0 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer accepted  -2.0 2.6  1.0 5.2  0.9  3.5 
Payoff of low-type firm if offer rejected  -3.0 -3.0  0.0 0.0  -3.0  0.0 
           
Probability of offer by high-type firm: fh(.)  0.0 1.0  0.0 1.0  1.0  1.0 
Probability of offer by low-type firm: fl(.)  0.0 1.0  1.0 1.0  1.0  1.0 
           
Expected payoff of investor:  0.0 -1.7  1.0 -1.5  1.2  1.2 
Probability of acceptance by investor: α(.)   0.0 0.0  1.0 0.0  1.0  1.0 
Notes: Predicted offers are given with and without a 1$CAN risk premium experimentally given to 
investors for the purpose of the incitation design. Payoffs are here displayed as they were to participants, 
which were paid according to the net value created by the investment. 
Hypothesis B: In both the expensive and cheap signaling settings, a price pooling and brown 
signaling equilibrium should be selected in which both firm types offer   
  [       ]. Investors 
should accept those offers and reject all others.  
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APPENDIX C.4.: DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL STATISTICS AND COMPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
 
TABLE C.4.1. 
Descriptive statistics of participants’ profile per treatment 
 
Treatment 
Nb. 
Subjects 
Age Gender 
(%) 
Lab 
Experiment 
Investment experience 
 
 Mean Std. 
Dv. 
Min Max M W Mean Std. 
Dv. 
Mean Std. 
Dv. 
Min Max 
Control 40 28.4 8.3 18 55 52 48 0.80 0.40 2.58 0.79 1 4 
E1 44 28.0 6.7 21 58 43 57 0.89 0.32 2.48 0.91 1 4 
E2 40 28.4 8.5 18 60 60 40 0.85 0.36 2.55 1.00 1 5 
E3 44 26.8 5.8 18 45 59 41 0.84 0.37 2.27 0.91 1 4 
C1 44 27.1 6.4 18 46 50 50 0.80 0.40 2.55 1.14 1 4 
C2 40 28.5 8.4 18 58 52 48 0.85 0.36 2.40 1.14 1 5 
C3 44 28.4 7.9 18 60 52 48 0.75 0.43 2.32 1.06 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE C.4.2. 
Proportion of participants that changed of offer category over the last 5 rounds 
Firm type  Treatment 
  E1 E2 E3 C1 C2 C3 control 
Low type 
firm  
         
50% 42% 42% 25% 42% 58% 42% 
High type 
firm 
 
38% 50% 50% 50% 38% 50% 13% 
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TABLE C.4.3. 
Descriptive statistics on Probit control variables 
Variable name   Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
investment decision   2880 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Offered shares z    2880 29.26 13.31 0.00 100.00 
Carbon offset purchased   2880 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Advertisement purchased   2880 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Result at previous round (investor)   2880 0.42 2.15 -6.00 26.00 
Result at previous round (firm)   2880 1.24 3.20 -20.00 15.00 
Non credible offer   2880 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
1st period dummy   2880 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Last 10 period dummy   2880 0.42 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Period   2880 12.50 6.92 1.00 24.00 
Gender (investor)   2880 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Age (investor)   2880 27.38 6.81 18.00 58.00 
Gender (firm)   2880 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age (firm)   2880 28.33 7.98 18.00 60.00 
Experience at experiment 
(investor) 
  
2880 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Knowledge at investing(investor)   2880 2.48 1.07 1.00 5.00 
Experience at experiment (firm)   2880 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Knowledge at investing(firm)   2880 2.43 1.00 1.00 5.00 
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FIGURE C.4.1. 
Offers made by firm types and investors’ acceptance rate in expensive advertisement (E1) and 
expensive carbon offset (E2) treatments over the first five periods of play 
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FIGURE C.4.2. 
Offers made by firm types and investors’ acceptance rate in expensive signal choice (E3) and cheap 
signal choice (C3) treatments over the first five periods of play 
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FIGURE C.4.3. 
Offers made by firm types and investors’ acceptance rate in cheap advertisement (C1) and cheap 
carbon offset (C2) treatments over the first five periods of play  
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APPENDIX C.5.: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS29 
 
The Experiment: 
This experiment consists in simulating investment decisions.  
In this experiment, you will randomly be divided into three groups: Group A, Group B and Group C.  
Group A participants manage an Initial Project of a given value. Group A participants can be of two 
types: Type 1 and Type 2. Initial Projects of Type 1 participants have a larger value than Initial Projects 
of Type 2 participants.  
Group A participants are asked to build a New Project, which will add value to their Initial Project. 
The value of the Initial Project added to the value of the New Project is called Final Value. To build 
the New Project, Group A participants have to get external financing from Group B participants. If 
they do not get financing, Group A participants cannot build their New Project. New Projects of Type 1 
participants also have a larger value than New Projects of Type 2 participants. Hence the Final Value 
of Type 1 participants’ projects is always larger than the Final Value of Type 2 participants’ projects.  
Each Group A participants knows his or her type (Type 1 or Type 2) but must keep this information 
private and confidential.  
Group A participants have three options: 
 - He or she can choose to purchase an advertisement stating that he or she is a Type 1 
participant. If he or she purchases the advertisement, Group C participant receives a commission. 
 - Or, Group A participant can choose to purchase the carbon offset of his or her project 
emissions. If he or she chooses to purchase the carbon offset, the commission will be paid to the not-
for-profit carbon-offset Canadian organization Planetair on their website, at the end of the session. 
 - Finally, Group A participants can choose not to purchase anything.  
Group B participants can choose to provide financing or not to Group A participants. In return from 
the financing they provide, Group B participants get a share of the Final Value plus fees. Group B 
participants do not know whether the Group A participant they are matched with is Type 1 or Type 2. 
However, they know that 40% Group A participants are Type 1 and 60% are type 2. They also know if 
the participant they are matched with purchased an advertisement stating that he or she is Type 1; or 
the project carbon offset; or nothing. 
Group C participant do not take any decision. His or her results only depend on the decisions of the 
other participants. 
 
What you are going to do 
All participants are endowed at the beginning with 6$CAN, which are brought into play. 
Group A participants will discover their type (Type 1 or Type 2), randomly allocated. This information 
must be kept private. 40% of Group A participants are type 1 and 60% are type 2.  
Both Type 1 and Type 2 Group A participants need to get a 6$CAN financing to build their New 
Projects. The two possible types are: 
 Type 1 participant: his or her Initial Project is worth 20 $CAN. If the 6$CAN financing is 
obtained, the New Project is financed and yields 15 $CAN. The Final Value of a Type 1 
project is thus worth 35 $CAN. If financing is not obtained, the Final Value stays at 20 $CAN. 
                                                             
29
 Instructions have been translated from French. Original French instructions are available upon request.  
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 Type 2 participant: his or her Initial Project is worth 6 $CAN. If the 6$CAN financing is 
obtained, the New Project is financed and yields 8 $CAN. The Final Value of a Type 1 project 
is thus worth 14 $CAN. If financing is not obtained, the Final Value stays at 6 $CAN. 
After having discovered his or her type, Group A participant proposes a share (percentage) of his or 
her project to Group B participant against financing and has three options: 
 Option 1: Offer a share and purchase an advertisement stating that he or she is type 1. 
Purchasing the advertisement costs 8 $CAN. If the offer is accepted by the Group B 
participant, the Final Value to be shared is thus equal to 35–8 =27 $CAN for type 1, and 14- 8 
= 6 $CAN for type 2. If the offer is rejected by Group B participant, the Group A participant 
has a result of -8 $CAN. Whether the offer is accepted or not, each time an advertisement is 
purchased, Group C participant earns a 1 $CAN commission. 
 Option 2: Offer a share and purchase the carbon offset of the project emissions. Purchasing 
this carbon offset costs 8 $CAN. If the offer is accepted by the Group B participant, the Final 
Value to be shared is thus equal to 35–8 =27 $CAN for type 1, and 14- 8 = 6 $CAN for type 2. 
If the offer is rejected by Group B participant, the Group A participant has a result of -8 
$CAN. Whether the offer is accepted or not, each time a carbon offset is purchased, 1 $CAN 
is given for carbon offset to Planetair. 
 Option 3: Offer a share and purchase nothing. If the offer is accepted by the Group B 
participant, the Final Value to be shared is thus equal to 35$CAN for type 1, and 14$CAN for 
type 2.  
Group A participants select option1, or option 2, or option 3. Then their offer is sent to their Group B 
partner. Only their Group B partner at the round knows the share offered and if the Group A 
participant purchased an advertisement stating that he or she is type 1, or carbon offset, or nothing.  
Group B participants discover the offer made by their Group A partner for the round. Then they 
decide:  
 Either to accept the offer and to finance the New Project. To finance the New Project, Group 
B participants invest 6 $CAN and want in return to earn at least a 1 $CAN fees. The produced 
Final Value is then shared between the Group A participant and the Group B participant 
following the share agreed upon.  
 Or to reject the offer and not to finance the project. In this case, if Group A participant had 
bought nothing, both players neither loose nor earn money. If Group A participant had 
purchased an advertisement, he or she loses 8$CAN and Group C participant earns 1 $CAN. If 
he or she had purchased a carbon offset, Group A participant looses 8$CAN and 1 $CAN is 
given for carbon offset to Planetair. 
Summary of task parameters (given in $CAN) 
 Type 1 Type 2 
Financing needed by Group A participant 6 6 
Group B participant fees 1 1 
Value of a Group A participant’s Initial Project 20 6 
Value created by Group A participant’s New Project 15 8 
Final Value of Group A participant’s global project (to be shared) 35 14 
Advertisement cost 8 8 
Final Value after advertisement purchase (to be shared) 27 6 
Group C participant’s commission if an advertisement is purchased 1 1 
Carbon offset cost 8 8 
Final Value after carbon offset purchase (to be shared) 27 6 
Transfer to Planetair if carbon offset is purchased 1 1 
Type probability 40% 60% 
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Results of one round: 
At each round, a Group A participant makes an offer to a Group B participant. An advertisement or a 
carbon offset is or not purchased. Group B participant either accepts or rejects the offer. A screen is 
then displayed and indicates: the offer made; the answer to the offer; your results; and your partner 
results. If you are a Group C participant, the screen indicates how much commission you were given.  
Your result for the round is calculated as your share of the created value (net of money invested). We 
will go through various examples in a few minutes.  
Only your partner for the round knows your decision and your result.  
At each round, and for the whole experiment, you will stay in the same Group and keep the same type. 
Yet at each round you will be matched with a new partner. Matching is random and anonymous.  
You do not know in advance how many rounds you will be playing.  
 
Example without purchase of advertisement or carbon offset: 
Suppose that a Group A participant offers a 20% share to Group B participant and purchases nothing 
(no advertisement, no carbon offset).  
Suppose his or her Group B partner accepts this offer.  
Suppose that the Group A participant was type 1. Her or his project has then a Final Value of 35 
$CAN. The Group B participant gets 20%*35=7 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we only 
consider the created value, so we subtract the 6$CAN financing. The group B participant earns finally 
7– 6 =1 $CAN (which covers the 1 $CAN fees he asked for). Group A participant gets 80%*35=28 
$CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we only consider the created value, so we subtract the 
value of the Initial Project, that is 20$CAN. The Group A participant thus earns 28-20 = 8 $CAN. 
Suppose now that the Group A participant was type 2. His or her project then has a Final Value of 14 
$CAN. The Group B participant gets 20%*14=2.8 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we 
subtract the 6$CAN financing. He or she thus looses 2.8 – 6 = -3.2 $CAN. The Group A participant 
gets 80%*14=11.2 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we subtract the value of his or her 
Initial Project, that is 6$CAN. He or she thus earns 11.2 – 6 = 5.2 $CAN. 
If the Group B participant rejects the offer, nothing is earned nor lost.  
In every case, Group C participant earns nothing and nothing is given for carbon offset to Planetair.  
 
Example with advertisement purchase or carbon offset purchase: 
Suppose that a Group A participant purchases the advertisement or the carbon offset for 8$CAN and 
offers a 20% share to Group B participant. 
Suppose his or her Group B partner accepts this offer.  
Suppose that the Group A participant was type 1. His or her project has then a Final Value of 35 - 8= 
27 $CAN. The Group B participant gets 20%*27=5.4 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we 
only consider the created value, so we subtract the 6$CAN financing. The group B participant looses 
finally 5.4 – 6 =- 0.6 $CAN. Group A participant gets 80%*27=21.6 $CAN. To get his or her result 
for the round, we only consider the created value, so we subtract the value of the Initial Project, that is 
20$CAN. The Group A participant thus earns 21.6-20 = 1.6 $CAN. 
Suppose now that the Group A participant was type 2. His or her project then has a Final Value of 14 - 
8= 6 $CAN. The Group B participant gets 20%*6= 1.2 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, 
we subtract the 6$CAN financing. He or she thus looses 1.2 – 6 = - 4.8 $CAN. The Group A 
participant gets 80%*6=4.8 $CAN. To get his or her result for the round, we subtract the value of his 
or her Initial Project, that is 6$CAN. He or she thus looses 4.8– 6 = -1.2 $CAN. 
If the Group B participant rejects the offer, he or she neither earns nor looses anything. However, 
Group A participant looses 8$CAN.  
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In every case, Group C participant earns 1$CAN if an advertisement has been purchased; or 1$CAN is 
given to Planetair for carbon offset if carbon offset has been purchased.  
 
Tables to calculate your results at each round: 
 
Table 1 presents results in every case for every possible offer made if nothing has been purchased. 
Table 2 presents results in every case for every possible offer made if carbon offset OR advertisement 
has been purchased.  
We are going to go though those tables together. Do you find in the Tables the lines corresponding to 
the examples?  
 
Your payment for the experiment: 
Whatever your results at the rounds, you will get 10$CAN for having completed the experiment. 
Then, you will receive an additional payoff that will depend on your decisions and other participants’ 
decisions.  
At the beginning of the experiment, you are endowed 6$CAN, which are at stake. You can lose them 
in the experiment, or earn more, depending on your results.  
You are going to play many rounds. At the end of the experiment, 2 rounds will be randomly selected.  
Your additional payoff will be calculated as the sum of your results at those two rounds, plus the 
6$CAN endowment. If this sum is negative, we consider that the additional payment is null.  
 
Payoffs examples:  
 
1) If a participant got the results « 9 $CAN » and « 1 $CAN » at the randomly selected rounds, 
his or her additional payoff is 9 + 1 + 6 = 16. His or her final payoff is thus 16 + 10 = 26$CAN.  
2) If a participant got the results « 9 $CAN » and « -12 $CAN » at the randomly selected rounds, 
his or her additional payoff is 9 -12 + 6 = 3= 16. His or her final payoff is thus 3 + 10 = 13$CAN. 
3) If a participant got the results « 9 $CAN » and « -16 $CAN » at the randomly selected rounds, 
his or her additional payoff is 9 -16 + 6 = -1, which is considered as null. His or her final payoff is thus 
0 + 10 = 10$CAN. 
 
TABLE 1 – NO PURCHASE  
% offered 
by A 
Group A participant is Type 1 Group A participant is Type 2 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that A gets 
Result 
for A 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that B gets 
Result 
for B 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that A gets 
Result 
for A 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that B gets 
Result for 
B 
0 35 15 0 -6 14 8 0 -6 
1 34,65 14,65 0,35 -5,65 13,86 7,86 0,14 -5,86 
2 34,3 14,3 0,7 -5,3 13,72 7,72 0,28 -5,72 
… … … … … … … … … 
99 0,35 -19,65 34,65 28,65 0,14 -5,86 13,86 7,86 
100 0 -20 35 29 0 -6 14 8 
Full tables available upon request 
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TABLE 2 – PURCHASE of advertisement OR carbon offset 
% offered 
by A 
Group A participant is Type 1 Group A participant is Type 2 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that A gets 
Result 
for A 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that B gets 
Result 
for B 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that A gets 
Result 
for A 
Share of the 
Final Value 
that B gets 
Result for 
B 
0 27 7 0 -6 6 0 0 -6 
1 26,73 6,73 0,27 -5,73 5,94 -0,06 0,06 -5,94 
2 26,46 6,46 0,54 -5,46 5,88 -0,12 0,12 -5,88 
… … … … … … … … … 
99 0,27 -19,73 26,73 20,73 0,06 -5,94 5,94 -0,06 
100 0 -20 27 21 0 -6 6 0 
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D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
 
Appendix D.1.: Case studies used in the experiment30 
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM A 
Business summary 
Firm A is a restaurant chain that employs over 1600 workers. All chain concepts, products and marketing tools 
apply to all restaurant units, empowering Firm A with a strong and visible brand image.  
Along 17 other French restaurant chains, Firm A belongs to a restaurant sample group. Firm A stands as n°1 in 
terms of turnover growth in 2008, 2009 and 2010. It over-performed the market throughout the crisis, increased 
its turnover by +1.9% from 2008 to 2007 (market  -1.8%) and only suffered a -0.2% loss from 2009 to 2008 
when the market underwent -6.1%.  
The average meal cost is lower than in its restaurant chain competitors. Moreover, the VAT reduction was 
passed on the average meal cost (- 3.5% from 2009 to 2010), in line with the special agreement for the restaurant 
industry (« Contrat d’avenir de la restauration »). The « fish and seafood » product benefits from a positive 
image in terms of nutritional quality. Those elements provide Firm A with a popularly-positioned price/product 
ratio, half-way between rapid and basic lunch catering and evening or weekend family dinner.  
Three categories of establishments exist: downtown restaurants; mall restaurants, and « solo » restaurants, a 
growing category with a strong visual impact. On November 30, 2010, Firm A counts 74 establishments (12 in 
Paris, 26 en Paris region, 36 in other French regions). 9 openings are forecasted in 2011 and 8 in 2012. Full 
growth potential is estimated at 150 establishments in France.  
For several years, Firm A has been engaged in an aggressive marketing policy (budget of 2% of turnover). 
Finally, Firm A had been managed by a high-quality top team for the past five years.  
 
Financial Information  
 
Business plan 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
  
       Turnover 
       % growth 
       EBITDA 
        % turnover 
       EBIT 
        % turnover 
        
 
 
 
BALANCE SHEET (k€)    2008   2009   2010 
Turnover 
                                                                   
30
 Translated from French. Original French version available upon request. Note that in the French version, ESG 
information were visually similar in terms of number of lines.  
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% change A-1 turnover restaurants 
      Raw material costs 
      Gross Profit 
      % gross profit restaurants 
      Personnel costs - Restaurant 
     Other costs - Restaurants 
      Gross Operating Income 
      % margin restaurants 
      Building rental costs 
     % margin restaurants 
      Head office costs 
      Gross Operating Profit -Total 
     % margin      
      
Operating Capex : About 4 M€/year (openings put apart), which is in the industry average in turnover %. 
 
Comparables Transactions Multiples 
  EBITDA Multiples 
Max  
 Min 
 Average 
  
 
Comparables 
Firms   
Stock 
price (€)   
Market 
Cap (€)   
Firm 
Value (€) 
Multiple 
Turn./LTM 
Multiple 
EBITDA/LTM 
Multiple 
EBIT/LTM 
X 
            Y 
            Z 
            ..... 
             
Average Stock Market Multiples 
  Mult Turn. Mult EBITDA Mult EBIT 
Max  
   Min 
   Average 
    
 
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 150 M€ 
Risk premium increase:     Firm value 130 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 170 M€ 
 
 
 
Information Steps 
Information 1:  
Firm A Board of Directors is strongly involved in Human Resources Management, particularly for employee 
training.  
In 2010, 95% restaurant employees were trained, including e-learning trainings (for management, kitchen and 
dining room workers). Trained employees benefited in average from 0.63 training day in 2010, against a 0.20 
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industry average. A “Challengers program” was implemented in 2009 to train future managers (Directors and 
Deputy Directors) over 18 months. Annual appraisals are formalized, with regular skill assessment for team 
managers.  
In 2010, 191 employees (that is 11%) were granted an internal promotion against 56 (4%) in 2009. Employee 
promotion led to an average wage increase of +6%.  
Information 2:  
Firm A commits to ensure that the greatest value is attached to work and skills and therefore especially targets 
wage increase and working condition improvement.  
Wages are in the high range of the chain restaurant industry, with performance incentives based on quantitative 
and qualitative objectives. In 2010, Firm A raised the salary scale higher that demanded by the collective 
agreements. Since 2008, wages systematically increased by +2 to +3%, while the inflation increased by about 
1.5%. 92% workers have permanent contracts, against a 64% industry average. Working conditions have been 
improved with the installation of skylights in the dishwashing area and a reduction of the cook stove heat.  
Employee turnover was reduced from 130% in 2000 to 42% in 2010. Work stoppages (WS) decreased by 1 WS/ 
13 000 worked hours in 2009 to 1 WS/15 500 in 2010. Finally, shirking decreased from 7.3% in 2009 to 4.3% in 
2010. 
Information 3:  
Firm A did not implement a voluntary policy of environmental footprint reduction. 
The carbon footprint is not evaluated. Water, gas and electricity consumptions are not monitored by restaurant 
unit. Monitoring and implementing water and energy savings are not included in 2011 targets. Paper 
consumption for marketing and head office activities are not well-documented. New buildings do not follow the 
High Environmental Quality standards. There is no restaurant waste reduction policy and few recycling practices 
have been implemented.  
Global energy and water consumptions increased between 2009 and 2010. Waste management deteriorated from 
an average 5.42 waste liters / consumer in 2009 to 5.78 liters in 2010.  
Information 4:  
Firm A does not possess any supplier chart with environmental guidelines and does not audit its key raw material 
suppliers (including shellfish suppliers) on those issues. 
A European directive recently implemented water classification criteria for shellfish production based on 
Escherichia coli bacteria concentration. Only Area A –produced shellfish can directly be sold for human 
consumption. 100% shellfish sold by Firm A are produced in Area B, meaning human consumption is only 
allowed after sufficient treatment in a purification center.  
The IFREMER national research center has shown that some pollutants (including heavy metals) and toxins 
(including endocrine disrupters) are not eliminated in the purification process.  
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM B 
Business summary 
Firm B produces packaging solutions for the agri-food industry. It has a twofold expertise: packaging and 
cooking products ; and a twofold trade : processing and distributing its products. It currently employs 227 
workers.  
Firm B is the French leader on its niche market (144 M€ in total size), with 35% market shares on its segment 
(over 50% in specialized segments). The agri-food paper/cardboard industry market has a strong resilience 
(relative certainty of yield, small risk), that follows in volumes the arifood product consumption. The market 
slightly decreased in volumes in 2008-2009 (-5% to -7%) due to the crisis, but should return to growth thanks to 
the population growth (0.5%/year). Firm B customers are wholesalers; large retailers (distribution channel well 
managed and with little competition); and large catering industrials.  
Following the financial crisis, Firm B focused on maintaining a satisfactory level of profitability and underwent 
two years of activity decrease in 2008 and 2009 (-4.6%). Retailer price pressure exists but remains relatively 
limited, even though some competitors did several concessions over the period to maintain their volumes.  
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Since 2009, Firm A has undertaken a market consolidation with a focus on growth market segments and 
diversification thanks to external growth. In 2010, it acquired the tangible and intangible assets of a small 
promising packaging industrial, hence improving Firm B visibility in the industry, including at an international 
level. Salesmen have an active and substantial presence worldwide to defend Firm B markets. Despite decreasing 
results, Firm B acquires more than ever new clients and signs new contracts, developing profitable outlets. To 
sustain its aggressive action plan, an official growth-marketing position was created in 2010, giving Firm B new 
impetus. Firm A image is in the process of modernizing and this evolution creates a gap with its usual 
competitors.  
Despite the crisis, Firm B has thus demonstrated its strength as a non volatile asset to built portfolio long-lasting 
value.  
 
Financial Information 
Similar to Case A (different values) 
 
 
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 38.2 M€ 
Risk premium increase:     Firm value 33.4 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 44.5 M€ 
 
 
Information steps 
Information 1:  
Firm B implemented a policy to manage its environmental footprint. 
Indicators were set up to monitor water, gas, electricity and paper consumptions and carbon emissions. A 
physical-chemical pre-treatment process for industrial water effluents was installed in 2000. A product waste 
(including toxic waste) monitoring system was also implemented. Finally, a policy of selective waste sorting and 
recycling is currently being installed.  
Water and energy consumptions decreased in 2009 (-3%) and 2010 (-7%). 66% waster was recycled in 2010, 
against 55% in 2009.  
Information 2:  
Firm B diversified into the ecodesign segment and now produces and commercializes products with reduced 
environmental footprint.  
In terms of ecodesign, Firm B invested to develop products that optimize raw materials (basis weight and/or 
packaging thickness reductions) and decrease toxic waste (use of vegetal inks, reduction of harmful volatile 
organic compounds). In 2009, Firm B launched the fabrication and sale of 100% labeled FSC product mix (label 
of sustainable and responsible forest management, delivered by an independent NGO).  
In 2010, 72% cardboard and 33% paper supplied are FSC (respectively + 24% and + 12% compared to 2009), so 
without additional cost. The new product targets retailers, includes 20% less materials, without affecting the 
product quality.  
Information 3 
Firm B did not clearly formalize the organization and structure of authority delegation.  
The current functional organization chart dates back to 2009 and has not been regularly updated. Authority 
delegation is not clearly established. No operational committee exists (management board, audit board, safety 
committee, sustainable development committee...) to formalize the firm strategic decisions. Audits and internal 
controls are not part of the corporate culture.  
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Most information on Firm B governance thus arises from dialog with its manager. Decision making is not 
participatory.  
Information 4  
Firm B is currently managed by Mister Z., CEO since 1991. His family founded the Firm in 1874.  
Mister Z has a deep understanding on the firm’s memory, background, know-how and key industrial and 
commercial account management. He largely supports the new Firm B growth-marketing strategy, influenced the 
recruitment in 2010 of Mister L. as head of the growth-marketing department, and follows its evolution.  
For reasons of ill health, Mister Z. decided to retire starting from January the 1st, 2012. No successor is currently 
anticipated. Mister L. recently announced his resignation.  
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM C 
Business summary 
Firm C creates, produces and retails electronic components at the world scale. Its products are used in sensitive 
industries such as transport (airplanes, trains, aerospace). It currently employs 2608 workers. 2010 saw 
substantial increase in large contracts on new products.  
Firm C is known for its important history in electronic components, with a worldwide market and production 
plants in Europe (4) and Asia (2) and commercial offices in Europe (4), Asia (2), the United States (2), and a 
network of salesmen in over 30 countries. Firm C encompasses a holding and a subsidiary company per 
production plant.  
Due to the wide range of equipments and country-specific norms, the number of Firm C products is particularly 
important. Firm C markets are resilient despite a relatively low growth (about 1%/year). The competitive 
dynamics is in favor of Firm C, whose growth exceeds the market growth (including gains in market shares). 
The electronic component market for specific industries has above-average operational demands. Components 
indeed need to last long (above 5 years) without major machinery failure, so in demanding environments 
(shocks, vibrations, temperature changes...). Firm C brands benefit from a quality track record and a good image.  
Firm C currently undergoes a high growth. In 2010, the firm achieved a 319,2 m€ turnover, that is +18,3% 
compared to 2009, with a 60,0m€ EBITDA (18,9% EBITDA margin). The 2011 budget shows a 335,2m€ 
turnover, that is a 5,1% increase. Productivity gains allowed by the automation of part of the production process 
and cost savings in the Chinese production enable a 68.0m€ EBITDA forecast (20.2% turnover).  
The firm top management, mostly French, is acknowledged for its excellence. Over the past 5 years, it has been 
focusing on Firm C commercial growth, while keeping a tight hand on expenses. R&D efforts and upstream 
positioning on emerging products confirm Firm C management quality.  
The growth potential of Firm C remains important considering the potential gains in world market shares. In 
particular, there is strong expectations on the commercialization of new products meeting the modern safety 
requirements of upcoming norms, which will likely lead clients to renew their demanding equipments.  
 
Financial Information 
Similar to Firm A (different values) 
 
 
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 497.8 M€ 
Risk premium increase:     Firm value 447.4 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 560.8 M€ 
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Information Steps 
Information 1 
Firm C decided to implement a new operational governance better involving its different subsidiaries.  
A supervisory board exists since several years. It encompasses a former Firm C top manager and investors and 
meets every three months. At the management level, chairman and CEO are distinct posts and those managers 
constitute a balanced trio with the Financial Officer. Monthly meetings with managers of subsidiaries abroad are 
organized and formalized.  
The Supervisory board members are highly satisfied by Firm C governance efficiency and their excellent 
relationships with the management.  
Information 2  
Firm C decided to increase the formalization of the organization with its subsidiaries.  
Following this decision, an organization chart was set up to clarify each subsidiary’s governance. Operational 
committees (commercial committee; R&D; Quality; industrial Production) were created at the holding level, 
gathering plant managers. Meetings between subsidiaries as well as between their departments (R&D; Quality; 
industrial Production) were also organized and formalized.  
Those structures enable Firm C to develop a more transversal and less hierarchical management, which 
particularly well suits its activity.  
Information 3  
Firm C does not display its human resources policy as being a priority.  
In terms of wages, Firm C is slightly lower than the industry average. Training programs implemented over the 
last four years focused on high-growth plant managers. The social dialog tensed over the last few months in two 
European production sites. Workers ask for a wage increase and a better management of their career in Firm C.  
Employee turnover increased by + 12% between 2008 and 2010 and work stoppages increased by + 6%.  
Information 4  
Firm C leaves its subsidiaries with as much freedom as possible regarding human resources management.  
Reports of the subsidiary meetings highlight that subsidiary Z in China has implemented a human resources 
policy which strongly differs from the other subsidiaries. In particular, it is underlined that employees work 10 to 
12 hours a day, 6 days a week and work 80 to 200 extra hours monthly (whereas the regulation limits them to 
36). A two-day strike occurred last month, workers asking for a wage increase and an improvement of their 
working conditions.  
The Southern Daily, a popular Chinese newspaper, just published its black list of the 20 worst multinational to 
work for in China, and Firm C appears among them.  
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APPENDIX D.2.: PARTICIPANTS’ PROFILE 
 
 
 
Fig. D.2.1. Distribution of participants by Private Equity specialty 
 
 
Fig. D.2.2. Distribution of participants by position in their Private Equity firms 
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Fig. D.2.3. Distribution of the risk aversion of participants in our field experiment, compared to laboratory experiment participants 
 
 
Table D.2.1 
Descriptive statistics on participants’ profile (from questionnaire) 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Full sample 
Variable (definition) Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Std. Dv. Min Max 
Number of participants 110 11 70 7 90 9 60 6 330 33 -   
Age 110 43.81 70 36.86 90 36.33 60 34.67 330 38.64 9.78 24.00 57.00 
Gender (=0 if man, 1 if woman) 110 0.45 70 0.29 90 0.22 60 0.00 330 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
ESG training (= 1 if trained, 0 otherwise) 110 0.46 70 0.43 90 0.44 60 0.67 330 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Risk aversion 110 2.18 70 2.71 80 2.63 50 2.00 310 2.39 1.31 0.00 5.00 
Venture capital (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.27 70 0.14 90 0.56 60 0.33 330 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Expansion capital  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.09 70 0.43 90 0.44 60 0.00 330 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Buyouts  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.64 70 0.57 90 0.33 60 0.50 330 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SRI  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.09 70 0.00 90 0.00 60 0.17 330 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
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Appendix D.3.: Experiment instructions31 
 
The experiment 
You will successively be given two firm case studies during the experiment. For each case study, you 
will receive additional information as the experiment goes on. You will have to value each firm several 
times, as additional information is provided. You will write down your firm valuation after each new 
piece of information. You will undertake several valuation rounds, for each case study. You are 
competing against the other participants to make a deal with each of those firms. You can earn a Prize 
depending on your decisions and the other participants’ decisions. This Prize consists in 3 bottles of 
Champagne. 
At the end of the experiment, a valuation round will be randomly selected for each case study. For the 
randomly selected valuation round, the participant who will have proposed the highest value for the 
firm will make the deal. However, the Winner will only receive the Prize if he or she made a « good 
deal », that is if the firm was not paid at too high a price. You are not allowed to communicate with the 
other participants throughout the experiment. You must keep confidential your firm valuations for each 
information round.  
 
What you are going to do in details  
A first case study will be handed over to you. The case study encompasses quantitative and qualitative 
information: business summary, business plan, firm history, balance sheet, comparable transactions, 
multiples and DCF. You will then value the firm for the first time and decide whether you want to 
invest in it or not. This is the valuation round n°1. You have 12 min to do so. A calculator is at your 
disposal would you need one. You will write down your firm valuation and investment decision on the 
valuation sheet (that we will shortly give you). We will then pick up your valuation sheet. 
A new piece of qualitative information (valuation round n°2) will be given to you. You can then 
choose either to change your first valuation and investment decision, or to keep to your first decisions. 
You can choose not to invest in the firm, but you still need to write down your valuation. You have 4 
min to take those decisions. Three new pieces of qualitative information (valuation rounds n°3, n°4 
and n°5) will successively be given to you in the same way. You will proceed for valuation rounds n°3, 
n°4 and n°5 as for valuation round n°2.For each case study, you will be thus asked five firm 
valuations. 
Once the first case study is completed by all, the second case study will be handed over to you, 
following the same rules. Once both case studies are completed, you will have to fill up a 
questionnaire. Finally, we will discover who the Winners are.  
 
Results and Winners: 
One Winner is identified for each case study. Thus there will be two Winners in this experiment. For 
each case study, a valuation round (n°1; n°2, n°3, n°4 or n°5) is randomly selected using a dice at the 
end of the experiment. The selected round will be used to identify who is the Winner for each case 
study. The Winner for each case study is the one who « made the deal » with the firm at the randomly 
selected valuation round. It is the participant who proposed the highest firm valuation and decided to 
invest in the firm at the selected round. The Winner will be known to all.   
The Winner only gets the Prize (3 bottles of Champagne worth about 120€) if he or she « made a good 
deal », that if he or she did not pay too high a price for the firm. If he or she paid too much for the firm 
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(that is « made a bad deal »), then he or she loses the Prize. Whether the firm has been paid too much 
for or not is decided by the market consensus. The market consensus on the firm valuation is given by 
the median of all firm valuations proposed by participants (for this case study, at this selected round). 
If the Winner paid the firm more than 10% above the market consensus, the Prize is lost. If the Winner 
paid the firm less than 10% above the market consensus, the Prize is won. Whether the Winner keeps 
or loses the Prize is known to all.  
If there are several Winners for a given case study (ex aequo), a draw will be used to identify who 
keeps the Prize. You have a few minutes to read those instructions again. Please let us know would 
you have any question; we will privately answer them. When all participants will be ready, we will 
start the experiment.   
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APPENDIX D.4.: POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. Do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. The study cases were very clear. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. The study cases were comprehensive enough to give a valuation of the firm. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
2. For case A, do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your own judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your anticipations on other participants’ judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
3. For case B, do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your own judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your anticipations on other participants’ judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
4. Please indicate the following information: 
a. Your age: _______________________________________________________________________ 
b. Your gender: ______________________________________________________________________ 
c. Your company: ________________________________________________________________ 
d. Your function in this company: ____________________________________________________ 
e. Your specialization (VC, LBO...): ______________________________________________________ 
 
ESG criteria are criteria that are used to evaluate how a firm takes into account environmental, social and 
governance impacts in its financial management. 
5. Did you receive training in your company about integration of ESG criteria into: 
a. your target analysis? 
  yes  no   
b. your due diligence contract? 
  yes  no 
c. your portfolio management? 
  yes  no   
 
6. Does your company have an ESG charter? 
  yes  no   
 
7. Would you say that the integration of ESG criteria is important for: 
a. LPs (Limited Partners) of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. stockholders of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
c. image of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
d. risk management of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
8. In your job, negative news: 
a. about environmental practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about environmental practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
b. about social practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
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  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about social practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
c. about governance practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about governance practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
9. In your job, positive news: 
a. about environmental practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about environmental practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
b. about social practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about social practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
c. about governance practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about governance practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
10. Please indicate for each decision if you choose option a of option b by ticking the corresponding box. 
 YOUR DECISION 
Decision 1 
Option a: 3 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 7 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 3 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 7 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                      
Option b      
Decision  2 
Option a: 4 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 6 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 4 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 6 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision 3 
Option a: 5 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 5 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 5 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 5 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision 4 
Option a: 6 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 4 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 6 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 4 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision  5 
Option a: 7 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 3 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 7 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 3 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
 
 
At the end of the sessions, the results will be analyzed. We will be able to give you detailed and personalized 
conclusions of the study. You will thus know where you situate in terms of firm valuation regarding the other 
participants. 
Do you wish to receive this personalized report? 
  yes  no   
If yes, please indicate bellow your name as well as your email address. 
Name: _____________________________________________________________________________ 
Email : ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Of course, your name as well as your company name will never be communicated in any result or publication. 
 
 241 
 
APPENDIX D.5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table D.5.1. 
Detailed descriptive statistics on experimental results by treatment 
Treatment  Valuation   Change in valuation   Investment decision  Change in investment decision 
Number Firm Factor Sign Obs.  Mean (M€)  Mean (%) Std. Er. Min. Max.  Mean (%)  Mean (%) 
1 A Base  11  166.82       90.91   
  Social + 11  169.82  1.92 2.99 0.00 8.55  90.91  0.00 
  Social ++ 11  171.91  1.20 1.43 0.00 3.13  90.91  0.00 
  Env. - 11  166.27  -3.28 6.24 -20.24 3.13  90.91  0.00 
  Env. - - 11  153.50  -7.26 8.74 -27.78 0.00  36.36  -54.55 
 B Base  11  38.06       63.64   
  Env. + 11  39.18  3.08 3.85 0.00 11.11  63.64  0.00 
  Env. ++ 11  40.01  2.17 3.98 0.00 13.51  90.91  27.27 
  Gov. - 11  38.48  -3.88 6.56 -21.05 0.00  63.64  -27.27 
  Gov. - - 11  36.42  -5.82 5.76 -16.29 0.00  36.36  -27.27 
                
2 C Base  7  458.29       85.71   
  Gov. + 7  460.00  0.34 0.73 0.00 1.96  85.71  0.00 
  Gov. ++ 7  459.71  -0.09 1.00 -2.17 0.00  100.00  14.29 
  Social - 7  453.00  -1.32 1.54 -4.00 0.00  71.43  -28.57 
  Social - - 7  432.14  -4.12 6.76 -18.60 0.00  28.57  -42.86 
 A Base  7  133.71       71.43   
  Social + 7  135.14  0.96 1.32 0.00 3.03  71.43  0.00 
  Social ++ 7  138.14  2.51 3.62 0.00 10.00  71.43  0.00 
  Env. - 7  137.00  -0.75 1.29 -2.89 0.00  71.43  0.00 
  Env. - - 7  129.00  -6.68 7.02 -16.67 0.00  57.14  -14.29 
                
3 B Base  9  40.68       77.78   
  Env. + 9  40.84  0.38 0.95 0.00 2.86  77.78  0.00 
  Env. ++ 9  43.44  5.90 5.95 0.00 16.00  77.78  0.00 
  Gov. - 9  40.19  -8.15 4.70 -16.67 -2.10  66.67  -11.11 
  Gov. - - 9  36.41  -9.60 8.56 -23.81 0.00  44.44  -22.22 
 C Base  9  558.78       100.00   
  Gov. + 9  571.56  2.27 3.61 0.00 8.40  100.00  0.00 
  Gov. ++ 9  578.83  1.14 3.09 0.00 9.38  100.00  0.00 
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  Social - 9  551.11  -4.26 8.03 -17.14 11.27  100.00  0.00 
  Social - - 9  495.00  -10.92 11.42 -38.20 0.00  66.67  -33.33 
                
4 A Base  6  145.33       50.00   
  Env. - 6  135.33  -6.54 9.04 -23.08 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Env. - - 6  116.67  -11.21 11.72 -31.82 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Social + 6  131.67  11.17 18.55 0.00 46.67  33.33  -16.67 
  Social ++ 6  132.5  0.79 1.94 0.00 4.76  33.33  0.00 
 B Base  6  33.17       50.00   
  Gov. - 6  30.83  -5.79 9.18 -20.45 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Gov. - - 6  25.00  -18.56 10.74 -28.57 0.00  66.67  16.67 
  Env. + 6  25.33  1.11 2.72 0.00 6.67  66.67  0.00 
  Env. ++ 6  25.67  1.04 2.55 0.00 6.25  66.67  0.00 
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TABLE D.5.2. 
 Effects of corporate sustainability policies on the change in firm valuation – robustness check a 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1
 d
  Model 2 
c
 Model 2' 
d
 
Pos. x Env (global) 4.88 *** (1.79) 5.09 *** (1.89)        
Neg x Env (global) -11.16 *** (1.86) -11.12 *** (1.97)        
Pos x Soc (global) 5.36 *** (1.85) 5.40 *** (1.96)        
Neg x Soc (global) -10.24 *** (2.18) -10.65 *** (2.33)        
Pos x Gov (global) 2.26  (2.18) 1.85  (2.33)        
Neg x Gov 
(global) 
-15.32 *** (1.79) -15.12 *** (1.89)        
Pos x Env x soft        1.73  (1.40) 1.89  (1.43) 
Pos x Env x hard        3.25 ** (1.40) 3.40 ** (1.43) 
Neg x Env x soft        -3.51 ** (1.44) -3.53 ** (1.48) 
Neg x Env x hard        -8.24 *** (1.44) -8.25 *** (1.48) 
Pos x Soc x soft        3.79 *** (1.44) 3.78 ** (1.48) 
Pos x Soc x hard        1.33  (1.44) 1.32  (1.48) 
Neg x Soc x soft        -2.81 * (1.69) -3.04 * (1.75) 
Neg x Soc x hard        -7.78 *** (1.69) -8.01 *** (1.75) 
Pos x Gov x soft        1.59  (1.69) 1.36  (1.75) 
Pos x Gov x hard        0.77  (1.69) 0.54  (1.75) 
Neg x Gov x soft        -5.75 *** (1.40) -5.60 *** (1.43) 
Neg x Gov x hard        -10.02 *** (1.40) -9.87 *** (1.43) 
Case study order 0.65  (1.13) 0.71  (1.18)  -0.13  (0.69) -0.13  (0.71) 
Internet session -1.16  (1.65)     -0.67  (1.00)    
Investor age 0.10  (0.06)     0.06 * (0.04) 
   
Investor gender 1.87  (1.32)     1.20  (0.80) 
   
Venture capital -1.75  (2.17)     -1.24  (1.31) 
   
Buyout -1.14  (1.86)     -0.83  (1.12) 
   
Expansion capital -2.49  (1.80)     -1.64 ** (1.08) 
   
SRI -3.98  (3.24)     -3.04  (1.95) 
   
ESG training -0.14  (1.15)     -0.03  (0.69) 
   
Obs. 198   198    330   330 
  
Nb. investors 33   33    33   33   
Wald chi2 191.84 ***      188.77 ***     
F-test    23.83 ***      12.96 ***  
R² (within) 0.51   0.51    0.37   0.37 
  
a
 Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. 
Corporate policy effects are decomposed into factor (Env., Social or Gov.), sign (Positive or Negative) and quality 
(soft or hard) and crossed effects are estimated. * p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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Table D.5.3. 
Effects of corporate sustainability policies on investment decision – robustness check a 
 
Model 3 
b
 
 
Model 3’ d  
  Estimates 
 
Predictive margins
 c
   Estimates   
Pos x Env x soft -0.80 
 
(0.73)  0.71 *** (0.11) 
 
-0.84 
 
(0.74) 
 
Pos x Env x hard 0.43 
 
(0.83)  0.86 *** (0.08) 
 
0.45 
 
(0.89) 
 
Neg x Env x soft 0.37 
 
(0.80)  0.85 *** (0.09) 
 
0.49 
 
(0.86) 
 
Neg x Env x hard -2.08 *** (0.72)  0.49 *** (0.13) 
 
-2.05 *** (0.71) 
 
Pos x Soc x soft -0.06 
 
(0.77)  0.81 *** (0.08) 
 
0.00 
 
(0.81) 
 
Pos x Soc x hard -0.09 
 
(0.77)  0.80 *** (0.10) 
 
-0.03 
 
(0.81) 
 
Neg x Soc x soft 0.93 
 
(1.05)  0.90 *** (0.08) 
 
0.92 
 
(1.08) 
 
Neg x Soc x hard -2.44 *** (0.84)  0.43 *** (0.15) 
 
-2.28 *** (0.80) 
 
Pos x Gov x soft 2.03 
 
(1.31)  0.96 *** (0.05) 
 
1.96 
 
(1.27) 
 
Pos x Gov x hard
 e
 22.91 
 
(26832.8)  1.00 *** (0.00) 
 
16.35 
 
(1184.48) 
 
Neg x Gov x soft -1.44 ** (0.71)  0.60 *** (0.12) 
 
-1.49 ** (0.72) 
 
Neg x Gov x hard -2.58 ***  (0.72)  0.40 *** (0.12) 
 
-2.52 *** (0.70) 
 
    
 
        
Case study order 0.42 
 
(0.39)  
    
0.42 * (0.38) 
 
internet session -2.38 * (1.28)  
        
investor age -0.01 
 
(0.05)  
        
investor gender -1.14 
 
(1.03)  
        
venture capital -1.61 
 
(1.63)  
        
buyout -2.99 ** (1.42)  
        
expansion capital -1.86 
 
(1.38)  
        
SRI -3.35 
 
(2.39)  
        
ESG training 0.58 
 
(0.89)  
        
risk aversion -0.24   (0.47)                  
Obs. 330 
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Nb. investors 33 
       
24 
   
Wald chi2 35.83 ** 
          
LR chi2 
        
53.91 *** 
  
log_likelihood -128.98               -62.64       
a
 Effects of corporate policies on the investment decision (0 = don’t’ invest; 1 = invest) depending on their Factor 
(Env., Social or Gov.), Sign (Positive or Negative) and Quality (soft or hard), estimated as crossed effects.  
b  
Model 3 is a random effects logistic regression.  
c 
 Predictive margins are the predicted probability of deciding to invest knowing the Factor, Sign and Quality, 
assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. that it is an average investor). 
d 
 Model 3’ is a fixed effects logistic regression. 9 investors had all positive (invest) or null (don’t’ invest) outcome 
and were dropped from the sample. 
e
 All observations  = 1 when Factor =  Governance, Sign = Positive and Quality = Hard 
* p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
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